Second Meeting between General de Gaulle and President Nixon
Saturday, March 1, 1969, 10:00 a.m. - 11:55 a.m.
Mr. Nixon: In our expanded meeting, we could discuss monetary, commercial, and economic issues. In this one-on-one conversation with you, perhaps we can talk about the European situation, Vietnam, and the current issue provoked by new Soviet harassment in Berlin. I would like to know your opinion on these different matters, if we have time to cover them all. As for Berlin, I believe that without being provocative or belligerent, we must be firm and insist on the freedom of access. The action currently being taken by the East Germans is clearly being directed by the Soviets and does not seem directly related to the federal elections.
General de Gaulle: One must understand that the Soviet Union will never accept Germany regaining true political and military power. It observes that there is significant economic development in Germany, in fact on both sides of the Wall, it cannot oppose this, but it will never accept Germany becoming a major power again. To make this stance clear, it is seizing the opportunity presented by the election of the Federal President being held in Berlin; this being not entirely in accordance with the status of the city, whose government depends only on the victorious powers. This naturally creates a difficult situation for you, for us, and for Great Britain.
Mr. Nixon: Don’t you think it’s necessary to insist on maintaining the right of military access, aside from civilian access?
General de Gaulle: There is no doubt about it. Military access is a right defined by the status signed by the four occupying powers. Besides, the Soviets are not objecting to that. The current issue concerns the movement of civilians.
Mr. Nixon: What do you think about the future of the European countries, particularly Germany, and also about the possible consequences that détente between the United States and the Soviet Union could have on Western Europe, its ability to defend itself, and the Communist parties, especially in Italy? Yesterday we spoke about the effects of détente on Eastern Europe.
General de Gaulle: In London, Brussels, Bonn, Berlin, and Rome, you have seen that there is no Europe. Perhaps one day it will exist, but the fact is that it does not today. There are European countries, more or less devastated by the war, two of them suffered defeat, and two were victorious with you, but heavily damaged and suffering great losses: Great Britain and France. There are also small countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, which are respectable, but do not carry much weight. As for England, France, Germany, and Italy, these are extremely different countries; they always have been, and are as much so today as ever. They differ in language, in secular and even millennia-old customs. The United Kingdom is built for commerce, outward-facing toward the ocean; France and Germany are continental nations, also open to the sea, but not as organically so as the UK. As for Italy, it is a peninsula, situated in the Mediterranean and isolated, because it is simply a peninsula and in that sea.
What is their respective situation? France, England, and Italy have recovered their borders and their democratic regimes; but, I repeat, they have been significantly diminished and are aware of it. And then there is Germany, source of all troubles, especially in the first and second world wars. Its situation is very specific: it is divided in two and watched closely by Russia and its satellites, especially Poland. It has been diminished, not economically, but politically. It is no longer an independent country. In fact, it must request and accept your protectorate, without which it could not stand. This is not the case for France. Of course, it is not at the level it was when it built Versailles and the Trianon; but it has recovered itself, it is again a national reality and does not need a protectorate. It is naturally pleased to have friends and, if needed, allies. Germany and Italy, however, need your protectorate, and Germany especially could not have security without you.
England could have managed without, but in the political, economic, and monetary domains, since Churchill, it has chosen to follow your policy, from which it draws or believes it draws benefit. It has deliberately accepted to place itself under your general leadership. Between these different countries, the differences are fundamental. One can regret this, by imagining another situation, and say it is a pity that these countries cannot agree on all subjects. But that is not possible because of their interests and relative situations that are too different. Nevertheless, that does not prevent them from living.
A word now about the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. Faced with a Soviet threat that is still real, though it mostly was, these so differing European countries have a common interest. The Soviet Union has become an enormous power, which it wasn’t before, and Europe’s common interest is not to allow itself to be invaded by it. That is why the Atlantic Alliance was natural: if Europe were attacked by the Soviet Union, the United States would be allied with the whole of Western Europe. That is a good thing, and it was wise to create it in 1949. For the moment, since the Soviet threat still exists and real détente hasn’t happened yet, the Atlantic Alliance must be maintained, that is, the commitment by the United States to Europe to fight together the Soviet Union in the event of an attack by it.
There is also NATO, an organization created to integrate the military forces of European states under American command. Naturally, this was dressed up with a Council and various Committees, but that is what this organization means: to prepare for defense against the Soviet Union under the direction of American command, and to fight under that command if war broke out. One is committed in advance, and accepts to no longer have a genuine national policy nor national defense. Practically, this notion could be justified in the beginning, when the Soviet threat was immediate and European nations had lost their substance. These had to accept to be defended by the United States. That was natural because, at the time, the US was the only one with the atomic weapon, and NATO was conceived as the defense of Europe through that American weapon.
