Charles de Gaulle on Atlanticism, Europe

From "C'était de Gaulle"

These past couple of weeks there has been a lot of talk of French “strategic autonomy” as well as its relation with the American world order. I thought it would be of some value to our friends if they received the perspective of the founder of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle. All passages from this series are taken from the book “C’était de Gaulle” by Alain Peyrefitte. Peyrefitte was minister of Information under De Gaulle (as well as several other positions) and his confidant for a while.

In the book, he relays the conversations he had with the General. The topics cover everything from foreign policy, a potential monarchist succession, decolonisation, etc. Such topics have profound impact on the course of contemporary France, and it is often amusing to contrast them to those who today call themselves “Gaullists”. The book remains a great source on De Gaulle in France, and remains largely unknown in the English sphere as I haven’t found any translations. Hopefully, it will be of some value.

Some notes for the reader: For the sake of brevity, I will shorten Alain Peyrefitte’s name by “AP” and Charles de Gaulle as “CDG” (as is done in the book).

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On the Nassau Agreement

AP: "What does this clause allowing the English to regain their freedom of action 'if their supreme national interests are at stake' mean?"

CDG: "Nobody knows. What is certain is that the nuclear strength of the English can no longer be an element of their national policy. They will lose all freedom of action. If they were to deem a 'supreme national interest' to be at stake, how could they regain their independence when all their forces are integrated into the American system? Withdrawing a national force from the multilateral system in which it would be included would create such a serious dispute that it is hard to see how the United States would accept it.

Regaining the free use of their force... It's a joke, one more joke. Once Macmillan has assigned his bombers, rockets, and nuclear warheads to the multilateral force, do you really think he's going to take them back overnight? All of it will be so integrated, intertwined, that the English will be completely tied up. A tight network of liaison services, technical subordinations will be woven around and inside this multilateral force. It's not in moments of apocalypse that they could break free from it!

For example, what would have happened during the Suez operation? Theoretically, England could have responded to the Soviet blackmail if it had had submarines armed with Polaris missiles. But since there was a conflict between England and the United States, how could England have withdrawn its forces to oppose the Soviet threat? The Americans would never have allowed it.

The English have put themselves in a trap at Nassau. They won't get out of it. Their atomic independence is cooked. But since the Conservative Party is disciplined, it will try to conceal it to overcome this crisis. When you think that until the Second World War, the English were the elders and America the younger. They sold their birthright for a dish of Polaris!

[…]

I had made the principle decision to close the door of the Common Market to the English, both because they are not economically ready to enter, and because they are not really politically willing. I felt that Macmillan would let himself be tied up at Nassau. He went there defeated. And sure enough, it happened. He resigned himself to placing his nuclear strike force in a multilateral force under American command.

Not only will nothing change in NATO, since it will still be the Americans who will command; but the nuclear force of the English, which had aspirations of becoming somewhat independent, will completely cease to be so. Until my return to office, Great Britain lived with the idea that it was the privileged sister; it would not have an independent nuclear strike force, but it was the only one with a finger on the trigger of the American force, which gave it a dominant position in Europe and allowed it to play on the rivalries of others, notably the Franco-German rivalries. In short, it thought it could lead all Europeans by the nose. For the past three or four years, as we have been taking steps to equip ourselves with our own nuclear strike force, it too had started to want one for itself. But it had not provided the means. And now, it has definitively given up on it.

Yet I had insisted with Macmillan, at Champs six months ago, at Rambouillet fifteen days ago, on the necessity of not remaining dependent on America. He had told me that it was his sentiment and that of the youth. But he fell headfirst into the trap. England is now nothing but a satellite of the United States. If it enters the Common Market, it will only be the Trojan horse of the Americans. That would mean Europe renounces its independence.”

AP: "Is that what you will say on January 14th?"

CDG: "Not exactly like that!"

[…]

CDG: “Technically, this offer could not interest us. But the real reason for my refusal is political. We cannot leave to the Americans the task of deciding our future. That's it. We want to have our own force.

