Preparing the visit to Latin America
Salon doré, January 16, 1963.
AP: “Among the subjects you announced for your press conference, you did not address Latin America.”
CDG: “Latin America is a reality that will become more and more apparent. We cannot let this continent fall into misery, revolution, or dependence on the Americans…”
“Offroy was sent to Mexico to sound out the Mexicans about a possible visit by De Gaulle. This visit, which will be the first to Latin America, must be a success. It will set the tone. The Mexicans promise us a triumph. But they have asked for three things in return. First, that their President be invited on an official visit to France. Naturally, that is what we will do. Second, they would like credits; we will give them some. Finally, they would like us to return three flags that the Legion captured during the Mexican War. That is the most difficult. I do not like returning trophies that our army won in battle. Can you imagine De Gaulle arriving in Mexico with flags in his suitcase? Impossible.”
The reverence for the flag is not part of that “folklore” that he wants to rid the army of. One dies to defend or recover a flag. Returning those that have been conquered is not a trivial gesture. The General has suffered too much from having to bring our colors to Algeria, even in the name of national interest, to treat this Mexican demand lightly.
Salon Doré, January 24, 1963.
I question the General again about Latin America.
CDG: “Now there is a major subject. Which way will it turn? How will it organize itself to live? With whose support will it be able to develop?”
“Its discomfort has burst into the open, during the confrontation between the United States and Russia over Cuba. It is suffocating in its Ancien Régime system, in its large landed estates, in its military dictatorships, in its capitalism where misery rubs shoulders with opulence. It must evolve. The temptation is great for it to do so under the influence of communism.”
“It detests the Americans. It desperately desires to escape their hegemony, and at the same time the risks that subversion and, even more so, an appeal to Russia or China would entail.”
“It is therefore a privileged place for European action. In the coming months, I will strive to develop Franco-German cooperation in this area and also to reach an agreement with the Italians. Together, several European countries could do much more than separately. We would be welcomed with open arms. It is a magnificent card to play.”
AP: “And Spain and Portugal?”
CDG: “Of course, all of this must be done jointly among Europeans, including the Spanish and the Portuguese. But what do you expect the Portuguese to send to America, other than their priests? That is already something, by the way.”
“As for the North Americans, they are not particularly hostile to our taking initiatives in this area. Kennedy spoke to me about it. They sense that they will not get out of it alone and that it will turn out badly. They want us to help them. Of course, they do not want us to take their place. It is like with NATO; they want to continue to lead. What they would like to do is create a sort of pool, which they would naturally head, which would serve as a mask, and behind which they could still command. But I will not go along with that. There must be a common action of the Europeans and we have a fine role to play.”
The Franco-German treaty had been signed the day before. De Gaulle speaks as a conquering representative of European nationalism — a new conquistador leading the Europeans.
At the Council meeting on February 27, 1963, Couve tells us about the lobster that our Breton fishermen go to catch off the coast of Brazil. Five French boats are seized. Great emotion in Brittany, where the protection of our navy is demanded. Brazil has refused the arbitration we proposed. Enormous passionate reactions.
CDG: “These gesticulations are out of place. This is not about territorial waters. It is happening 200 kilometers off the coast of Brazil.”
Couve: “Rather 150. Legally, our case is strong. The heart of the matter is that the Breton fishermen buy lobsters at a much higher price from the miserable Brazilian fishermen than the American fishermen do. The American fishermen are furious about this breach of their monopoly. It is the Americans who are stirring up the Brazilian press against us.”
After the Council.
CDG: “This lobster war is yet another American story! Because our boats dare to compete with American companies! These lobsters are sold for 2,500 francs per kilo in Paris. The American companies, who sell them to us, buy them from Brazilian fishermen in Recife for 75 centimes. These companies obviously have a great interest in maintaining their monopoly. The Americans are too happy to unleash the Brazilian newspapers against France.”
AP: “That bodes well for when you go there.”
CDG (raising his arm, with an indifferent gesture): “It is a way for them to divert anger. All of this is miserable. Miserable.”
Salon Doré, March 27, 1963.
AP: “Is the visit of the Mexican President going well?”
CDG: “Yes. Lopez Mateos would like French firms to set up his petrochemical industry, his refineries, his dams for electricity, etc. He is not unhappy to escape the tête-à-tête with the Americans. It is catastrophic for people like the Mexicans to have to deal with only one country, which wants to dominate them economically. So, France would allow them, to a certain extent, to escape American influence.”