However, everything has changed: the Soviets are no longer as threatening (I am not saying they never will be again, precautions are needed, and therefore keeping the Atlantic Alliance); but their threat is not immediate, and I do not believe they intend to attack Europe. Moreover, European nations, including France, have regained national substance and some means, even atomic. Finally, the United States are no longer the only ones to possess powerful nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union has its own.
Therefore, the issue of protection by the American nuclear arsenal is no longer posed in the same conditions as when NATO was created. In this situation, France remains in the Alliance and remains the ally of the United States. When needed, it made that clear, as during the Cuban crisis and other occasions. I repeat to you today: if there were a world war, France would be with you. Yet, while remaining committed to the Alliance, France is no longer in the organization of national and military integration.
I have explained this many times: for France, such an integration would be worthless, as it would mean giving up, notably, national defense. Being in NATO for France would amount to saying: if there’s a war, it’s that of the United States, and not that France; the United States will do what they want, and France will be at their discretion. That’s not enough to animate a national defense. NATO means the absence of national defense and exclusive power to the United States. But France cannot exist as it is and has always been without a national policy and national defense. Without them, it falls apart, it disperses itself among a multitude of political parties, it is unable to have a government, it weakens, and no longer stands. To be itself, it must have national policy and defense. The best service it can render the Alliance is to be itself, with its own forces and policy, because in war, a France armed with its substance and its reality would be more useful than a France without a national soul.
What is true for France is not necessarily true for other European countries, first of all for Germany. Germany needs your protectorate for reasons which are its own, which are not related to France. It is therefore natural, and I’ve told Chancellor Kiesinger this a hundred times, that Germany remains in NATO. We have no objection to that, and we have never suggested anything else.
The same for Italy: it is less threatened than Germany, but it lacks vigor. Its economic situation is improving and becoming appreciable, but Italy has never been a solid country. It is thus normal that it would place itself under your protectorate and consequently remain in NATO. The same naturally goes for Belgium and the Netherlands, who do not have means, and we have never held a different view concerning them.
Mr. Nixon: I think that you also include Greece and Turkey.
General de Gaulle: Of course. Then there is finally the United Kingdom, which could, like us, have remained in the Alliance while leaving NATO to pursue an independent policy and defense. Yet it judged it more beneficial to remain under the United States' and thus within NATO. It has atomic armaments that it developed with and thanks to you, which is not the case for us; for reasons of language, commerce, and currency, it has tied itself to you and therefore holds on to NATO. That is fairly normal, given that they are English, and I said nothing against it.
As for France, I say it is good to remain in the Alliance, that’s what we are doing, but it is necessary for France to have its own policy and defense and therefore not be part of NATO integration. For reasons different from Germany, which has no political power and has been divided in two; different from Italy, which has no resilience; and different from the United Kingdom, which has deliberately chosen to be your second-in-command; the Benelux countries and the Scandinavians quite naturally seek your protection through NATO.
In short, regarding France: yes to the Alliance, no to NATO. As for the other countries, we have no objection to them saying yes to both.
Mr. Nixon: I think I understand you well. Whatever the divergences, we must proceed from the facts as they are to grasp the deeper intentions. In any case, our goal is the same. Perhaps we could develop a framework for consultation and mutual assistance in military matters that would align with the position of independence you just described.
As I told your Minister of Defense yesterday regarding the French nuclear deterrent, I have a different view than those that some expressed previously. I do believe it is good for the United States to have another power like France at its side possessing nuclear capability. It is not good for the non-communist countries that the United States be the only country with strategic weapons.
As for the future, should European cooperation develop, it would be useful for it to be founded on the French position. More important still, I hope we can reach with France, in accordance with its position of independence, an extension and deepening of our military cooperation in closer conditions than those that exist today.
General de Gaulle: We have no objection to having military relations with the United States that we know are our allies and that we are yours. What we dislike is that these relations are always proposed through NATO. We constantly find the United States in the form of NATO. Yet, we want military relations with the United States, but not through the intermediary of NATO.
I have great respect for General Lemnitzer, with whom I have often spoken. When he tells me he regrets not having satisfactory military relations with us, though we do have some, I do not share his regret. No matter what he says, to us, he is the United States, but under the guise of NATO.
Things would be very different if we had relations with the United States as we once did. In that case, we could indeed develop them.
As for the French nuclear force, it would not serve European nations in any way, in their current situation, if it were integrated. But in another situation, and so long as it is not integrated, it could serve them. Yet the current situation is precisely not definitive.
