Appendix to Charles de Gaulle on the Gold Exchange Standard

Press Conference, February 4th 1965

Charles de Gaulle

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to see you. In our world in the process of being shaped, and for our country whose stability allows for political continuity in a meeting like ours today, I think it is not the issues of the day, the hour, or the minute that we need to address. It is primarily the main issues on which I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to ask me the questions you wish, and in keeping with tradition, I will try to answer them. Please go ahead.

Journalist

Mr. President of the Republic, how do you foresee the relationship between France and the Soviet Union in 1965, particularly regarding the issue of German reunification? And how do you envision the relations between France and the various communist countries of Europe and Asia? Mr. President, I would like to respectfully ask you a personal question that, for both emotional and political reasons, interests the French people. The question is the following: how are you feeling?

Charles de Gaulle

I will answer you right away. I am not unwell, but rest assured, one day I will not fail to die.

[Laughter across the room]

Journalist

Allow me to complete our colleague's question. What do you consider to be the best paths to achieve German reunification in the current international context? In your opinion, what are the real chances of resolving this issue effectively and fairly? Mr. President, by converting part of its dollar holdings into gold, France has caused a stir that has highlighted certain flaws in the international monetary system. Are you in favor of reforming this system and, if so, how? Regarding the German question again, Mr. President, where do your preferences lie, in direct confrontation with Moscow within the framework of the former victorious powers of World War II, or direct dialogue with the Eastern European countries, including Russia? General, what do you think of the crisis at the United Nations? General, what is the status of the income policy, and does the government plan to expedite its implementation? What are the prospects for future relations between France and the Arab countries, from North Africa to the Near East? General, can you clarify your policy regarding foreign investments in France, and in particular American investments?

Charles de Gaulle

Well, here are all the subjects that preoccupy you all and, I believe, the entire world. Concerning France specifically, you mentioned income policy, and I will talk about this in turn. There was also the matter of the international monetary system currently in practice, and of what we think of it here. Several questions were raised about the global situation concerning the issue of Germany, particularly France's policy in this regard. The situation of the United Nations was also mentioned. I believe I have covered all the proposed topics for us to discuss. And so if you would like, I will start by talking about French economic and social policy, which is often referred to today as income policy.

Driven by machinery, modern economy is in a state of perpetual change. This is evident in their structure, as various sectors are created, concentrated, and progress rapidly while others decline or disappear. It is true for the overall product of a country's activity. It is true for how individuals use their own income, whether by consuming, saving, or investing in businesses, housing, or equipment. It is true for what the state takes from the national product of the country’s activity, collects by taxation what it borrows, and to what it dedicates its resources. Additionally, external connections are such today that what happens abroad inevitably affects what happens domestically. And what about wars and upheavals that destroy human resources and production equipment in some countries, while others find opportunities to increase theirs?

In short, we can say that the very nature of our mechanized civilization is that all the benefits resulting from advances in science, technology, capabilities, or infrastructure and tools are perpetually variable in their total and in their distribution. It is true that development, thanks to the means employed in our era, tends to increase rather than decrease. But this expansion itself is subject to many avatars, sometimes it is rapid, sometimes slow, driven by overheating as we say, or halted by crisis, sometimes in some sectors we see excessive development, while others see insufficient progress. This leads to many jolts, irregularities, abusive profits, or unjustified delays, resulting in numerous conflicts and difficulties within societies. As a result, states are increasingly inclined to frame and guide their national economies.

Before doing so, they face two opposing doctrines, each simple and terrifying. “Laisser faire, laisser passer” applied since the dawn of mechanization, undoubtedly gave a powerful impetus to development through profit, entrepreneurship, and free competition. But it also led to severe shocks and massive injustices. On the other hand, the communist system, implemented in certain countries after national catastrophes swept away their structures, and which vegetated under egoistical and archaic methods; the communist system, as I was saying, managed, through relentless coercion and propaganda, to build a massive production apparatus, especially in mining and heavy industry, but at the cost of immense trials, enormous waste, and crushing individuals who were never given neither the choice nor freedom. And in certain activities requiring spontaneous personal initiative and adaptation to multiple and changing demands, such as consumer goods manufacturing, agriculture, or distribution, the communist system is evidently deficient. Profit is necessary for initiative.