On the train between Paris and Sedan, April 22, 1963.
AP: “Will you make your trip to Latin America this year?”
CDG: “I will do it next year, if I am not dead by then. But do not speak of it yet, it is too hypothetical.”
(The General does not announce a project he is not certain to carry out; in his tone, I sense a concern not to defy Providence: the future belongs to God.)
“Latin America is a continent where many things will play out. It is essential that France and Europe be present there. It needs us: we have nothing to be ashamed of! We must avoid the tête-à-tête between South Americans and North Americans. Why should we apologize for it? Why should we hide it? We must keep our heads high!”
“You see, for decades, the French have gradually gotten into the habit of lowering their eyes, of apologizing, of asking for forgiveness. Let us stand tall! We must give the whole world the habit of a France that holds its head high! It knows what it wants! It does not wait for the permission of others to decide what it has to do, nor to do it!”
At the Council meeting on August 13, 1963.
Fouchet: “I represented General de Gaulle in Peru for the inauguration of the new President, Belaunde Terry. The Peruvian leaders are all Francophiles; Belaunde Terry studied architecture in Paris. They are turning towards France.”
“The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs are requesting France's technical and cultural assistance. De Gaulle, they told me, is the ‘Lider Maximo of Latin civilization.’”
“The particular nationalism of each nation takes precedence over the general nationalism of Latin America, but all of them share a common hatred of the Americans, the gringos.”
“I then went to Mexico, as you had instructed me to do. Lopez Mateos is still enthusiastic about the reception he received in Paris. Mexico, very ambitious, considers itself the leader of all Latin America. Between the aristocratic system of Peru and the Marxist dictatorship of Fidel Castro, it has found a worthy socialism.”
“My interlocutors fear a new Yalta, which would this time be a division of the world, with Soviet domination over Europe and American domination over Latin America, the Pacific, and Asia. They fervently hope that Latin civilization, at the call of its Lider Maximo, that is, you, will unite to oppose it.”
CDG: “Your report was of the highest interest.”
A rare degree of praise. He merely adds: “The unifying factor for all these disparate countries is their hostility towards the United States.”
Salon Doré, January 22, 1964.
CDG: “Latin America is a neuralgic center. It is there that we can best act to prevent the revolution, which would inevitably result from the hatred that the populations feel towards the Yankees. It is there that I will make two trips this year, one to Mexico in March, the other in the autumn, to Argentina, Brazil, and Peru.”
AP: “Brazil too? Despite the lobster war?”
CDG: “Yes, but do not say anything. We were waiting for President Goulart to express his regrets. That will be done: he did not wish to see us pass by his coasts without making a stop.”
Salon Doré, January 29, 1964.
AP: “Your trip could crystallize the aspirations for independence from the Americans in the Third World.”
CDG: “That is possible. On the other hand, they need what the Americans give them. And the Americans, for a long time, have been buying the essential part of their production, only to resell it with enormous profits.”
AP: “Are you opening a breach in the Monroe Doctrine: ‘America for the Americans?’”
CDG: “Certainly. Yes, but Kennedy himself was not opposed to that. (He already told me that last year.) He felt that action was needed to prevent the revolution. When he was here, he told me: ‘Europe, and particularly France, you must take your place in Latin America; it is very important.’ Only, he would have liked it to be under his banner.”
Salon Doré, February 18, 1964.
AP: “This idea of Franco-German cooperation in Latin America, is it just for show, or can it be effective?”
CDG: “First of all, it looks good in the picture. We have companies; new ones will be created. The Germans, in terms of exports, are much more advanced than we are. So, it makes sense to coordinate, so that some do this and others do that. With them, we have better things to do than to eat each other's wool.”
AP: “Only, Erhard does not seem inclined to spend a penny.”
CDG: “That does not matter. In these times, a government can do a lot to encourage private companies to do something, or conversely, to discourage them.”
AP: “Would you announce collective aid from Europe?”
CDG: “I am not in a position to say that! If one day Europe wants to do as we do and engage in collective enterprises, then things would go much better. Everything is connected. At the same time as we are trying to organize Europe, we must project ourselves externally. The best way to build Europe is for Europeans to build together outside of Europe.”
A year has passed since the General spoke to me about the flags of Mexico.