The English have refused to keep their future in their own hands. They have accepted to put all their atomic force, present and future, in this multilateral force under American command. All current British bombers will be placed there. The Americans are willing to give us something, provided that we give it back to them, while giving them everything else: both what they have given themselves, and what they had not given! It's an excellent deal for them. (Big laugh.)

It's meant to allow Macmillan to save face. But it's transparent. As for the clause on the "supreme interests" of England, which would allow the English to withdraw their chips, I told you, it's a joke. They have entered a trap. Impossible to get out of it. Even their missiles themselves wouldn't be able to guide themselves, without the support of the logistic system, radars, etc., which are necessary for them to succeed. They have allowed themselves to be vassalized.”

On disengagement from NATO

AP: "Do you think we can just disengage from NATO like that without the Americans shooting us?"

CDG: "Of course, we can! That's exactly what we're doing, step by step. We're distancing ourselves from the Americans while remaining good friends. The friendship remains, as evidenced by Malraux's recent trip. The Americans know, or at least should know, that one does not rely on what is weak. One only relies on what is firm."

AP: "Do they really know that?"

CDG: "They should. But in reality, they always have the temptation to rely on what is weak rather than what is strong. In all the underdeveloped countries, they are tempted to prop up rotten regimes that are favorable to them, and even more so because they themselves have corrupted them, rather than supporting tough regimes that arise from a genuine popular will; because they fear such regimes. During the war, they relied on Pétain, or Darlan, or Giraud, against de Gaulle, who embodied the will of the nation. And even we ourselves, how many times have we been tempted to rely on the Glaouis and other Bao Dais?"

As he speaks, I have the feeling that he has just touched on the crux of the opposition between the Americans and himself. He continues without my intervention.

CDG: "The Americans will never be able to resist promoting the career of a Jean Monnet to the fullest extent, because they see in him their man, and opposing de Gaulle, because they perceive in him a man who resists them. However, they should understand that the best ally of the United States is not the one who bows down to them, but the one who knows how to say no to them."

He brings me to the heart of his truth: to exist is to resist. His formula could be likened to that of Goethe, whom he occasionally quotes to mock his adversaries: "Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint" [I am the spirit that always denies]. Except that he only denies in order to unequivocally affirm France.

On the NATO forces in France

Restricted Council Meeting of Thursday, June 2, 1966.

CDG: "This NATO issue is both simple and complex. Simple, because we know what we want and where we are going. Complex, because there are actually several negotiations."

He distinguishes four of them. The first with the Federal Republic of Germany; the second on the employment of our forces in times of war.

CDG: "If there were a military action by NATO, we would first adopt a reserved attitude. We would join this action, or not, depending on the circumstances. It would depend on our free will. But once we have decided to participate in these operations, it is clear that we would do so in conjunction with our allies."

The third on the conditions of the departure of the Americans; the fourth between France and the various allied governments, on the facilities we grant in times of peace for overflight and communications, as well as potentially in times of war.

Couve clarifies a point: "As for the facilities to be granted to the Americans, we can give longer delays. For example, there are two pipelines, one collective for NATO, the other exclusively American."

CDG: "That is not integration, since we can cut off the pipelines at any time... like the overflight of NATO planes, which we can prohibit at any moment. What needs to be done is to remove the American soldiers; otherwise, there is no reason for them to remain indefinitely in our country, as in an occupied territory."

[…]

Council meeting of March 22, 1967.

Couve: "The evacuations of NATO headquarters and troops continue, with dignity. The Americans have been accommodating. The operation will cost them dearly. Farewell ceremonies are taking place in a very proper atmosphere. We part amicably."

CDG: "Well, I see that everyone is satisfied. So we have done what needed to be done."

On his conception of Europe

Then he gets to the heart of the matter, perhaps wanting to mitigate through me the "anti-European" impression he may have given.

CDG: "Our policy, Peyrefitte, I ask you to emphasize it well: it is to achieve the unity of Europe. If I insisted on reconciling France and Germany, it is for a purely practical reason: it is because this reconciliation is the foundation of any European policy.

