The Battle of Montenotte
Memoirs of Napoleon: The Campaign of Italy, Chapter II
Memoirs of Napoleon
The Campaign of Italy
Chapter II
I. Campaign plan. — II. Status report of the armies. — III. Napoleon arrives in Nice (March 27, 1796). — IV. Battle of Montenotte (April 12). — V. Battle of Millesimo (April 14). — VI. Battle of Dego (April 15). — VII. Battle of San Michele (April 19). —Battle of Mondovi (April 22). — VIII. Armistice of Cherasco (April 28). — IX. Is it proper to cross the Po and move further away from France? — X. Aide-de-camp Murat crosses Piedmont and brings news of the army's victories to Paris.
I. Campaign plan.
The King of Sardinia, whose geographical and military position dubbed him the gatekeeper of the Alps, had in 1796 fortresses at the end of all the gorges leading to Piedmont. To penetrate into Italy by forcing the Alps, it was necessary to seize one or more of these fortresses; the roads did not allow the transport of siege artillery; the mountains are covered with snow three-quarters of the year, which leaves very little time for the siege of strongholds. Napoleon conceived the idea of going around all the Alps and entering Italy precisely at the point where these high mountains end and the Apennines begin, as we saw in Chapter I. The Mont Blanc is the highest point of the Alps, from which the chain of these mountains slopes downwards on the Adriatic side, as well as on the Mediterranean side, to Giacomo, where they end and the Apennines begin, which rise gradually up to Monte San Giacomo, near Rome. Monte San Giacomo is therefore the lowest point of the Alps and the Apennines at the same time, where the former end and the latter begin. Savona, a seaport and stronghold, was situated to serve as a depot and a support point. From this city to the Madonna there are three miles; a railway road led there; and from the Madonna to Carcare there are six miles, which could be made passable for artillery in a few days. At Carcare, there were roads for vehicles leading into the interior of Piedmont and Monferrat; this point was the only place where one could enter Italy without encountering mountains. The elevations of the terrain there were not very significant, which is why, later under the Empire, the project for a canal was conceived that would link the Adriatic to the Mediterranean via the Po, the Tanaro, and the Bormida, with a system of locks from this river to Savona. By penetrating into Italy via Savone, Cadibona, Carcare, and the Bormida, one could hope to separate the Sardinian and Austrian armies, as from there both Lombardy and Piedmont could be threatened; one could march on Milan as well as Turin. The Piedmontese had an interest in covering Turin, and the Austrians in covering Milan.
II. Status report of the armies.
The enemy army was commanded by General Beaulieu, a distinguished officer who had gained a reputation in the northern campaigns. It was well-equipped and formidable. It was composed of Austrians, Sardinians, and Neapolitans. It was twice the size of the French army and was expected to be reinforced by contingents from Naples, the Pope, Modena, and Parma. It was divided into two main corps: the Austrian active army, composed of four infantry divisions with forty-two battalions, forty-four squadrons, and one hundred forty cannons, amounting to 45,000 men under the lieutenant generals Argenteau, Melas, Vukassovich, Liptai, and Sebottendorf; and the active Sardinian army, composed of three infantry divisions and one cavalry division, with a total of 25,000 men and sixty cannons. This force was commanded by Austrian General Colli and Generals Provera and La Tour. The remaining Sardinian forces were stationed in garrisons or defending the frontier opposite the French Alpine army, under the command of the Duke of Aosta.
The French army was composed of four active infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions under their generals; in total, 25,000 infantrymen, 2,500 cavalrymen, 2,500 artillerymen, sappers, administration, etc. This made a total of 30,000 men under arms. The army's full strength was 106,000 men; however, 36,000 were prisoners, dead, or had deserted. A proper review had long been awaited to officially remove them from the records. Another 20,000 men were stationed in the 8th military division in Toulon, Marseille, and Avignon, ranging from the mouths of the Rhône to the Var. They could only be used for the defense of Provence, which was under the ministry's jurisdiction. This left an active force of 50,000 men on the left bank of the Var, including 5,000 in hospitals and 7,000 in storage units of infantry, cavalry (including 2,500 unmounted men), and artillery; leaving 38,000 men actively under arms ready to go on campaign; 8,000 infantry and artillery men were stationed in the garrisons of Nice, Villefranche, Monaco, the coasts of Genoa, Saorgio, and guarding the upper crest of the Alps, from Argentière to Tanaro. The cavalry was in the worst state, having spent a long time on the Rhône to recover, but lacked supplies there.
