First meeting between General de Gaulle and President Nixon
Friday, February 28, 1969, 3:45 p.m. – 5:55 p.m.
General de Gaulle: So, here you are, Mr. President! I am ready to talk with you about everything you wish.
Mr. Nixon: I think it would be most useful for us to begin by discussing overall East-West relations, and then move on to more specific issues, such as the Middle East, Vietnam, and economic matters (without getting into technical details). On all these points, I’d like to have your opinion, and receive your advice. One of my major concerns is this: the new President of the United States must sooner or later consider a meeting with the Soviets. I would like to be sure that the position of the United States and my own is in line with our common objectives. What kind of talks do you think I should have with the Kremlin? What other initiatives could the new administration take in this domain? Finally, naturally, we should also talk about all our bilateral matters. I would very much like to have your overall assessment of the situation in Eastern Europe since the Czechoslovak affair and the recent Soviet declaration regarding sovereignty. On that point, what do you think would be the best policy to follow? I hope you can speak plainly with me, because the goal of our meeting here is not to make public statements but to open our minds to one another as two people entrusted with responsibilities. I assure you that I have no intention of making our conversations the subject of diplomatic cables, and I am convinced you feel the same. What I want above all is your counsel.
General de Gaulle: You can be sure that we will not air our discussions in the public sphere. You want to know what I think of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We already discussed this in 1967, but I will try to clarify my thoughts today. There is Russia, and there is communism; they are not necessarily the same thing. As for communism, we want no part of it, that is clear. Besides, I believe it is no longer advancing. It is not progressing in France, not anymore in Italy, and not at all in Germany. It seems to have had its fill in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even in Russia. It no longer has appeal there; it has lost its dynamism. Certainly, it can still endure for a long time, but it is too late for it to seek to conquer the world.
So there is Russia, which finds itself under a communist regime. It is nevertheless still Russia: a very large country with many resources, pride, and national ambitions that are not necessarily those of communism. That is a fact. It is a country that has suffered greatly and is convinced it won the war. And besides that is true, it was mainly Russia that broke the back of the German army. This country has vast resources, and a deep sense of national resilience; it made difficult progress, and it knows it.
If, contrary to all possibility, you were in the place of the Soviet leaders, what would your main concern be? It would be China, immense China, with thousands of kilometers of shared border with Russia, which hates Russia, has always hated it, and hates it now as much as ever. It also has great ambitions, almost all directed against Russia, toward Manchuria, Siberia, Central Asia. And Russia knows it.
Everything about how Russia, now with a stagnant communism, considers the West, and notably at the United States, depends on its future position vis-à-vis China. It knows that it may have to face China one day and that it cannot confront both China and the West at the same time, particularly the United States. That is why, overall, with caution, advances and retreats, Russia's policy is to draw closer to the West and the United States. I do not mean by this that it can fully trust you in all matters. You are its rival. But it desires an arrangement, a modus vivendi with you, to obtain a guarantee, or at least a sense of a guarantee, in its growing dispute with China. It wants to avoid the risk of your action in its back.
This applies to the United States, the West in general, and Germany in particular. Russia has suffered greatly at the hands of Germany, at all times, and especially during the last world war, when the Germans were terrible, penetrating as far as the Caucasus and nearly bringing Russia down. Russia has not forgotten this. Its constant concern is not to have a Germany behind its back that could harm or attack it, or rally part of the West against it, if one day it ever faced serious difficulties in the East. That, I believe, is the dominant principle of its policy.
Mr. Nixon: So, in your opinion, that would be the essential aim of Russia in seeking a modus vivendi. Some of my interlocutors, these days, believe that Russia wants a summit meeting with us not only to achieve a certain degree of détente, but also and mostly to consolidate its domination over Eastern Europe, divide the West, and thus weaken its will to defend itself.
General de Gaulle: It’s natural for Russia to be pleased if the West reduces its defense capabilities, as that increases its relative power. However, I don't think it wants to march against the West: it knows very well that even if the West doesn’t respond immediately with all its strength and means, world war would ultimately be inevitable. Russia does not want such a war for many reasons, the main one being that it knows it could not win it. Certainly, if Europe weakens, Russia would not be displeased, and if the United States became less powerful, it would be quite happy. But the Soviets will not, for all that, set out to conquer the West. It’s too late for that.