The matter comes before the Council on February 26, 1964. Messmer presents it with a coldness that masks his emotion as a former colonel of the Foreign Legion:
“A hundred years ago, the French army (he does not say ‘the Legion’) seized a number of Mexican military emblems. Most are tattered pennants. When unfolded, they crumble to dust.”
“Only three emblems are of certain interest. The Mexicans suggest that we return these three flags. Since this campaign had no follow-up…”
CDG: “Yes, it did have follow-ups! There are always follow-ups. Everything is linked in history. The expedition established Maximilian, General Weygand was a consequence of Maximilian, and the armistice of '40 was a consequence of Weygand's appointment as commander-in-chief.” (Laughter.)
Messmer does not laugh and continues as if he had heard nothing: “Since this campaign had no follow-up, I will send a general officer to return these three flags to the Mexicans.”
CDG: “I do not wish to return them myself.”
Messmer had the elegance to take this whole affair upon himself. With his offhand joke, the General betrayed his discomfort. By proceeding, Messmer gives a lesson in discretion and self-control. The General takes it in stride and, as if to apologize to his minister, reveals to all his personal concern.
Honor is saved. That of the French armies and their chief: the matter will have been settled before his arrival, without his having to “carry these flags in his luggage.” But also the honor of the Mexicans, restored after a hundred years. Always, respect the dignity of peoples.
Salon Doré, March 11, 1964.
AP: “What will you announce next week in Mexico? The Americans are dreading your trip.”
CDG: “They have a persecution complex. It's not serious.”
AP: “They are afraid that you will mobilize Latin America against them.”
CDG: “It is already mobilized against their system of colonization through local feudal lords. Let's be clear: the Yankees are unbearable to Latin America. Naturally, these countries take American money, but they resent it. And they blame the Americans for reducing them to beggary.”
AP: “You risk being the catalyst.”
CDG: “The outcome for Latin America is no longer a dialogue solely with the Yankees; it is an international situation in which Latin America will also deal with Europe. So, we will present ourselves as the vanguard of Europe.”
[…]
The General's place in the institutions is so overwhelming that everyone wonders what would happen if he were not there. After the Council meeting on January 29, 1964, I ask him:
“Do you really intend, during your tour of South America, to go to all the countries?”
CDG: “I would not be surprised if I end up doing so.”
AP: “It will be a huge undertaking? Maybe a month? How will we be able to function normally for a month in the absence of the President?”
CDG: “The Council of Ministers can meet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, by delegation of the President of the Republic. Besides, I will arrange to be able to sign decrees. I will have a warship brought in.”
AP: “Napoleon did sign his decree on the Comédie-Française in Moscow…”
CDG: “Napoleon occupied Moscow with his troops. It was a French conquest, and the signing of the decree marked it well. No, I need to be on French soil. I need to have a ship brought in.”
AP: “A month is a long time. You never know what might happen.”
CDG: “Well, one day or another, they will have to do without me! So, we might as well start practicing now.”
On Mexico
Pointe-à-Pitre, March 20, 1964.
While waiting for the procession to depart, the General, who arrived from Mexico overnight, has Jacquinot and me take a seat.
Jacquinot: “Why did you arouse such enthusiasm?”
CDG: “Because it’s France. For Mexicans, France is the embodiment of the national idea.”
AP: “Was it a good idea to approach Latin America through Mexico?”
CDG: “Mexico is different from other countries, firstly because of its stability. How can you expect to emerge from underdevelopment without stability? For a poor country, the stability and authority of a government are more suitable than the instability of our Western democracies. It is necessary and sufficient for the regime to respect, more or less, human rights and, above all, the dignity of the people. As for our formalistic habits, they are not suited to these countries.”
“Mexico has been led for thirty years by a single party, the ‘Institutional Revolutionary Party,’ while maintaining the appearances of a democracy. I have the impression that this party is becoming more and more institutional and less and less revolutionary. In fact, I believe it is no longer revolutionary at all.”
Jacquinot: "What are the Mexicans' feelings towards the United States?"
CDG: “All the industry, all the commerce, all the finance are controlled by the Americans. It is like in Canada. With one big difference. The English Canadians lend themselves to this takeover because they feel they are of the same race, the same culture, the same language, and they largely benefit from this situation. They give the Americans a leg up. This allows them to accentuate their domination over the French. The Mexicans, like the French Canadians, do not feel they are of the same race, the same culture, or the same language. They are increasingly unwilling to accept this situation. For the moment, they are showing it by looking towards France. That is better than looking towards Moscow.”