The arsenals of Nice and Antibes were well stocked with artillery but lacked transport means; all the draft horses were in miserable condition. The financial shortage was so severe that, despite all its efforts, the government could only provide 2,000 gold louis in cash to the army treasury for the campaign’s launch and one million in bills, some of which were protested. The army lacked everything and could hope for nothing from France; it had to expect everything from victory. It was only in the plains of Italy that it could organize its transports, harness its artillery, clothe its soldiers, and mount its cavalry. The French army had only 30,000 men present under arms and thirty pieces of cannon; in contrast, they faced 80,000 men and two hundred pieces of cannon. If they had to fight in a general battle, their numerical inferiority, combined with the lack of artillery and cavalry, would have prevented them from resisting. They would have to compensate for their numerical disadvantage with rapid marches, for their lack of artillery with the nature of their maneuvers, and for their cavalry inferiority with strategic positioning; for the morale of French soldiers was excellent; they had distinguished themselves and hardened on the rocks of the Alps and the Pyrenees. Hardships, poverty, and misery are the school of a good soldier.
III. Napoleon arrives in Nice (March 27, 1796).
Napoleon arrived in Nice on March 27; the state of the army, presented to him by General Schérer, was worse than he had imagined. The bread supply was secured, but meat had not been distributed for a long time. There were only five hundred mules for transportation; they could only move a maximum of thirty cannons. Every day, the situation worsened: there was no time to waste. The army could no longer stay where it was; it had to advance or retreat. He ordered them to advance and to surprise the enemy at the beginning of the campaign, stunning them with brilliant and decisive victories. The general headquarters had not left Nice since the war began; Napoleon set it in motion toward Albenga. For a long time, all administrative services had been operating as if in fixed positions, focusing more on comforts of life than the army's needs.
While reviewing the troops, he said to them:
“Soldiers, you are naked, badly fed; the government owes you much but can give you nothing. Your patience, the courage you show amidst these rocks are admirable, but they bring you no glory; no fame shines upon you. I want to lead you to the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in your power; you will find honor, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, would you lack courage or perseverance?”
This speech from a twenty-six-year-old general, whose reputation already gleamed from the operations at Toulon, Saorgio, and Cairo, was met with enthusiastic acclamations.
To bypass the Alps and enter Italy through the Cadibona Pass, the entire army had to be gathered at one point, an extremely dangerous maneuver if the snows had still covered the Alpine passes. The transition from a defensive to an offensive stance is one of the most delicate operations. Sérurier was stationed at Garessio with his division to observe Colli’s encampments near Ceva; Masséna and Augereau were in Loano, Finale, and Savona. Laharpe was positioned to threaten Genoa; his vanguard, commanded by Brigadier General Cervoni, occupied Voltri.
The French ambassador requested the Genoese Senate to allow the passage of La Bocchetta and the keys to Gavi, announcing that the French intended to penetrate Lombardy and support their operations around Genoa. The rumor spread rapidly in the city; the Senate and councils went into permanent session. The impact of which was soon felt in Milan.
IV. Battle of Montenotte (April 12).
Alarmed, Beaulieu rushed to the defense of Genoa. He established his headquarters in Novi and divided his army into three corps: the right wing, composed of Piedmontese forces under Colli’s command, was stationed at Ceva to defend the Stura and Tanaro rivers. The center, under the command of Argenteau, set up headquarters at Sassello and marched toward Montenotte to cut off the French army’s advance toward Genoa by attacking its left flank and intercepting it at Savona along the Corniche road. Beaulieu himself, with the left wing, advanced from Bocchetta toward Voltri to protect Genoa.
At first glance, these dispositions appeared well thought out; however, upon closer examination of the geography, it became clear that Beaulieu was dividing his forces. Communication between his center and left wing was impractical except through the mountains, whereas the French army, in contrast, was positioned to rapidly concentrate its forces within a few hours and strike either one of the enemy corps at full strength. If one of them was defeated, the other would be forced to retreat.