Thus, away from obligatory and spectacular mass gatherings and movements, life under communism is perpetually threatened, or at least dull, colorless, and tasteless. Some have believed, and some still do, that one of these excessive systems could find broad support here and impose themselves on the state and nation. But these are mere fantasies. It may seem convenient to some traditional theorists to celebrate the illusion of an unregulated economy, and equally expedient to subversion advocates to dream of a future society free of profits and competition. But everyone knows that barring a cataclysm that overturns everything, we will no longer surrender to the unchecked discretion of liberal capitalism, and no one believes we will ever submit to the crushing dictatorship of totalitarian communism. No, the path we have chosen is neither of these. We have chosen to drive, yes, to drive our effort and progress for the greatest output, greatest continuity, and greatest justice. This means that while leaving ample room for individual or collective enterprise, which involves risk by profit or loss, we apply public action to steer our economy towards national advancement and the improvement of the French people's welfare as France's wealth grows.

To do this, our framework is the plan that sets objectives to reach, steps, and conditions. Our means are laws, regulations, information, and, of course, credit, taxes, tariffs, and subsidies. Our policy is an action that adjusts the national income to the needs and progress of the community and its various economic sectors and social categories. The income policy. Monsieur Jourdain wrote prose without knowing it, and we have long practiced income policy without naming it. We did so when, over half a century ago, we adopted general and progressive income tax or established social security, family allowances, and the minimum wage after the Liberation. We continue this policy when we apply agricultural orientation laws, when we allocate part of the national income to massively support research, education, health, and agriculture, when we build hundreds of thousands of housing units each year, when we develop the country's infrastructure as a whole or regionally, and when we increase public servants' salaries in proportion to national income growth.

But our era does not stand still, so every passing day further commits us to our chosen path. It is essential that national product growth, resulting from development, is distributed among consumption, investment, public operating expenses, infrastructure, social benefits, and I forgot domestic or foreign debt repayment, ensuring that this growth is apportioned to sustain both present life and France's future progress. Naturally, this allocation must align with our means, needs, our own evolution, and those countries closest to us. Moreover, the total resources must not exceed what the country has earned, lest we face inflation and, ultimately, bankruptcy. This programming, as we say, expressed in percentages, must also enhance its social impact by addressing the various income and profit categories: industrial and commercial profits, wages and salaries, service earnings, agricultural incomes, and social benefits. Perfect parity is impossible because the data relative to each case are never identical. Furthermore this parity would be undesirable because it would be disastrous to remove emulation. What matters is that all categories advance with the overall progress, ensuring everyone gets their share.

We can very well understand that this policy may initially unsettle either various groups focused on their business, on their interests, wary by principle of public intervention in the economy, or certain professional bodies accustomed to focusing their actions on demands and fearing their role may diminish as the nation's economic and social life becomes more regular, less disparate, and more equitable. However, income policy aligns too closely with our era's trends to be anything but a collective concern. It is up to the Republic's authorities, government and parliament, to decide its nature. Still, the opinions and debates shaping it require cooperation from those responsible for production, labor, or technical fields. That is why the commissions of the plan, economic and social council, and recently established regional development commissions provide suitable frameworks for such consultations.

You see that amidst the significant upheavals occurring worldwide since the advent of mechanization, France has now established the means and paths of its own transformation. We know we have many steps to go, as progress has no limits. But we can say that our revolution proceeds regularly, day by day, because it is embraced in our minds and enshrined in law. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs have exposed many times what I have just said. The General Commissioner of the Plan has developed it in his reports, you all know it. Finally, in my turn I hope I have answered your question regarding income policy and related matters. Now, please repeat your questions about the international monetary system. Gentlemen, please go ahead.

Journalist

Mr. President, by converting part of its dollar holdings into gold, France has triggered reactions that have highlighted certain flaws in the current international monetary system. Are you in favor of reforming this system, and if so, how? My question, Mr. President, is connected to the previous one. Could you clarify your policy regarding foreign investments in France, particularly American investments?

Charles de Gaulle

Very well, I will try to explain my thoughts on these points. As the Western European states, which were ruined and decimated by the wars, recover their substance, the relative situation which was theirs tends to appear inadequate and even often abusive and dangerous. This observation does not imply anything unfriendly on their part, and even less so on the part of France, towards any country, particularly America. But the fact that these states increasingly want to act independently in all areas of international relations stems from the natural course of things. This also applies to the monetary system that has been in practice, or the monetary relations in practice in the world since the trials endured by Europe caused it to lose balance.