AP: “The old ruling classes, the Spaniards, the clergy, were satisfied with this situation.”
CDG: “That is why they were swept away. They were like the feudal lords in our Ancien Régime, like the petits-blancs in the colonies: relics of history. Our feudal lords thought it was enough to abolish their privileges. But it was too late. The privileged were abolished. That is what the Mexican Revolution did, with much violence. That is what will happen in Latin America, wherever the dollar dominates and has corrupted the ruling class.”
Jacquinot: “With whom did you have conversations?”
CDG: “With Lopez Mateos, naturally, to whom I was returning his visit from last year. I also saw his presumptive heir, Diaz Ordaz, although he is not yet elected — but it is as good as done. Each one displays the will to follow the same policy as his predecessor. That compensates for the fact that one can only be President once, which is a peculiarity of their Constitution.”
“These countries lack capabilities, technical knowledge, the ability to organize, rather than money. We can do a lot in this area.”
Jacquinot: “In short, it was a useful trip.”
He doubted it until then. “Why is he going on this jaunt, what's the point?” his senatorial electors must have said to him.
At the Council meeting on March 25, 1964.
Couve: “The General's visit to Mexico preceded any other potential visit to Latin America. Why Mexico? It benefits from great stability, thanks to the rule of a single party that ensures the continuity of institutions through co-optation.”
Jacquet says to me: “That would be good if the UNR were like that.”
The General really has a keen ear. Speaking in our direction: “It is up to you.” Missoffe whispers to Jacquet: “He got you good.”
Couve, unfazed, relates the highlights of the visit: “The first day was spectacular, but there was still nothing unusual. It was the welcome, between the airport and Constitution Square. There were a lot of people, around a million.”
“The appearance of the two Presidents of the Republic on the balcony of the National Palace, where it is tradition that only the Mexican President appears once a year, provoked enthusiasm in the Zócalo Square, packed with people.”
“Moreover, the host addressed the crowd in Spanish. Then exceptional phenomena were triggered. The arrangement of things lent itself to it: visits to a workers' city, to Congress, to the Senate, to the University. Everywhere, an increasingly warm welcome, which did not seem organized, but spontaneous, or rather contagious, as was the case in Germany.”
“At the University, tens of thousands of students were gathered, in a certain disorder. The University enjoys complete autonomy, so the police do not enter. We witnessed a spectacle of extraordinary enthusiasm. All testimonies agree that it is an unprecedented phenomenon.”
CDG: “The Mexicans would like to see the birth of a European bank for development. But it is mainly on the cultural and technical level that our action can develop at a lower cost.”
“Mexico has shown the attraction that France inspires in it. It is very marked by France, and this is not just out of politeness.”
Can one be more sober in success?
On further visits to Latin America
Salon Doré, May 21, 1964.
AP: “Do you still intend to visit most of the countries in South America?”
CDG: “Yes, all the countries in South America!”
AP: “One could wonder if your convalescence will progress quickly enough to allow that.”
CDG: “Ah yes, my convalescence (as if he were going to say: ‘I forgot’), it is going well.”
(With an air of saying: “Mind your own business.”)
Salon Doré, August 14, 1964.
AP: “American journalists are again afraid that after your trip to South America, the masses will be tempted by a policy of rupture.”
CDG: “The masses? They are already tempted before I arrive… A policy of rupture, no, but of liberation, yes.”
AP: “Are you not afraid that Castro-style movements will develop?”
CDG: “Oh, there have already been some and there will be more! It is not impossible that Chile will elect a President oriented towards reforms and liberation from the United States. The two things can merge in Latin America.”
AP: “There are still powerful structures of landowners, of the privileged.”
CDG: “That is the whole question. The question is how long these feudal structures will last.”
Salon Doré, September 9, 1964.
AP: “Many people, starting with those who are most loyal to you, are wondering if this trip, which will be so tiring, is really necessary.”
CDG: “Tiring? Yes, it will be. But I believe it will be good for France. This trip has been decided. It must be done.”
(During the trip to the Antilles, he had told me: “A voyage, you should not do it. You should have done it.”)
AP: “You will go up three times to more than 2,600 meters! What is surprising is the disproportion between the result that can be expected from this trip and the enormous fatigue and even the risks it entails. Wouldn't it be worth giving some explanations?”