General Argenteau, commanding the enemy’s central force, camped at Lower Montenotte on April 10. On April 11, he advanced toward Monte-Legino to emerge at the Madonna on Savona. Colonel Rampon, responsible for guarding the three redoubts of Monte-Legino, upon receiving news of the enemy’s movement, launched a strong reconnaissance to meet it; it was brought from midday until two o’clock when they were pushed back into the redoubts. Argenteau attempted to capture them straight away; he was pushed back in three successive attacks by Rampon. Since his troops were exhausted, he took position, with the aim to outflank the redoubts the following day. Meanwhile, Beaulieu emerged on Genoa on the 10th. That same day, he attacked General Cervoni, ahead of Voltri; Cervoni defended his position throughout the day, took up a new position on Mont de la Fourche. In the evening, he retreated and joined his division under Laharpe, which, before dawn on the 12th, was positioned behind Rampon at Monte-Legino. During the night, the French commander-in-chief advanced with Augereau’s and Masséna’s divisions, the latter through the Cadibona Pass and emerging from the Bric de Menao and Castlas, behind Montenotte. At the crack of dawn on the 12th, Argenteau, surrounded on all sides, was attacked head-on by Rampon and Laharpe, and from the rear and flanks by Masséna’s division. The rout was total; everything was either killed, captured, or scattered. Four flags, five cannons, and 2,000 prisoners were the trophies of the day.
At the same time, Beaulieu arrived at Voltri, but found no one there. He entered with no resistance with Nelson, the British admiral. It was only on the 13th that Beaulieu learned of the disaster at Montenotte and the French entry into Piedmont. He was then forced to hurriedly regroup his troops and retreat along the treacherous paths where the disposition of his plan had led them. This detour was such that only a part of his troops managed to reach Millesimo two days later, and it took him twelve days to evacuate his supply depots at Voltri and Bocchetta; which forced him to leave troops behind to protect them.
V. Battle of Millesimo (April 14).
On April 12th, the headquarters of the army arrived at Carcare. The Piedmontese had retreated on Millesimo and the Austrians on Dego. These two positions were linked by a Piedmontese brigade which occupied the heights of Biestro. At Millesimo, the Piedmontese were on horseback over the way that covers Piedmont; they were joined by Colli, with all that he could muster from the right. At Dego, the Austrians occupied the position which defends the way to Acqui, direct road to Milan; they were joined by Beaulieu and all he could muster from Voltri. There he was in position to receive all the reinforcements that Lombardy could furnish him with. Thus the two great entries into Piedmont and Milan were covered; the enemy flattered itself with having had the time to establish himself and retreat to it. However advantageous the battle of Montenotte could have been for the French, the enemy had found in the superiority of numbers the means to repair his losses. But, two days later on the 14th, the Battle of Millesimo opened both roads to Turin and Milan.
Augereau, forming the left, marched on Millesimo ; Masséna, with the center, launched himself towards Biestro and Dego, and Laharpe, with the right, advanced on the heights of Cairo: the French Army thereby occupied the four leagues of terrain from the right to the left. The enemy supported his right by having the hill of Cosseria occupied, which dominates the two branches of the Bormida. But, as of the 13th, General Augereau, whose troops had not given battle at Montenotte, pushed the right of the enemy with such impetuosity, that he took from him the gorges of Millesimo and surrounded the hill of Cosseria. The Austrian general Provera, with his rearguard of 2,000 men, was cut off. In such a desperate position, he responded with boldness. This general took refuge in an old ruined castle and barricaded himself within. From this height, he could see the right of the Sardinian army, that was making preparations for the next day’s battle, where he could expect to be removed. The General-in-Chief felt the importance of seizing, within the same day of the 13th, the castle of Cosseria. But this position was too strong, many attacks failed. The next day, two armies were on each other. Masséna and Laharpe removed Dego after an obstinate struggle; Menard and Joubert, the heights of Biestro. All the attacks of Colli to clear Cosseria were vain; he was beaten and continued stubbornly. So Provera laid down his arms. The enemy, vividly pursued to the gorges of Spigno, on the road of Acqui, by 400 men of the 22nd Chasseurs, 7th Hussars, and 15th Dragoons, left thirty or so pieces of harnesses cannons and sixty caissons, fifteen flags, and 6,000 prisoners, among which two generals and twenty-four colonels. The General-in-Chief found himself at all times in the most important moments.
The separation of the two armies, Austrian and Sardinian, was thereby well pronounced. Beaulieu placed his headquarters to Acqui, road to Milan, and Colli placed himself at Ceva, to oppose the junction to Serurier and cover Turin.