But what kind of Europe? It must truly be a European Europe. If it is not the Europe of peoples, if it is entrusted to a few technocratic organizations more or less integrated, it will be a history for professionals, limited and without a future. And it is the Americans who will take advantage of it to impose their hegemony. Europe must be independent. That is my policy.

This does not mean that it should not have allies. It must have them, given the global threat posed by communism. However, it must exist on its own, for itself.

The Americans favored Jean Monnet's Europe as long as it was a means for them to maintain or expand their hegemony. When they see that their influence risks decreasing instead if Europe becomes a powerful body that could do without them, they are less enthusiastic.

The goal is to create Europe without breaking with the Americans, but independently of them."

He returns to this theme after a pause, as if he feared that I did not understand

"Europe can only be created if there is a European ambition, if Europeans want to exist on their own. Similarly, a nation, to exist as a nation, must first become aware of what differentiates it from others and must be able to assume its destiny.

The sense of national identity has always been affirmed in relation to other nations: a European national sentiment can only be affirmed in the face of the Russians and Americans. The idea of Europe, since the end of the war, has progressed thanks to the threat from the Russians. Now that the Russians are weakening, and fortunately so, we have the opportunity to toughen up towards the United States, and it is our duty; otherwise, the so-called integrated Europe would dissolve into the Atlantic entity, that is to say, American, like sugar in coffee!"

On the unique French impulse to create Europe:

CDG: “What the Anglo-Saxons want is a borderless Europe, a Europe that no longer aspires to be itself. The Europe without frontiers. The Europe in the English manner. The Europe where England has not overcome its old habits to truly become European. In reality, it's the Europe of the Americans. The Europe of the multinational corporations. A Europe where, in its economy, and even more so in its defense and politics, it would be placed under inexorable American hegemony. A Europe where each European country, including our own, would lose its soul. Why should we join this Europe?

It so happens that France is the only one that wants a Europe that truly exists, the only one that can want it. Our European partners are more accommodating than us towards England and America, for a simple reason, which is that they cannot even imagine not bowing to the slightest pressure from Washington. The tragedy of Europe is that apart from us, there is no one else who has the ambition to truly be European.

America is trying to dominate Europe, just as it seeks to dominate Latin America, Southeast Asia. America, whether it wants it or not, has become today an enterprise of global hegemony.”

AP: “Western European peoples are grateful to America for having defeated Hitler and stood up to Stalin.”

CDG: “I do not deny that. But today we are witnessing a physical phenomenon, like tidal waves or volcanic eruptions, which somehow escapes even the American leaders themselves. American power is so overwhelming, they are so far ahead in cutting-edge technologies, they are so wealthy, and they borrow so much - since only the rich are lent to... Their expansion has something elemental."

On Churchill

After the Council, I point out to the General that the English have not always been "the poor English." If they are now, is it not because they don't have a Churchill?The General calmly repeats a lesson he has already given me:

"Oh! Make no mistake! Churchill was magnificent until '42. Then, as if exhausted from too great an effort, he passed the torch to the Americans and faded into the background."

Upon this, the General tells me a memory that my retort must have brought to his mind.

"I was arguing with Churchill over the recognition of the authority of the Provisional Government in the territories of France that would be liberated after the landing. The Americans wanted to give authority to Eisenhower and the AMGOT. They had prepared proclamations, fake banknotes, etc., which the American troops were ready to distribute. Naturally, the English followed suit.

On the eve of the landing, Churchill invites me to lunch on a train, on the English coast, near Portsmouth. A train! As if there were already a tunnel under the Channel and he was about to enter France in his train! I was there with Palewski (here, the General is mistaken: according to his own Memoirs, it was Viénot).

He receives me for lunch in his carriage. And in the middle of lunch, in the presence of some English ministers, he gives me a frightful scene and shouts at the top of his lungs: 'Remember, de Gaulle, that every time I have to choose between Europe and the open sea, I will always choose the open sea! When I have to choose between you, de Gaulle, and Roosevelt, I will always choose Roosevelt! If we are liberating Europe now, it's because the Americans are here to do it with us! We cannot take a position different from that of the United States! And if we only had the FFF to help us, we would have to quickly embark again. Like at Dunkirk four years ago!'