CDG: “I prefer not to. I would rather not explain what I am going to do, neither myself nor through you. You see, it is a principle that has always served me well and that I recommend to you: one should never explain in advance what one is going to do. When one has done something, one can explain the reasons. But when one has not yet done it, it is better to leave people in suspense.”
“One must always keep peoples on their toes. That is the great secret. When I am in America, I will gradually explain, in my interventions and in my speeches, the reasons for my trip, and they will then appear by themselves, and they will sweep away doubts or concerns at the same time. So, why try to sweep them away earlier? People would always try to put my statements in opposition to what I will do. One should never give the impression that one is apologizing for what one does. Peoples are there to question. That is good. Let the crowd worry, and let the leader reassure them by acting!”
Salon Doré, September 16, 1964.
The General is about to depart. He consents to my saying something about this trip before it begins. But I have to press him with questions.
CDG: “You can say that this trip will mark the importance France attaches to the emergence of Latin America as a key player on the international stage, as an element of balance and peace.”
AP: “And that this trip also has a meaning for France?”
CDG: “Yes, it signifies that our country has regained stability and peace. Under no other Republic has a President left the national territory for so long. Today, he can be absent for many weeks; the solidity of the institutions allows it.”
AP: “And this trip is innovative for our foreign policy?”
CDG: “Until last year, many were convinced that the country was withdrawing into the Hexagon. Hexagon, that very ugly word to which the adversaries of France would like to reduce it, to make it subsequently a province in a magma. Decolonization could appear to the French as a painful retreat. This trip should show them that France, because it has chosen the realities and necessities of its time, can once again shine abroad.”
AP: “By going beyond the borders of our former Empire?”
CDG: “This trip manifests France's will to be present not only in its former possessions but also in a part of the world that will become increasingly important and where France once had an eminent position. France had withdrawn from Latin America since the great crisis of 1929-1930; but it still has moral and sentimental capital there. It is my duty to reawaken it.”
AP: “France already bears a heavy burden for aid to underdeveloped countries. Isn't this an overwhelming task?”
CDG: “Cooperation is something other than pouring money. It consists of bringing cultural and technical elements that allow a country to enter the path of development; it is the leaven that makes the dough rise. But it is also sympathy. Do not forget that at the time of the Liberation of Paris, the bells in Latin America rang out loudly. Our policy of independence resonates more among these peoples than anywhere else.”
AP: “Won't you be lighting a fuse to a powder keg?”
CDG: “Today, the Latin American countries are gripped by a real feeling of claustrophobia. Many American leaders now declare themselves convinced that the only way to end the conflictual situation between the two Americas is to reintroduce a European presence in Latin America.”
AP: “Would Europe act as a mediator between South and North Americans?”
CDG: “No, no! They do not need a mediator. Simply, we think that the resumption of relations between Europe and Latin America can only facilitate an improvement in relations between North and South Americans.”
The indication is clear: it is not about fanning the flames of anti-Americanism, but about creating a counter-fire. Is this merely a more acceptable presentation of the trip for the Americans?
General de Gaulle visits Latin America
At the Council meeting on October 21, 1964.
Couve gives a lengthy account of the journey: “Twenty-six days, ten countries: General de Gaulle will have been officially received throughout Latin America, except for Central America and the Caribbean.”
“The reception was extraordinary. Without exception, the crowds were immense and warm. It was a complete success.”
Couve must have thought that, as after his account of the visit to Mexico, the General would be brief — so it was up to the minister to tell all. But this time, to conclude his two trips, the General cannot or does not want to refrain from expressing his feelings at length.
CDG: “The goal was to reestablish a lost contact and to revitalize a latent energy: a genuine favor towards France. This has been achieved. If we had not done it, this favor would have continued to dissipate. Since the competition is fierce, it was the right moment to revive this sentiment.”
“There are two types of countries. In most, there are essentially two peoples. The Spaniards, who were liberated by Bolivar, whose action had a ripple effect, including in Brazil. But the Liberator did not at all liberate the Indians, a mountainous mass, difficult to access, who do not modernize, and who are kept in a sort of relegation by governments that are heirs to colonial power. Hence a continual problem that deeply agitates these countries. Moreover, all these countries, with the exception of Mexico, are plagued by political instability.”