There is a fact: as I was telling you yesterday, I am convinced that the Soviet threat is decreasing and will continue to decrease, mainly because of China. As relations evolve between the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States, especially if you manage to establish a modus vivendi with Russia, the general atmosphere would change. That is one of the reasons why Europe’s situation would not remain the same.
I also believe that the movement which has begun, whereby France, the UK, even Germany and Italy are regaining more consistency, strength, and national reality, will continue. I therefore do not despair that one day these different states, including even England, that is not continental, would end up agreeing on permanent consultation in the political domain, and perhaps even to reach defense arrangements, with the Atlantic Alliance continuing to exist.
Regaining their economic, political, and even military reality, these countries could come to an understanding. That’s not for today, it is perhaps possible tomorrow. I have not given up on this idea; I have always hoped for it and it’s in that hope that we have acted.
That is the reason why we must accept reconciliation with Germany, which required a great effort on France’s part; why we have established good relations with Italy; and why we hope to have good relations with the United Kingdom (though it must be said that the latter is not very forthcoming). One cannot rule out that the Soviet threat may diminish and European states may gain in substance.
Moreover, there are no fundamental oppositions between them, no border disputes, no more Alsace-Lorraine, no Schleswig-Holstein, no colonial differences between France and England. These states could therefore come together, consult, and undertake coordinated policy, even in defense matters.
The day that becomes possible, the Atlantic Alliance will change: it will no longer be an American protectorate, but an alliance between the United States and European states. America’s burden in Europe will be lightened. In the event of war, the United States with all its forces and Europe with all its own will be together. There will be no need for the strict and immediate integration like that which exists within NATO. We will no longer need such large American forces in Germany and other European countries. Everything will be different. I believe it, and I wish for it.
Mr. Nixon: What do you think of the current situation of American forces in NATO and in Germany? The political leaders I’ve spoken with insisted that any reduction of American forces in Europe would be disastrous for German morale. So is it better to maintain these forces at their current level, despite the diminished Soviet threat, because of German sentiment?
General de Gaulle: I’ve already said it to the Germans, and I repeat it to you here: it is natural, for the moment, that Germany remains in NATO and that American forces remain in Germany. It is not for me to assess the precise level of these forces. Nonetheless, that level should have value and significance. It can be higher or lower, but the essential thing is that the American presence in Germany matches the overall situation.
Mr. Nixon: So you would not be favorable to the “tripwire” theory, the idea of symbolic troops that would suffice to trigger the general apparatus in case of a Soviet attack?
General de Gaulle: The American presence in Germany must be real. However, if détente develops with the East and the United States reaches agreements with the Soviet Union, it’s likely that these psychological reasons will become less pressing and that you might then reduce your presence in Germany. Still, that is your concern, not France’s.
We too have forces in Germany, maintained at our own expense, and not by the Germans. Ours are the most significant after yours. We have more troops than the United Kingdom. We haven’t withdrawn them for the same psychological reasons you haven’t withdrawn yours. That’s normal in the current situation, though it may not always be so.
Mr. Nixon: We will have another private meeting tomorrow, Sunday. By then, I will have met with Ambassador Lodge. I would like to talk to you then about Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There’s another topic I consider very important: when we met in 1963, you told me it was in the West’s interest that the United States and France be able to correspond privately, without displaying it too publicly so as not to irritate others, particularly the Soviet Union and China. I fully agree with that. But there’s also the question of our own communications, not only with the Soviet Union but also with China. I would like your opinion on this matter. It may be wise not to put all our eggs in one basket, namely, that of the Soviet Union. Right now, the State Department believes we must not only pursue détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also aim for some sort of understanding between the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union against China. That may be a good short-term policy, but in the long run, we must recognize that our interests might be better served by following what you also told me in 1963, that the Soviet Union and China were two major powers with which we had to maintain parallel relationships. Nonetheless, the issue of relations with China presents enormous difficulties, for everyone in fact.
General de Gaulle: Of course. We can talk about Vietnam on Sunday as you suggest, but I’d like to say a few words now, since you’ll be meeting with your delegation tomorrow, and we know something they might not yet be aware of. As the negotiations are taking place in Paris, we naturally have some contacts with the North Vietnamese delegates, and even with those of the National Front. The day before yesterday, the head of the Front's delegation came to the Quai d’Orsay to say that if there was a Viet Cong offensive in the South, it was because the Paris negotiations weren’t working. They had therefore been forced to resume military action, though they did so reluctantly. If real negotiations were to begin, the situation on the ground would be different.