However, as you say, for the same reasons they want détente with the United States, France, and perhaps other European countries, the Soviets do not want their satellites to slip toward the West either. That would reduce their power. So they want to maintain their control over Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; if possible, a little over Romania; as for Yugoslavia, it’s too late. They occupied Czechoslovakia because they feared it was about to leave their camp. They don’t want to weaken their position against the West, but they have neither the intent nor the means to conquer it. Perhaps they’ll do something to settle the Berlin issue, which, after all, isn’t a major one; but they won’t march toward the Rhine.
In this general situation, given the growing threat posed by China, Russia does not want the West as an enemy. And I therefore believe it sincerely seeks détente. When France expressed goodwill in this regard, the Russians were all politeness, and when you will tell them that you’re ready to conclude practical arrangements with them, on anti-missile systems, for instance, they will do you all sorts of courtesies. They’ve wanted this for a long time, since Khrushchev. Certainly, there have been obstacles, like Vietnam; but that’s their idea, and they are committed to it more than ever. France considers that this is not a bad thing at all. So long as we are not at war, and you do not intend to break down the Berlin Wall, the only thing left is to make peace.
Of course, precautions are necessary, and we’ll have to discuss those, you and I. But this is the time to work on détente, because the current state of communism no longer allows it to be expansionist, and Russia is not strong enough to think of conquests while also dealing with China. So Russia currently needs détente, especially with the United States.
Mr. Nixon: Do you believe that Russia believes in the reality of American deterrence? Let’s consider the current situation between the United States, Europe, and Russia: since 1962, the balance of power has changed. When President Kennedy stood firm during the Cuban Missile Crisis (and he greatly appreciated the immediate support you gave him), the United States had a five-to-one advantage over the Soviets in strategic devices, both in number and in first and second-strike capability. Since then, the Soviets have caught up. Today, the United States may still be slightly ahead, but a certain strategic arms parity has been established. As for conventional arms, the Warsaw Pact forces surpass those of the West in Europe, including France. In these circumstances, some suggest that if Russia attempts a political and diplomatic maneuver, and I agree with you that they will attempt nothing militarily...
General de Gaulle: ... except perhaps in Berlin.
Mr. Nixon: ...it would be because they are convinced that the United States is not truly resolved to engage in a strategic exchange. Some Europeans believe this too: they do not think the United States would be prepared to respond strategically in the event of a Soviet attack.
General de Gaulle: I could not answer for all Europeans, as they are very different peoples; but I can tell you that if one day the Soviets were to march on the West (which, once again, I do not believe), they would have the initial advantage with their conventional arms. But a moment would come when the United States would have to intervene with its nuclear weapons. Russia knows well that the United States could never accept for it to take Europe, meaning it would also dominate Africa, and thus take back all the American positions. It might achieve some initial successes, perhaps even using tactical nuclear weapons, but it knows that things would not end there, that the United States would intervene with all its power, and that consequently, Russia would be destroyed. Russia certainly also has the means to destroy the United States. In that case, everyone would be killed. That is not something living people naturally desire.
Europeans, at least the French, know that in the case of a Soviet attack on the West, you would not immediately respond with your full force, because that would mean your death, and besides, that of the adversary. You would take some time before fully committing, and during that time, Europe would be in a tragic situation. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union used only tactical weapons, the result would be that all of Europe would be destroyed, that is, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany by Soviet weapons, and East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary by American ones. In the meantime, the United States and the Soviet Union would not strike each other, but a moment would come when they would have to and thus annihilate each other. I do not believe Russia wants that, any more than you or we do. That is not a policy, death.
We must therefore do something else, and something other than the policy of the Cold War, which serves only to prepare a hot war. The two blocs prevent development and the progress of freedom. Through détente, freedom inevitably gains ground. It has already made gains in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, where the process began thanks to détente, and even in Russia. That is what we want, and that’s why, with necessary precautions, as they are always needed, we support a policy of détente with the East.
Mr. Nixon: If freedom progresses through détente, why would Russia want it? Essentially because of its fear of China? Would it risk a détente that could weaken its hold over Eastern Europe?