That was Churchill's conviction. Eden shook his head. Bevin came to me after lunch and said in a loud and clear voice: 'The Prime Minister spoke in his own name, not on behalf of the British Cabinet.' Nevertheless, it has been, in general, the policy of the English since 1942, whether the government is Labour or Tory.

Except for a brief parenthesis that was quickly closed: Eden, after Nasser's blow on Suez. But he faltered; the dollar pressured the pound, and the City pressured Eden, who did not have strong enough nerves."

For the General, the quality of nerves comes first and foremost. A man with nerves of steel holds up. A man with less tough nerves challenges tasks beyond his capabilities only in a fit of rage. A man with no nerves at all collapses.

On NATO structure

AP: “Will you be able to make NATO evolve? In 1969, when each country will be able to regain its freedom, will we propose another formula?”

CDG: “NATO is a facade. It's a machine to disguise America's control over Europe. Thanks to NATO, Europe is placed under the dependence of the United States without appearing so. "Until the meeting in the Bahamas, the British were no more in NATO than we are now. They were even less, in reality.

They don't even have 45,000 men in NATO. But they arrange to have generals everywhere, so they can control what's happening there. They are very skilled at infiltrating. But in reality, they keep the bulk of their forces outside of NATO. Gradually, we will do the same. With the difference that they have more or less share in the command exercised by the Americans, whereas we have no share, because we are not Anglo-Saxons."

[…]

Golden Salon, November 6, 1963, the General told me:

CDG: "Look, even at NATO, which the Americans have built with their own hands, their thing, have you seen that? The NATO parliamentarians declare that the Multilateral Force is just a big joke. The truth is, the Americans will end up being hated by everyone. Even by their most unconditional allies. The Multilateral Force, it's just another hoax. All the tricks that the Americans come up with are disproven by events. It's becoming increasingly true. Look at their so-called détente...”

AP: “What do you think it means that the Soviets have resumed stopping American convoys to Berlin?”

CDG: “Of course, the Russians are demonstrating that American propaganda is a lie when it talks about the ‘spirit of Moscow’ and tries to make people believe that a big step has been taken towards détente.”

AP: “Don Cook, in the Herald Tribune, praises France's solidarity in sending a convoy to Berlin.”

CDG: “Solidarity? That's stupid! We didn't do that to please the Americans! France does not accept its relations with Berlin being interrupted. So we decided to send a convoy, according to the established plan. The convoy charged ahead. It passed.

The Russians did not dare to stop it. It so happened that it allowed the Americans to pass afterwards and get out of the ridiculous situation they put themselves in by letting themselves be intercepted. But that's not why we did it!

You see, France is an ally, but an independent ally, fiercely determined not to obey any dictate, any pressure. It has rights proportionate to its duties, and duties towards its allies proportionate to their attitude towards it. We are not sheep."

On LBJ

Golden Salon, November 18, 1964.

AP: "Now that Johnson is elected, do you think it's useful to have a meeting with him?"

CDG: "What would Johnson tell me, and what would I tell him? A meeting with Johnson is not like a meeting with Kennedy. He is not up to par, and he knows it. He is completely dependent on his advisors. He knows nothing about the issues. He's ignorant about Europe. He thought Napoleon was Italian. (Laughs.) So, what do you want to do with guys like that?"

AP: "Aren't you afraid that he will come after us now?"

CDG: "Come after us for what and why? What does it matter to me? Through speeches? If needed, I'll make speeches too. He's not the one who has control over me, I have control over him. What can Johnson do against us?"

AP: "He might try to isolate us, perhaps?"

CDG: "If I shut the door on all the NATO nonsense, what can he do against me? Nothing."

On Germany

AP: "If we oppose it, we will end up getting closer to the Soviets, who will be the only ones opposing it as well."