VI. Battle of Dego (April 15).
However, the Austrian grenadier division of Vukassovich, which had been led from Voltri by Sassello, arrived on April 15th at three in the morning at Dego. The position was no longer occupied but by a few French battalions. These grenadiers easily took this village, and the alarm was great at the French headquarters, where there was barely an inkling of how the enemies could be at Dego, when the outposts, placed on the road to Acqui, were not disturbed. Napoleon marched towards it; after two hours of a very intense struggle, Dego was retaken, and the enemy division was almost entirely taken prisoner or killed. The Adjutant General Lanusse, since then Divisional General, gloriously fallen on the battlefield of Alexandria in Egypt in 1801, decided the victory during an uncertain moment. At the head of two battalions of light troops; he climbed the left side of the Dego hill; battalions of Hungarian grenadiers ran to prevent them from coming up; two columns advanced and pulled back three times; but, at the third time, Lanusse, putting his hat at the edge of his sword, boldly advanced and sealed the victory. This act, which occurred under the full view of the General-in-Chief, earned him the rank of Brigade General. Generals Causse and Banel were killed; they were coming from the Oriental Pyrenees. The officers who served in this army showed a most distinguished courage and impetuosity.
It is in the village of Dego that Napoleon noticed for the first time a battalion commander, who he made a colonel: it was Lannes, who since then became Marshall of the Empire, Duke of Montebello, and displayed the greatest talents; we will constantly see him thereafter take the greatest part in all events.
After the struggle of Dego, operations were directed against the Piedmontese; we settled for keeping the Austrians in check. Laharpe was placed in observation at the camp of San Benedetto, on the Belbo. Beaulieu, weakened, only concerned himself with rallying and organizing the remnants of his army. The Laharpe division, forced to remain many days in that position, suffered by the lack of supplies, the lack of transports, and the depletion of a country in which had sojourned so many troops; it gave way to a few disorders.
Serurier, informed at Garessio of the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo, seized the height of San-Giovanni-di-Murialdo, and entered Ceva on the same day that Augereau arrived on the heights of Montezemolo. On the 17th, after a vain resistance, Colli evacuated the fortified camp of Ceva, passed again by the Tanaro and retreated behind the Corsaglia, occupying by his right the Madonna de Vico. On the same day, the General-in-Chief brought his headquarters to Ceva; the enemy had left behind the camp artillery, which he did not have the time to take along, and merely placed a garrison in the fort.
The arrival of the army on the heights of Montezemolo was a sublime spectacle. From there it discovered the immense and fertile plains of Piedmont. Le Pô, Tanaro, and a mass of other rivers weaved away. This belt, white of snow and ice, of a prodigious elevation, surrounded this rich basin of promised land all the way to the horizon. These gigantic barriers, which seemed to be the limits of another world, that nature had found pleasing to render so formidable, of which art had not spared a thing, had just fallen as if by enchantment: “Hannibal forced the Alps,” said Napoleon while fixing his gaze on these mountains, “We, we have turned them!” Delightful phrase, that expressed in two words the thought and spirit of the campaign.
The army passed the Tanaro. For the first time, it found itself in the plain, cavalry became necessary; General Stengel, who commanded, passed the Corsaglia at Lesegno and swept the plain in order to scout the country. The headquarters arrived at the castle of Lesegno, on the right bank of that river, near the area where it flows into the Tanaro.
VII. Battle of San Michele (April 19) — Battle of Mondovi (April 22).
On April 19th, General Sérurier crossed the bridge of San Michele to attack the right of Colli’s army, at the same time as Masséna crossed the Tanaro to flank its left; but Colli, realizing the danger of his position, had abandoned it during the night and himself marched on his own right to take position at Mondovi. He found himself, by a fortuitous circumstance, with his forces precisely in front of San Michele as General Sérurier came out of the bridge; he stopped, faced him with superior forces and forced him to retreat. Yet Sérurier could have maintained himself in San Michele, if one of his regiments of light infantry hadn’t taken to pillaging. Sérurier arrived on the 22nd by the bridge of Torre, Masséna by that of San Michele, the General-in-Chief by Lesegno. These three columns launched towards Mondovi. Colli had already elevated a few redoubts and had taken position, his right to the Madonna de Vico and his left to the Bicocca. Sérurier took out the redoubt of the Bicocca and decided the battle of Mondovi. That town and all its supplies fell under the power of the victor.