“Some — Chile, which has ethnic and geographical unity and a certain consistency despite its incredible length, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil (except for the Amazon, but no one goes there) — do not suffer from an ethnic threat: they are therefore relieved of this problem. These countries — except for Chile — still have an unstable government, due to their army, but mainly due to their natural inclination. These Mediterranean-type populations are incapable of ensuring regular government exercise. This political instability is the main drama of these countries. On the other hand, with mines, oil, and agriculture, they have the virtual means for considerable economic development, which they have not yet begun.”
“The Americans give money, but they use it to economically and politically control these countries, which is not pleasant for the latter. Under these conditions, their foreign policy necessarily tends, against their will, to accommodate the American dispensers of dollars, while seeking to find something else.”
“This something else is a closer relationship with the countries of Europe and especially France. Although it withdrew after the war of 1914, because it had its back broken (well, the expression is not reserved for Germany or England), because it had neither national conviction, nor firm policy, nor capital, disappeared in inflation, we could not do much.”
“It is up to us to reappear and gather the necessary forces. No doubt, these people want us to help them train their executives. This should not cost us too much. They want our investors to commit capital. But what is done in this regard, either in French projects or in their own enterprises, is not lost for us.”
“The effort must be led by the government. It must establish a plan of cooperation with the various countries of Latin America, at the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the other ministries. We are already doing quite a few things and we cannot do much more. We need to specify what remains to be done. As for the credits, we will not allocate more in 1965 than the budget of the year provides. But for the 1966 budget, we will have to make a larger share for cooperation in Latin America. We will then be able to mitigate or reduce what we are pouring into Africa. To act, we must pay.”
"In summary, we come away from this trip with the impression of a French reality in the souls, which is something absolutely exceptional. There may be a bit of the personal equation of the moment.”
(This is his modest way of referring to himself)
“But above all, in the Latin world, there is an attachment to France that is unparalleled. It is a way for Latins to celebrate their own Latinness. This is a fact more alive than it has ever been. But what I have been able to do there must be continued and completed.”
In October 1978, President Giscard d'Estaing traveled to Brazil, accompanied by three ministers: Louis de Guiringaud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simone Veil, Minister of Health, and myself, Minister of Justice. The General's triumph had become a myth. In Brasilia, people recited by heart phrases he had uttered fourteen years earlier before Congress or at the University.
The difference, which Giscard could observe, between the “historic” reception given to General de Gaulle and the one accorded to him, however eager and friendly it was, could not but be noticeable. Although he was on a state visit just like the General, he was accommodated in Rio in the same hotel as the press accompanying him.
A dinner was given in his honor at the former imperial palace near Rio, where the General had stayed. Commemorative plaques proudly recalled this. The governor of the State of Rio, in his toast, emphasized at length that this residence of the emperors of Brazil had once again entered history in 1964, during that memorable trip whose every episode remained in people's memories, by welcoming the illustrious guest. At the end of the toast, all eyes turned to Giscard: he did not stand up. As the head of state, he was not obliged to respond to the toast of a mere governor. The guests hoped to relive the emotions of yesterday — and he had enough talent to reestablish the magical connection. But there are exhilarations of the past that sound like a depreciation of the present. Is that how Giscard perceived the governor's message?
What France represents to Latin America
Élysée, February 13, 1963
The General elaborates on this theme of the three powers that matter:
“Besides the two colossi, there is another international reality, and there is only one: it is France, which is much smaller, certainly, than the other two, but which knows what it wants, knows where it is going, and has an immense role to play.”
“Of course, we have fewer cannons, fewer divisions than the two mastodons. Naturally, we are no longer the big animal; we no longer possess the power of yesteryear. There are missiles, but there are also ideas. France's magistracy is moral. In Africa, in Asia, in South America, our country is the symbol of racial equality, human rights, and the dignity of nations.”
“France represents something essential. It had declined excessively over the past century. It must regain its place.”
He accompanies me to the door, and after a silence, he straightens up to his full height. He is suddenly filled with the beauty that beings have when they say what they believe with all their soul:
"You see, our country distinguishes itself from others in that its vocation is more disinterested and more universal than that of any other. France, whenever it is itself, is humane and universal. The vocation of France is to work for the general interest. It is by being fully French that one is the most European, that one is the most universal.”
“There has always been a role for France, which has always distinguished it from other countries. While other countries, when they develop, try to subject others to their interests, France, when it manages to develop its influence, does so for the interest of all. There has always been a role for France. That is why it enjoys immense credit. That is why all the bells of Latin America rang out for the liberation of Paris. Because it has been a pioneer for American independence, for the abolition of slavery, for the right of peoples to self-determination. Because it is a champion of the independence of nations, against any hegemony. Everyone in the world obscurely feels it; France is the light of the world, its genius is to illuminate the universe.”