I was naturally speaking of the international monetary system that emerged after the First World War and that was established following the Second. It is known that this system, starting from the Genoa conference in 1922, granted two currencies, the Pound and the Dollar, the privilege of being considered equivalent to gold in external exchanges. It is true that the Pound was devalued in 1931 and the Dollar in 1933. At that time, one might have thought that this significant privilege, this significant advantage of these two currencies, was compromised. But America overcame its great crisis, and then the Second World War ruined the currencies of Western Europe, unleashing inflation there. As almost all of the world’s reserves were then held by the United States, and as they were universal suppliers, they could maintain the value of their currency. It could seem natural for states to indistinctly include dollars or gold in their foreign exchange reserves and for differences in balance of payments to be settled by transferring American monetary signs as well as precious metal.

And this international monetary system, this Gold Exchange Standard, has consequently been practically accepted since then. But it turns out it no longer corresponds in the same way to present realities and consequently entails increasingly heavy disadvantages. Since this issue, which interests the world, must be considered with serenity and objectivity, and since the current situation does not appear pressing or alarming in this regard, now is the time to do so. Let us note that the conditions that led to the Gold Exchange Standard have changed profoundly. The currencies of the Western European states have been restored to the point that the gold reserves these states possess, let’s say these six states, the six, in total equal that of the Americans. And it would even exceed it if these states wanted to convert into gold all the dollars they have in their accounts. Thus, this kind of transcendent value that was attributed to the dollar has lost its initial basis, which was America’s possession of the greater part of the world’s gold.

Moreover, the fact that many states accept dollars in principle, just like gold, for settling differences in their favor in the American balance of payments leads Americans to go into debt and do so freely abroad because what they owe, they partly pay with dollars they can issue themselves, not with gold which has real value, is only possessed if earned, and cannot be transferred to others without risk and sacrifice. Also, this kind of unilateral facility attributed to America helps obscure the idea that the dollar is an impartial and international sign of exchanges when it is actually a means of credit suitable for one state. Of course, there are other consequences of this situation, notably the fact that the United States, failing to settle their negative balances in gold, contrary to past practices requiring states to take necessary and stringent measures to establish balance, face annual deficits.

This situation creates, through what must be called inflation, American capital exported in the form of dollar loans granted to states or individuals. Naturally, this increase in American fiduciary circulation makes domestic investments less profitable. Thus, there is a growing tendency to invest abroad. This results in a sort of expropriation of certain enterprises in some countries. This practice has long favored and still somewhat favors the considerable aid America provides to many countries, from which we ourselves have significantly benefited in the past. But circumstances have changed, and this is why France advocates for the system to be changed. The fundamental imbalance that is now a fact should end. France has advocated this, as you know, at the Tokyo monetary conference. Given the potential consequences of a crisis in such a domain, we think it is necessary to take timely measures to avoid it. We believe it is essential for international exchanges to be established, as they were before the great misfortunes of the world, on an indisputable monetary base without bearing the mark of any particular country.

What basis? Truly, there seems to be no real criterion or standard other than gold. Yes, gold, which does not change nature, can be differently shaped into ingots, bars, or coins, has no nationality, and is eternally and universally regarded as the inalterable and fiduciary value par excellence. Despite the immense trials we have all endured, despite what may have been imagined, said, written, or done, the fact is that today no currency holds value except in direct or indirect, real or supposed relation to gold. Naturally, no state can be compelled to do what it must within itself. But in international exchanges, the supreme law, the golden rule, literally, is to restore the obligation to balance monetary zones by actual inflows and outflows of precious metal in payment balances.

Certainly, the end of the Gold Exchange Standard without severe shock and the restoration of the gold standard, along with necessary complementary and transitional measures, particularly the organization of international credit on this new basis, should be calmly examined between states, especially those with significant economic and financial power. The appropriate frameworks for such studies and negotiations already exist. The International Monetary Fund, established to ensure monetary solidarity as much as possible, is undoubtedly a very suitable place for such negotiations. The Committee of Ten, comprising apart from the United States and England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, and Canada, would prepare the necessary proposals. Finally, the six states appearing to be forming a Western European economic community should develop and advocate a sound system corresponding to common sense and the reborn economic and financial power of our old continent. France, for its part, is ready to actively contribute to this necessary reform in the interest of the entire world.