General Stengel, who had strayed too far into the plains with a thousand cavalrymen in pursuit of the enemy, was attacked by the Piedmontese cavalry, which was brave and in very good condition. He took all the measures expected from an experienced general. He conducted his retreat in good order, but during a charge, he was mortally wounded by a lance thrust. Colonel Murat, leading three cavalry regiments, pushed back the Piedmontese and pursued them for several hours. General Stengel, an Alsatian, was an excellent hussar officer; he had served under Dumouriez and in other campaigns in the North. He was skilled, intelligent, and alert, combining the qualities of youth with those of advanced age. He was a true vanguard general. Two or three days before his death, when he was the first to enter Lesegno, the General-in-Chief arrived a few hours later, and everything he needed was already prepared: the passes and fords were identified, guides were ensured, the priest and the postmaster were questioned, links were established with the local inhabitants, spies were sent in multiple directions, postal letters were intercepted and analyzed for military information. All necessary precautions had been taken to establish supply depots to refresh the troops. Unfortunately Stengel was nearsighted, an essential flaw in his profession that proved fatal to him.
The loss of the Piedmontese in this battle was of 3,000 men, eight pieces of cannon, ten flags, 1,500 prisoners, including three generals. After the battle of Mondovi, the General-in-Chief marched on Cherasco, Serurier launched towards Fossano, Augereau on Alba. Beaulieu had, from Acqui, marched on Nizza-della-Paglia with half of his army to create a diversion that would be favorable to the Piedmontese, but too late; he retreated on the Po as soon as he learned of the treaty of Cherasco.
VIII. Armistice of Cherasco (April 28).
These three columns entered Cherasco, Fossano, and Alba simultaneously. Colli’s headquarters were in Fossano; Sérurier dislodged him. Cherasco, at the confluence of the Stura and the Tanaro, was strong but poorly armed and not provisioned, as it was not on the frontier. This acquisition was important for the army; no time was lost in putting it in a state of defense; the artillery magazines were filled with everything necessary to complete the armament. The French vanguard crossed the Stura and advanced beyond the small town of Bra. However, the junction with Sérurier had allowed communication with Nice via Ponte-di-Nava; reinforcements of artillery and all the necessary equipment arrived and were organized. The army had been enriched in all these different battles with many cannons and horses; many were gathered on the plain of Mondovi. A few days after the entry into Cherasco, the army had sixty well-provisioned and well-equipped guns.
The soldiers, who had been without rations for ten days during this campaign, began receiving them regularly again. Looting and disorder, which had followed the rapid movements, ceased; discipline was restored; the army quickly adapted to the abundance and resources of this beautiful country. The losses, moreover, had not been as great as one might think. The rapidity of the movements, the impetuosity of the troops, and especially the art of always confronting the enemy with at least equal numbers, and often in superior numbers, added to the constant successes they had achieved, spared many men. Moreover, those losses were made up for, as soldiers were arriving through all the outlets from all the depots and hospitals of the Riviera of Genoa, at the mere sound of victory and the abundance that prevailed. Misery had been so great in the French army that one scarcely dared to describe it: officers, for several years, had not received more than 8 francs per month in salary, and the general staff was entirely unpaid. Marshal Berthier preserved in his papers an order of the day from Albenga which granted a gratuity of three louis to each division general.
Cherasco is ten leagues from Turin, fifteen from Alessandria, eighteen from Tortona, twenty-five from Genoa, twenty from Savona. The Sardinian court no longer knew what to do; its army was discouraged and partially destroyed. The Austrian army had no other thought than to cover Milan. Spirits were very agitated throughout Piedmont. The court had absolutely no public confidence; it submitted to Napoleon's discretion and requested an armistice. Many people would have preferred the army to march on Turin; but Turin was a stronghold, and the army would have needed heavy artillery to break through its gates. The king still had a large number of fortresses, and despite the victories just won, the slightest failure, the smallest whim of fortune could overturn everything; the two enemy armies, now united, were still, despite their setbacks, superior to the French army; they had considerable artillery and especially a cavalry that the French lacked.
In the French army, despite its victories, there was astonishment; it was struck by the grandeur of the enterprise; success seemed questionable when considering the weakness of means; morale would have exaggerated the slightest setback. Some officers, even generals, could not conceive that one might dare to think of conquering Italy with so little artillery, such poor cavalry, and such a weak army, which was also afflicted by disease and the distance from France that worsened with each passing day. Evidence of these feelings in the army can be found in the proclamation that the General-in-Chief addressed to his soldiers at Cherasco:
“Soldiers, in fifteen days you have won six victories, taken twenty-one flags, fifty-five cannons, several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont. You have taken 15,000 prisoners, and killed or wounded more than 10,000 men.”