General de Gaulle: I told you that there is communism, and that there is also Russia. Even if communism does not want détente, it may be that Russia does. What does détente mean? It means relations, contacts, travel, exchange of newspapers, goods; an attitude that makes people say, “We wish for development and peace; we must meet to try to iron out our difficulties together.” In such a climate, it is difficult for the communist dictatorship to maintain itself. Certainly, it tries to reassert control, but if it does, it is because it feels weakened. That is clearly the case in Czechoslovakia: the Czechs, in terms of national feeling, are no longer what they were ten years ago; they are much closer to us, in depth (I'm not talking about the newspapers or official sentiments, which are still manipulated). That is due to the beginning of a system of contacts and exchanges, the system of hope, because hope is re-emerging.
I went to Poland and Romania: I was struck there by the reception and enthusiasm of the population. Of course, they had some curiosity about seeing de Gaulle, but above all, they wanted to escape the straitjacket in which they had been trapped for so long. I sensed this even in Russia. People are people everywhere, even when covered in ideological paint. People long for freedom, peace, and dignity. But they cannot have that if there is no détente. In the tensions leading to war, there is no détente, and therefore no freedom for anyone. That is philosophy. But there is also practice. What else would you want to do, unless you plan to do nothing? Since you do not want war, there is no other policy to follow; and doing nothing is the last of all policies.
President Nixon: You are certainly right, but I would like to explain my position. If, the day after the new President of the United States took office six weeks ago, he had declared he wanted to meet with Kosygin and Brezhnev at a summit, the U.S. and the world would likely have applauded such a gesture for peace. But I did not do it, because I am convinced that such a summit must be prepared with the utmost care, especially when there is evident antagonism at the outset. This is different, of course, when dealing with people like us, who are fundamentally friends. It is not good for the President of the United States to enter into discussions with the Soviets without knowing exactly what he is going to say or what topics will be discussed. Talking just to talk is meaningless. We must not create false hopes for peace that may later be disappointed.
So I announced that discussions with the Soviets must indeed be prepared, but first by consulting our allies. In particular, the Soviets are interested in limiting strategic armaments: if we discuss that with them, it will inevitably affect American capabilities in Europe. There are other reasons as well why we should not act hastily. It may be true that the arms race increases the risk of war and that both the U.S. and the USSR would like to end it to ease their budgets. However, I do not want to make decisions regarding armaments based on financial reasons. The United States must provide itself with the means necessary to ensure its security. Politically, this may be difficult, but it is essential.
Moreover, discussing strategic arms with the Soviets in isolation seems to ignore a historical fact: wars are also caused by political tensions, independent of the arms race. If we reduce our arms and then there are flare-ups in the Middle East, Berlin, or Vietnam, that could lead to an escalation resulting in a major war. I agree with you that we must seize the current opportunity to work toward détente, but we must remain cool-headed and realistic in our talks with the Soviets: they know very well what they want, and we must also know very clearly what we want. In particular, arms reduction should not be a condition for discussions on the Middle East.
As we said at the ambassadorial level, we believe all issues must be addressed to achieve real détente. That’s why we think we must talk about the Middle East, and do it as a group of Four, as you propose (but we can discuss this further in a moment). We would also very much appreciate any support in resolving the Vietnam problem. It’s delicate for the Soviet Union because of China; but they do have influence over North Vietnam. Perhaps we could also discuss the Berlin problem, not necessarily to find an immediate solution, but to prepare one for the future. Do you think we are right to recommend such a cautious approach and to ask the Soviets to discuss multiple issues and not just arms limitations? An agreement on arms alone, if not accompanied by general political understanding on the Middle East, Europe, and Vietnam, would create false euphoria, an illusion of peace where there would be no real peace.
General de Gaulle: You are absolutely right. While recognizing that détente is the only acceptable policy, it must be pursued carefully, without rushing into the arms of the Soviets or addressing all issues at once by offering concessions. That is not at all what this is about. For our part, we began a policy of détente, but we never made political concessions, not even on Germany, although we had plenty of reasons to do so. One must focus on practical matters: if you start discussing nuclear arms, anti-missile systems, and issues already on the table, like Vietnam and the Middle East, as you propose, and if you manage to establish real contact with Russia to resolve these practical matters, you can certainly do so with all the necessary caution and dignity. But this does not mean unrolling a carpet beneath Brezhnev’s feet. You are absolutely right.