Mr. Nixon: I would like to outline my position on Vietnam. We are determined to do everything we can to end the war through negotiation, in a way compatible with what we see as an acceptable modus vivendi for both South and North Vietnam. However, if the North and the Front intensify their attacks, especially against cities, I am not the type to take that lightly. I am convinced that we must end this war one way or another, but not in a hasty or reckless manner. The worst policy would be one of indecision and vagueness. We have entered the path of negotiation, but if we’re met with a wall, we may take other paths, and I am prepared for that. As you know, it takes two to make peace. We are ready and are entering negotiations with an open mind. To succeed, it might be better, and I’ll discuss this with Lodge tomorrow, to have private negotiations with the Vietnamese. That might build more trust. We would like to be able to count on France’s help to get out of the current impasse. Soviet influence could also act in a beneficial way. Do you think they would want to help us end the war?
General de Gaulle: They certainly don’t want the war to continue indefinitely, first of all, because they don’t know what could happen. Politically, they’ve become conservative and don’t want difficulties. Then, this war is very costly for them. They provide equipment through sea, land, and air routes that are not easy and very expensive.
Mr. Nixon: That’s what Kosygin was already saying in 1967.
General de Gaulle: He told me here himself. The Soviets are therefore sincere in their desire for peace. Admittedly, they want it alongside their views, namely that all foreigners withdraw from Vietnam. They are obligated to adopt this stance because of their ideology and politics, and they will remain firm in that attitude. It is good for their propaganda to say everywhere, including in France, that the United States wants war, doesn’t wish for peace, that they are oppressing a foreign country, etc. Nevertheless, they still want an end to the war.
Would you like us to bring in Mr. Couve de Murville before the broader meeting, so he can hear other matters you want to discuss?
Mr. Couve de Murville joins the conversation.
General de Gaulle: Mr. Nixon is asking my thoughts on the relationship the United States might establish with China, in parallel to its relationship with the Soviet Union. American opinion is indeed divided: some say it’s better to play the Soviet Union against China, others think it’s better to maintain relations with both powers. You know, Mr. President, that we have relations with China. They don’t bring us much, apart from perhaps in the economic and cultural domains. We could maybe expand those exchanges, because China has significant needs, and diplomatic relations facilitate economic relations. If we have these relations with China, it is not because we are expecting much from them, for now, in the political domain. China is in complete turmoil; it has just emerged from its “Cultural Revolution,” which was just a general agitation. It seems, however, to be returning to a more normal situation. It’s a very huge beast with immense resources, that is working and making clear progress in industry, technology, and the nuclear domain. It has ambitions and is active everywhere, even in Paris, Africa, and Asia. As time goes on, its political role and weight will grow considerably.
What attitude should be taken toward it? Ignore it and let it stew in its own juice? Or try to establish possible contacts with it? That’s the path we’ve chosen, not with illusions about the present, but thinking ahead. We believe China should not be consigned to outer darkness. It’s better to know them and to have exchanges with them in all areas. We want to begin a détente between China and ourselves, and with the West. What will the effect be on Russia? That’s hard to say. The Soviets have always seemed to recommend normal relations with China, and they do so themselves. But do they really want them and do they want them to develop? That’s not our concern. What is our concern is to know China, to penetrate it if possible, to get it to sit at the table with us and to offer it openings. It’s up to you to draw your own conclusions. If you decided to start normal relations with China, and that would mean it would sit at the UN, it would certainly stir up a lot of dust and make a big impression. But I don’t think the result would be a bad one.
Mr. Nixon: There’s short-term policy and long-term policy. For various reasons, we can’t change much in the short term regarding Asia. In the long term, however, it seems undeniable that it would be very bad for the interests of the United States, and the entire West, if we appeared to be aligned with the Soviet Union against China, that they would thus seek to isolate it completely. I therefore believe, like you, that it is necessary to establish, if possible, a line of communication with China, so we can sound it out, and so we have, in our discussions with the Soviet Union, a kind of “floating anchor” to counterbalance the Soviets if necessary. That doesn’t mean we should brutally appear to be playing one against the other, but it would mean that within ten years, when China will have significant nuclear capability, we will have far more communication with it than we do today. Could such a policy create difficulties or dangers for détente with the Soviet Union?
General de Gaulle: For you, the question is to know (for us, it’s settled) whether it is better to establish relations with China before you’re forced to do so by China’s own development, or only once you are forced to.
The one-on-one meeting ends after General de Gaulle and Mr. Nixon exchanged their views on the procedure for the expanded meeting: in response to a question from Mr. Nixon, General de Gaulle would present what the two Presidents had said about the European situation, so that Mr. Rogers and Mr. Kissinger in particular, after their visits to other European capitals, would be informed of it. Mr. Nixon also informed General de Gaulle that he would inform him of any conversations he might have with the Soviets, and that he would consult him if he had decisions to make.