Sir, you asked me something about the United Nations. Someone asked about my health, and also about that of…

Journalist

Yes, Mr. President, given the acute nature of the United Nations crisis, I wanted to ask you for your opinion on this crisis and what measure you would recommend to resolve it?

Charles de Gaulle

I will go back quite far because the idea of the United Nations is an old one. Naturally, it emerged from the war because war gives birth to everything, as the ancient Greeks used to say. It was from the First World War that the League of Nations was born, which France, England, the United States, and their allies decided to establish in order to try, through the cooperation of peaceful countries, to prevent the recurrence of the misfortunes that had torn the world apart. Subsequently, America decided to abstain from being a part of it. But as long as the circumstances that underpinned the world's situation were those set by the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations could exist and function, mostly by exalting its own principles, especially when it came to theoretically condemning war.

But it became evident that, given that men are men and states are states, they had aimed too high. As imperialist Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy attacked the established order, and it was no longer just a matter of talking but of acting against them, the League of Nations demonstrated its impotence because the gathering of so many calculations, reservations, fears, and diverse interests could not result in action. Action requires determination, commitment, and risk. The Second World War then rendered the Geneva institution bankrupt, and we saw its main members come to blows, divided as they were into two opposing camps.

Nevertheless, the idea of offering all the nations of the world the opportunity to meet on equal footing, to discuss among themselves the affairs of the universe, to formulate the average sentiment of the peoples on these matters, to concentrate information on the material, social, and moral situation of many countries, and to put into effect the aid useful or necessary for their development. This idea reappeared even before the cannons had fallen silent, with Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek. I had the honor of helping to draft the charter that was to be adopted in San Francisco by fifty-one states.

It is known that, according to this constitution, the United Nations included a council responsible for overseeing general security, and even, if necessary, deploying means to ensure respect for it, as well as an assembly whose deliberations would result in recommendations. The right to act was reserved for the council. This council, among its eleven members, was to include the five victorious powers, each having a veto right. An Economic and Social Council, a Court of Justice, and a Secretary-General were added to these two main bodies to ensure the practical operation of the organization. Finally, the charter stipulated that the United Nations should not intervene in the internal affairs of a state.

This charter was reasonable within the assembly, it made it normal and permanent for almost all the states in the world to meet in a sort of forum from which international opinion could emerge. It also conferred a highly recognized dignity on each of its members, particularly those who had recently achieved sovereignty and independence, thanks to the equality that reigned among them. Within the council, five powers, to whom their politics, economy, arms, and influence granted global responsibility, could meet and perhaps even collaborate to maintain peace.

These provisions were, in my opinion, prudent. Naturally, it did not create a world government or parliament, as such a government and parliament cannot exist in our century except in dreams. But given the realities, and above all the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Russia across the globe amidst an increasing number of states, this charter, without pretending to impose what could not be imposed, afforded the United Nations balance and impartiality.

We know what happened under the pressure of events in Korea, Suez, and Hungary, and also due to the moderate abuse of the veto right by the Soviets. The United Nations allowed itself to exceed its nature and possibilities, deviating from its charter. Considering the Security Council's responsibilities, the General Assembly, in 1950, arrogated to itself the right to decide on the use of force, which immediately turned it into a battleground for disputes and rivalries. Amidst the resulting turmoil, the then Secretary-General assumed an excessive and superior authority, continuing down the path of abuses.

The organization, more precisely the General Assembly, took it upon itself to intervene in the internal situation of the Congo, sending military contingents provided by states often with vested interests — what state doesn't have them? — as well as political, economic, and administrative missions that effectively responded to the intentions of a great power. Evidently, through this series of breaches of its own legality, the United Nations underwent a profound transformation that led it to lose, it must be admitted, its unity, prestige, and functional capabilities, hence the crisis it is currently in.

I would frankly say that, in my opinion, the United Nations can regain its balance by returning to prudence and the charter. Given the current state of affairs, it is obviously necessary for Washington, Moscow, London, Beijing, and Paris to agree to return to the starting point, as they once agreed to found the United Nations. France, for its part, is fully prepared to support such an agreement, and it seems to me that Geneva would be the most suitable place for such negotiations between the five. Incidentally, it would also be an appropriate place for any other negotiations you have in mind.