President Nixon: On the Middle East, whose issue is now being addressed following the French initiative for preliminary Four-Power talks, don’t you think it might also be useful to have bilateral conversations between the U.S. and the USSR at the same time? In any case, the Four-Power consultations would continue, and we would keep you informed of our talks with the Soviets. It’s generally recognized that a quadripartite solution to the Middle East problem is preferable to a purely bilateral one. However, my question is broader: we’ve often expressed good intentions about multilateral discussions or those at the United Nations (I’m not referring here to the Four-Power talks on the Middle East); but when major powers’ interests are involved, it’s sometimes not possible to move forward without occasional bilateral contacts. So I’d like to ask what you think of bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions on the Middle East alongside Four-Power talks at the UN.
General de Gaulle: If you commit to the path we believe is the only viable one to resolve the Middle East conflict, that is, through a Four-Power arrangement that would be imposed and implemented, then naturally you will have bilateral conversations with the USSR, just as we have them with you and with Moscow. I think it’s important for the two directly interested parties, the Arabs and Israel, that the Four Powers immediately demonstrate they are in agreement and are not just engaged in endless negotiations. Even before the conflict began, that is, before June 1967, France had proposed that the Four Powers say to both the Arabs and Israel: “No one must attack; we will rule against whoever does.” If that had been done, Israel’s attack and the resulting tragedies might have been prevented. You were not opposed, and the UK naturally followed you, but Russia didn’t agree because it believed the Arabs were stronger than they really were and hoped to increase its influence by supporting them in a war it did not therefore seek to prevent.
Now, the Soviets want to stop it, we and you both know this. The Four must show they are determined to succeed. Either this will be done quickly, or it will never happen. Of course, we must not pretend, for example, by solemnly declaring as a group that the Jarring mission continues. The Four must firmly agree to implement the Security Council resolution: Israeli troops must withdraw, Israel’s security and borders must be guaranteed, freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal must be ensured, including for Israel, and refugees must be allowed to return home if they wish. Then, an arrangement can be made about border demarcation, possibly with adjustments. If the Four Powers agree, this could happen quickly. If not, it will never happen, and the situation in the Middle East will worsen. Indeed, Israel is becoming more and more imperialistic; Dayan may become the dominant figure, he wants to go toward the Nile, the Euphrates, to Beirut and Damascus; and he can, because he has the means. The Arabs are scattered and poorly armed. But then he will find himself among Arab populations in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, accidents, assassinations, concentration camps will multiply, pipelines and oil wells will be blown up. Arab governments will collapse in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and will be replaced by fanatics, led by we know not whom, certainly not by you, nor even by the Soviets.
President Nixon: What concerns me, not just about the Middle East but other issues too, is that it’s essential for the United States not to enter into bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union that affect broader interests without fully knowing the positions of its core allies. However, there is the practical aspect: the Soviets dominate the opinion of many Arabs, and the U.S. is not without influence over Israel. It might be wise, therefore, for the U.S. and USSR to have bilateral contacts, without stepping outside the framework of the Four Powers, to try to move the negotiation forward. In any case, I believe it's better to use the Four-Power format than to act bilaterally. Provided there is a clear understanding with you and with the British, don’t you think bilateral conversations we might have with the Soviets on the Middle East, should the occasion arise, would be useful?
General de Gaulle: I repeat: on this issue, as with so many others, it is natural for you to have discussions with one another, including with the Soviets. That is what we do as well. In fact, they have shared their plan with you, and they have shared it with us too; so you can respond and exchange views with them. However, as you said, I think that for the operation to succeed and in the interest of all, the solution should not come from a Soviet-American a parte. Even more so because such a solution would not suffice. As powerful as the Soviets may be with the Arabs, and you with Israel, that won’t be enough to bring both sides to a solution. We must work on this as Four, and together. That is what we have proposed. The Four must develop a proposal and have it adopted by the Security Council. Indeed, if the Four agree on a proposal, the Council will adopt it and will be in a position to implement it. Right now, we have a Security Council resolution that is not being enforced. That’s why the agreement of the Four is needed. You tell me you have influence over Israel, and the Soviets have influence over the Arabs. We are not quite in the same situation as you, but we also have means to act and be heard on both sides, especially among the Arabs, who want us to be part of a settlement. That is why I think that if you accept Four-Power consultation to give the Security Council the means to act, we might succeed, and that wouldn’t stop you from having bilateral conversations with others. On the other hand, if the proposal came only from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, there would be difficulties. There won’t be if the proposal comes from the U.S., the Soviet Union, France, and the UK.