Salon Doré, October 21, 1964.
Upon returning from Latin America, the General tells me: “If this trip had any use, it was to show that nations only want to assert themselves. They will not always be ready to abdicate their sovereignty to the two superpowers. They are becoming aware that they must resist them. China is more than convinced of this. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile too, deep down, even if they hesitate to proclaim it. It is France's vocation to exert its influence to promote this movement. One day will come when all the countries hostile to the domination of the two giants will rise to defend their independence. That day will be ours.”
This trip had another use: the General returns in great shape; he notes this and is happy about it. He has cheerfully endured its fatigues, four months after his prostate operation. Nothing rejuvenates him as much as feeling that he is expressing France's mission to the world. He holds his head high and, looking me straight in the eyes, says: “France must be France.” No doubt he is also thinking: “De Gaulle must be de Gaulle.”
At the Council meeting on December 9, 1964,
Malraux returns from Mexico, for the inauguration of the new President: “There were only three delegations: the Soviet, the American, and the French.”
“All the Indian past is presented with brilliance.”
“When one speaks of ‘Latinness,’ one thinks of France. The living past is not Spain, against which one revolted; it is France. Victor Hugo's letter to Juarez is learned by heart in schools. De Gaulle's France is for them what Pericles’ Greece is for us. The Indian claim is based on a past that is not just art, but the freedom embodied by France.”
CDG: “It is a fact that these countries instinctively turn towards ours because they are indisposed by the Americans. France is the recourse.”
On its ideological dependence towards the Americans
“For the Americans, the world is divided into two ideologies: the communist ideology and the capitalist ideology. One must choose between the two: ‘Whoever is not with me is against me.’”
“But it is not that simple. There are the Americans, whose interests are specifically American. There are the Europeans, whose interests no longer coincide with American interests, even if, for a certain time, the interest of the Americans involved their military installation in Europe. There is Asia, there is Africa. Africa can only be assisted by Europe. Latin America will find itself caught in the dilemma of dependence on North America or communism: in which case, it risks falling into communism out of a desire to escape North American dependence; unless it is assisted by Europe. As for Europe, its interest lies in being able to defend itself and adopt its own policy. It is this policy, and this policy alone, that can lift the Iron Curtain.”
On the American intervention in the Dominican Republic
At the Council meeting on May 12, 1965.
Joxe, who is acting in Couve's stead, attempts to clarify the confusing events that are stirring up Santo Domingo and led to the landing of American marines at the end of April.
“Two governments are confronting each other: that of General Antonio Imbert, who has the favor of President Johnson; and that of Caamaño, a supporter of the return of President Juan Bosch, whom Kennedy once backed. This former President, democratically elected in 1962 then overthrown in 1963 and exiled in Puerto Rico, has said he is at the disposal of his country.”
After the Council.
CDG: “We disapprove of the American intervention. We are not going to land in Santo Domingo to fight the Americans. But let them sort it out by themselves, morally and politically! We continue to hope that one day a government will be established in Santo Domingo that results from the free will of the citizens.”
AP: “Which cannot be exercised as long as the troops are there?”
CDG: “Obviously! It cannot manifest when you have marines on your back.”
At the Council meeting on May 18, 1965.
Couve reports a deterioration in Santo Domingo: “The United States is burdened by its own intervention and the enormity of its force.”
After the Council, the General tells me:
“There is a new fact in the world. It is that peoples have become conscious of themselves. There are all sorts of reasons for this, but it is a fact. They have become aware of their national identity, whereas in the past, this was very vague. A gunboat or a cruiser would be sent to them. Then, Egypt would pay its debt, or pretend to want to pay it. All that is over. The policy of the gunboat is finished and will not return. You immediately get caught up in a conspiracy because when you intervene in a country, you face a people who do not want you to intervene. If you intervene, you automatically create a civil war. And you never achieve anything! This is the fact that we have recognized. This is why we left Algeria, even though we were the masters on the ground; but it did not provide us with a solution. However, the Americans have not yet understood this.”
“They are wondering how to get out of it. It is always the same thing. It is like in Vietnam. They engage like fools, and then they do not know how to leave.”