France indeed ardently wishes that we may save this institution, in which the world has placed so much hope, to help foster solidarity among all people on earth. That is what I think about the current United Nations crisis.

I have been asked several questions about Europe, and in particular regarding the German problem and the reunification of Germany. I would like them to be repeated to me.

Journalist

[inaudible] in the current international situation as the best solution, the best path to achieving the reunification of Germany. In your opinion, what are the real chances of solving this problem effectively and fairly? How do you envision France's relations with the Soviet Union in 1965, particularly regarding the issue of German reunification? And how do you also view France's relations with communist countries of various tendencies in Europe and Asia?

Charles de Gaulle

You know that in the talks I had the honor and satisfaction of having with Chancellor Erhard fifteen days ago at Rambouillet, where we were able to establish a confident friendship, we naturally considered the problem of Germany. I won't tell you what was implicitly advanced from either side in these conversations on this crucial subject. But I can indicate what France's views are as far as they have not already been exposed. The German problem is the European problem par excellence. It has been so since the advent of the Roman Empire, and since historical Europe ceased to be limited to the Mediterranean basin, extending to the European Rhine because of the placement of the Germanic tribes at the center of our continent, between the Gauls, the Latins, and the Slavs. It is European because this problem, through a very harsh history, has concentrated within itself many aftereffects that cause the neighboring peoples of this country, in perpetual evolution, to feel rancor and apprehensions towards it from century to century. It is European because the German people are a great people in terms of economic activity, as well as thoughts, sciences, and arts. And also in terms of military capabilities, making Germany an essential part of Europe. It is European because Germany has always felt anxiety and sometimes fury inspired by its own uncertainty regarding its borders, its unity, its political regime, and its international future, making its destiny of concern to all of Europe, all the more so due to its indeterminacy.

It goes without saying that the events that occurred during the first half of this century have made this problem even more difficult and pressing. Already after the First World War, and because of the German Empire, Europe had undergone a massive upheaval to the west, east, north, and south. But the immense dominative enterprise of the Third Reich, the invasion of its armies up to the English Channel, the Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Adriatic, and both shores of the Mediterranean, and up to the Arctic, the outskirts of Moscow, the depths of the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, the actions of its submarines on all the oceans of the globe, its tyranny established over twelve European states, its hegemony over four others, the violent death of forty million men, military and civilian, as a consequence of its actions, particularly the systematic extermination of ten million detainees, had caused terrible wounds all around Germany.

No doubt, the final crushing of the Third Reich had put an end to the ordeal. Undoubtedly, the initial subordination imposed on the vanquished, and the faits accomplis in what was once East Prussia, Posen, and Silesia, the end of the Austrian Anschluss and the protectorate over Czechoslovakia, and the organic division of the country by the creation of zones and the status of Berlin had alleviated the direct fears that Germany had always inspired. Also, the reasonable and skillful policy of Chancellor Adenauer's government reassured many in the West. However, the scars left by the drama remained very deep. To be blunt, it's with caution, even some discomfort, that Western European opinion often viewed the economic expansion, military revival, and political renaissance of the Federal Republic. Meanwhile, the Sovietized regimes of the East used the instinctive distrust of populations towards Germans to justify the Cold War against the so-called revanchist-led Free World.

Thus, the problem is once again posed in history. For France, everything boils down to three questions, all closely linked. Ensuring that Germany becomes a certain element of peace and progress. Under this condition, aiding in its reunification, choosing the path and the framework that would allow this to happen. It is true that, after the world war, things were not immediately considered in this way. Under the pressure of the trials endured and the perils faced by the peoples of the old continent, many imagined preventing their misfortune by eliminating what had been the cause, namely German power. Hence the projects aimed at prohibiting the reconstitution of a central government, placing the Ruhr under international control, and keeping Germany disarmed; and it is known that France was initially inclined towards this conception, for obvious reasons.