Mr. Nixon: I agree with you: It is much better that the United States not go it alone with the Soviets and that any eventual arrangement not be of the “Yalta” type. Moreover, it would be very unfortunate if the Soviets appeared to be the only friends of the Arabs. If the arrangement were proposed only by the United States and the Soviet Union, the former would appear to be siding solely with Israel, and the latter solely with the Arabs. A joint position by the Four, with the participation of Great Britain, which has a role to play, would provide much more balance to the whole.
General de Gaulle: If the United States and France could agree on a practical solution, it would greatly facilitate an agreement with the Soviets. In fact, they want the issue resolved and are not at all reassured by the possibility of an anarchic outcome in the Middle East. They would therefore accept a solution reached between us two.
Mr. Nixon: I recently read the minutes of the conversations that took place at the officials’ level, and it seems to me that the views of France and the United States are moving in the same direction. I hope Mr. Debré and Mr. Rogers can discuss this matter right here and that we can then reach a definitive agreement.
General de Gaulle: To speak frankly, we have always been favorable to Israel and continue to support the existence of the State of Israel. Up until June 1967, we supported it consistently and supplied it with everything it requested; and that was quite a lot, which they always paid us for. Our relations were excellent; I received Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol, and Eban right here. However, since June 1967, we have changed our stance. We told Israel it should not attack. We were sure of its military success, but also sure that serious difficulties would follow and that everyone would be placed in an unfortunate situation. Had Israel been threatened, we would have contributed to its defense. But it attacked on its own initiative; it occupied Jordanian territories, Gaza, and the Sinai. And now? The troubles are only increasing. We therefore believe it must return to its original lines. Then efforts can be made to improve its borders. But first, Israel must give up its conquests. Then it must be recognized by all Arab countries with specific guarantees, and we are ready to contribute to that on an international level. We are also determined to ensure freedom of navigation. But the current situation cannot continue, or else everyone’s misfortunes will only increase.
Mr. Nixon: Regarding Israel, I’d like to clarify two points. First, some believe that no U.S. president can make any decision about Israel without taking into account the Jewish vote. That is not the case for me.
General de Gaulle: I know that.
Mr. Nixon: The decision I will make concerning the Middle East, as well as the one I will eventually make regarding strategic armaments, will not be based on domestic political considerations. Secondly, the United States must certainly exert its influence so that Israel accepts a settlement, but without making it seem like one is being imposed. And that’s a delicate matter. You know very well that the essential part of a Four-Power agreement must concern the guarantees, and Israel is extremely sensitive to the idea that a settlement might be imposed from outside. It seems to me that what we agree on today could be accepted by Israel; it’s a matter of presentation.
General de Gaulle: If the Four Powers are in agreement, the Security Council, which will certainly accept their proposal, will have the means to implement it, because Israel will be obliged to comply. Once the Four have expressed their intent, Israel will not be able to remain isolated. Moreover, “impose” is just a word: in reality, that is what it would be. Otherwise, Israel will never agree to return to its original lines. It will understand that it’s better for it to accept the solution than to eventually face pressure, then sanctions, from the Security Council.
Mr. Nixon: I must confess that I am pessimistic about the Middle East. Even if the settlement you envision were applied, radical forces may continue to intervene, like the fedayeen and others in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and perhaps Algeria. Any settlement risks being fragile. We may only be able to gain time. That is my personal feeling. I also believe it is in Israel’s interest for France, the United States, Great Britain, and to some extent Italy to support the stable forces in the Arab world, and let’s say, conservative, such as in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia. After a settlement is reached, the policy of the nations interested in the region’s stability must aim to support the existing governments, if only to ensure they adhere to the agreement and that revolutionary forces cannot seize power.
General de Gaulle: You are absolutely right.