CDG: "Automatically, we will get closer to the Russians as the Germans move away from us. Why did we move away from the Russians after the war, when we had offered to work things out with them regarding the fate of the Germans? I had offered it to Stalin, and he didn't want it. He rushed to Yalta, made arrangements with Roosevelt, and thought he could have everything, including Germany, without involving anyone else in Europe, especially France.

Since he pursued this policy, which was also threatening to us, we pursued a policy of attracting the Germans to the West, and consequently making huge concessions to them, thus strengthening them. We returned their coal and steel, liquidated the Saar, allowed them to have an army, and so on.

And a little more, if I hadn't been there, they would have made the European Economic Community exclusively to their advantage, favoring their industry and showing our agriculture the door. Well, that's enough! If now, instead of being nice and complaisant, in other words, practicing the Franco-German treaty, they go running to Washington and play the Americans' boys, from that moment on, I don't pay attention to them anymore the Germans."

On the NATO Multilateral Force

AP: "The Germans, nor the Americans, do not imagine that we would have the audacity to pursue a policy of understanding with the Russians."

CDG: "It all depends on what one calls a policy of understanding with the Russians. One thing is certain, the Germans can no longer count on us for their reunification.

Our position is incomparable. There is no one else capable of an independent policy, except for China. Only China and us. If I want to, I can abolish NATO and the American command in Europe, dismiss Lemnitzer and all the Americans who are here. And then, what will they do? They will go to Germany. (Loud laughter.) It's going to happen, by the way, one of these days."

AP: "If they go for the Multilateral Force?"

CDG: "In that case, right away. But it will happen anyway... Only, we will wait for them to make a mistake, you understand."

AP: "Then they are doing you a favor with the Multilateral Force."

CDG: "Yes, of course. It's the first act of the end of NATO... The truth is, the Americans would not have proposed the idea of the Multilateral Force if we didn't have bombs. They wanted to catch up with us, but they couldn't."

[…]

Golden Room, November 25, 1964.

AP: "Two American journalists, Walter Lippmann and Cyrus Sulzberger, mentioned to me the idea of a multilateral force that would be purely European."

GdG: "But no! (Loud laughter.) I am not going to give our bombs to Germany! You can be sure that I will not give up this colossal advantage we have over the other five members of the Common Market, because we are the only ones with nuclear weapons and therefore the only ones who are sure of ourselves in terms of defense! We have no reason whatsoever to squander this capital! Moreover, that's what bothers them, especially the Germans."

AP: "Would you consider, as progress is made in European integration, that our force, while remaining national, could protect our partners in certain cases?"

GdG: "But it will automatically protect them! Much better than the American force! For the simple reason that we are Europeans, and the Americans are not. The interest of the Americans in not allowing Europe to be destroyed is negligible compared to ours. If Europe is invaded, we are finished, while the Americans will not be finished just because the Russians arrive on the Rhine. The Germans reached Paris just fine, and America didn't feel finished. 'Hit my client... but don't hit me.'"

AP: "The Americans argue that back then, there was no alliance, whereas now they are obliged by the Alliance."

CDG: "An alliance? Treaties are only valid to the extent that they cover national interests. The day they no longer do, there is no treaty anymore. Moreover, there is no treaty that obliges the Americans to launch their atomic bombs if Europe is attacked. They have never wanted to commit to that, and it is only natural that they do not."

AP: "They are still obliged to commit their conventional forces, whereas in 1914 and 1939 they were not obliged to."

CDG: "Yes, they would commit their divisions from Germany. Perhaps they would even commit their small tactical bombs in Europe, because that would not lead the Russians to launch large strategic bombs on America. What they would destroy with their tactical weapons would simply be Europe, not Russia. Prussia would be destroyed by American bombs, West Germany and France by Russian bombs. What do the Americans care, in the end? Do you understand?"

AP: "The Americans would not engage in strategic nuclear action against Russia, and vice versa?"

CDG: "That's the whole question. 'Hit my client and I hit yours, but don't hit me and I won't hit you.'"