But the fact that the confrontation between the Free World and the Soviet World became the major issue, and that Germany was a stake, modified our perspectives. Moreover, in the depth of their misfortune, our German neighbors no longer seemed threatening to us, and despite everything, many felt towards them and despite everything an elemental attraction which their quality merits. Finally, and above all, the Union of Europe, which is an indispensable condition for its independence and development, required the reconciliation and cooperation of Germany and France. However, the opposition between East and West, unfolding on German soil, could not help but deepen its political and territorial division. Indeed, the Soviets, having imposed by force a regime of their making in their zone, suggested that one day Germany could be reunited under a similar system. But the Atlantic alliance, the economic and social success of the Federal Republic, and the revulsion inspired by communism in the entire German population rendered this pretense vain. To achieve unification of Germany under a similar system to theirs, the Soviets would have needed to triumph in a world conflict. Despite the tension they maintained in Berlin, they refrained from starting one.

On the other hand, the United States, guided by Foster Dulles's policy, might have thought that massively strengthening NATO would make Moscow back down and thereby restore Germany's unity. But this was merely a dream unless war ensued, to which neither Washington nor its allies were inclined. Furthermore, much of universal opinion, while recognizing the precarious nature of what was happening in the former Reich and disapproving of the brutal artifices of the Wall and barbed wire, accommodated the situation, which, like it or not, did not prevent peaceful coexistence.

Twenty years have therefore already passed without the new destiny of Germany being determined. Such uncertainty in such a region of the world and at such a time cannot certainly be considered definitive. Undoubtedly, things can remain as they are for a long time without provoking a general conflagration tomorrow, no more than they did yesterday, with mutual atomic deterrence preventing the worst. But it is certain that true peace between East and West, and even more so, fruitful relations, cannot be established as long as the German anomalies endure, the uncertainties they provoke, and the suffering they cause. It is also true that, without fighting to impose one solution or another, and without denying the interest in continually raising the question before the conscience of nations, the problem cannot be solved by direct confrontation of the ideologies and forces of the two opposing camps in the world.

In truth, it is only through the understanding and combined action of the peoples who have always been, who are today, and who will remain primarily interested in the fate of their German neighbor, that is, the European peoples, that the solution to a question that is essentially European can be found. For these peoples to one day consider examining together, then jointly resolving, and finally guaranteeing what needs to be done, that is the only way that can allow, and that is the only bond that can maintain, a Europe in a state of balance, peace, and cooperation from one end to the other of the territory that nature has assigned it. Certainly, the success of such a vast enterprise involves many conditions. Russia must evolve sufficiently to see its future not in totalitarian constraint imposed on itself and others, but in progress accomplished together by free men and peoples. The nations it has made its satellites must regain the ability to act for themselves in a renewed Europe. It must be recognized everywhere, and first of all by Germany, that any settlement involving it would necessarily entail agreement on its borders and armaments with all its neighbors, both East and West. The six states currently, we hope, establishing the Western European Economic Community must organize themselves in politics and defense to make possible a balance on our continent.

Evidently, all this entails very complex conditions and long timelines. Ultimately, one can only succeed if one strives to create a Europe that lives in harmony and cooperation from the Atlantic to the Urals, to develop its immense resources and, she being the mother of modern civilization, play jointly with America, its offspring, the role it deserves in the progress of the two billion people who absolutely need it. What part could Germany take in the global ambition of our rejuvenated old continent? Once again, it requires very complex conditions and long timelines. But what? The German problem is so vast that it necessarily has great dimensions and significant consequences. In any case, France believes that it can only be resolved by Europe itself, as it is of European dimensions. France, for its part, has this goal as an essential objective of its policy on this continent in the long term.

I hope I have answered you. I believe I have exhausted your questions, ladies and gentlemen. There seem to be no further questions.

Journalist

[inaudible] in the Middle east.

Charles de Gaulle

It is a matter that is evolving. As for North Africa, the evolution is favorable, very favorable. Regarding the East, it is an evolution that opens fruitful and, I believe, interesting prospects. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.

Journalist

[inaudible]

Charles de Gaulle

I would like to say a word even though I was not asked the question, simply to express how satisfied I was with the contact I had with the British Prime Minister during my visit to London, where I paid tribute to the great Churchill. Naturally, we realized during this contact that there is no mountain between England and France, there is only a channel and, with a tunnel, I believe we could bring them much closer. Probably all the problems that are common to our two great countries can be addressed more explicitly with myself, with the Prime Minister, and with French ministers when the British Prime Minister comes to Paris, which we certainly hope will happen. Thank you for your attention.