“Until now, you fought for barren rocks, painted by your courage, but useless to the fatherland. Today, your deeds rival those of the conquering army of Holland and the Rhine.”
“Deprived of everything, you have supplied everything. You won battles without cannons, crossed rivers without bridges, marched forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy and often without bread. The Republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty, were the only ones capable of enduring what you have endured. Thanks be to you, soldiers! The fatherland, grateful, will owe its prosperity to you; and if, as victors of Toulon, you foretold the immortal campaign of 1794, your current victories foretell one even more glorious.”
“The two armies that dared attack you now flee in terror; the wicked men who laughed at your misery, who rejoiced in the imagined triumphs of your enemies, are confounded and trembling.”
“But soldiers, you have done nothing, since everything remains to be done. Neither Turin nor Milan are yet yours. The ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin and Milan are still being trampled by the murderers of Basseville!… It is said that some among you are losing heart, that they would prefer to return to the peaks of the Apennines and the Alps! No, I cannot believe it. The victors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Mondovi, burn to carry the glory of the French people far and wide.”
The conferences for the suspension of arms were held at the headquarters, in the house of Salmatoris, then the head butler to the King of Sardinia, and later appointed Prefect of the Palace of the Emperor Napoleon.
The Piedmontese General La Tour and Colonel Costa [de Beauregard, chief of staff of the Piedmontese army] were entrusted with the king’s powers. [Baron de] La Tour was an old soldier, a lieutenant general in the service of Sardinia, very opposed to all new ideas, with little education, and of mediocre ability. Colonel Costa, a native of Savoy, was in the prime of life; he expressed himself with ease, was intelligent, and conducted himself under advantageous relations.
The conditions were that the king would leave the coalition and send a plenipotentiary to Paris to negotiate the definitive peace; that in the meantime there would be an armistice; that Ceva, Coni, Tortone, or failing those, Alexandria, would be handed over immediately to the French army with all their artillery and stores; that the French army would continue to occupy all territory currently in its possession; that the military roads, in all directions, would allow free communication between the army and France, and vice versa; that Valenza would be immediately evacuated by the Neapolitans and handed over to the French general until the crossing of the Po was completed; finally, that local militias would be disbanded, and that regular troops would be dispersed into garrisons so as to cast no shadow of threat on the French army.
Henceforth, the Austrians, isolated, could be pursued into the interior of Lombardy; the troops of the Army of the Alps, now freed up, would partly descend into Italy; the line of communication with Paris was shortened by half; and major supply depots and artillery bases were now available to form siege equipment and even to besiege Turin itself, should the Directory not agree to peace.
IX. Is it proper to cross the Po and move further away from France?
With the armistice concluded, and the towns of Coni, Tortone, and Ceva occupied, the question arose whether we should continue forward, and how far. The armistice, which had brought down all the fortified towns, and separated the Piedmontese army from the Austrian army, had been useful; but would it not now be more advantageous to capitalize on the means acquired to entirely revolutionize Piedmont and Genoa before going further? The French government had the right to refuse the negotiations proposed, and to declare its will through an ultimatum. Would it not be unwise to move too far from France, to cross the Ticino without being sure of the rear? The kings of Sardinia, who had once been so useful to France when they were loyal, had since most contributed to its setbacks once they shifted policy. Today the disposition of the spirits of that court could not permit the slightest illusion; the nobles and the priests dominate; they are irreconcilable enemies of the Republic. If one were to advance and suffer a defeat, would there not be much to fear from their hatred and thirst for revenge? Even Genoa would have cause for great concern. The system of oligarchy still dominates there, and however numerous the supporters of France may be, they remain without influence in political decisions. The burghers of Genoa may well complain, but all power stops there; the oligarchs rule, they command the troops and control between 8,000 to 10,000 peasant soldiers from the Fontana-Buona valleys and elsewhere, whom they call upon for defense when needed. So then, where must one stop, after having crossed the Ticino? Must one also cross the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, the Isonzo? Is it wise to leave behind so many populations so poorly disposed? Is not the way to move quickly to proceed gently and gain support in all the countries passed through, by changing the government and entrusting the administration to people with the same principles and interests as ours? If one enters the country of Venice, would that not compel this republic, which can field 50,000 men, to side with the enemy?
To that, the reply was: The French army must take advantage of its victory; it must stop only at the best line of defense against the Austrian armies, which will soon emerge from Tyrol and Friuli. That line is the Adige: it covers all the valleys of the Po; it intercepts Lower and Central Italy; it isolates the fortress of Mantua, and this fortress will probably be taken before the enemy army is reformed and in a position to save it.
It was for failing to understand this principle that Marshal Villars missed the whole aim of the war in 1733. He was at the head of 50,000 men gathered at the camp of Vigevano in October; with no enemy army before him, he could go wherever he wished. He limited himself to observing the Oglio, mounted on the Po; having thus missed the opportunity, he never found it again: three months later, Mercy arrived at the Serraglio with an army. Marshal de Coigny, although commanding a very superior army throughout the 1734 campaign and victorious in two pitched battles — those of Parma and Guastalla — drew no advantage from so many victories; he maneuvered alternatively on both banks of the Po. Had these generals known the topography of Italy well, from the month of November Villars would have taken position on the Adige, thereby intercepting all of Italy, and Coigny would have benefited from his victories to move in swiftly.
On the Adige lies the means of supplying all the expenses of the army, because it allows one to share the burden with a large population: that of Piedmont, of Lombardy, the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, the duchies of Parma and Modena. Fears that Venice might declare itself against France? The best way to prevent it is to bring the war in but a few days into the midst of its states; it is not prepared for such an event; it has not had time to raise troops and make resolutions; it is necessary to prevent the senate from deliberating. If the army remains on the right bank of the Ticino, the Austrians will force this republic to make common cause with them, or it will on its own throw itself into their arms, influenced by factionalism. The King of Sardinia is no longer a threat: his militias are disbanded; the English have stopped their subsidies; internal affairs are in the worst state. No matter which party gains the court, discontent will grow; as long as the fever remains, weakness will follow. 15,000 to 18,000 men are all the forces left to him; scattered across many cities, they will scarcely be enough to maintain internal order. On the other hand, the discontent of the court of Vienna against the cabinet of Turin is growing; it will reproach it for having despaired of the common cause after the first lost battle. This was not how Victor-Amadeus acted in 1705, after the victory that Vendôme won at Cassano, where Prince Eugene was cornered on the shores of Lake Iseo, and three French armies invaded all his states, even the County of Nice; only Turin remained to him, yet he held firm and persisted in his alliance with Austria. He was rewarded for it the following year at the Battle of Turin, where he regained all his states, as a result of this bold march of Prince Eugene, which fortune crowned with great success.
The oligarchs of Genoa are not to be feared; the best guarantee with them is the immense profits they gain from their neutrality. There is talk of spreading the principles of liberty in Piedmont and Genoa; but to do so, one must ignite civil war, rouse the people against the nobles and priests; one becomes responsible for the excesses that always accompany such a struggle. On the contrary, once at the Adige, the army will be in control of all the Austrian territories in Italy and all those of the Pope this side of the Apennines, in a position to proclaim the principles of liberty and to stir Italian patriotism against foreign domination. There will be no need to incite division among the various classes of citizens: nobles, bourgeois, peasants — all will be called upon to march in agreement for the reestablishment of the Italian homeland. The word Italia! Italia! proclaimed in Milan, in Bologna, in Verona, will produce a magical effect. Proclaimed on the right bank of the Ticino, the Italians will say: “Why are you not marching forward?”
X. Aide-de-camp Murat crosses Piedmont and brings news of the army's victories to Paris.
Colonel Murat, first aide-de-camp, was sent for Paris with twenty-one flags and the armistice of Cherasco. His arrival in Paris, by way of Mont-Cenis, with so many trophies and the act of submission of the King of Sardinia, caused great joy in the capital and aroused the most vivid enthusiasm. Aide-de-camp Junot, who had been dispatched after the Battle of Millesimo via the road from Nice, arrived after Murat.
The province of Alba, which the French entirely occupied, was the region in all of Piedmont most opposed to royal authority, the one that harbored the most revolutionary sentiment; troubles had already broken out there; and later new ones erupted. If one wanted to continue the war with the King of Sardinia, it was there that the most aid and the strongest inclination toward insurrection would have been found.
Thus, after fifteen days, the first point of the campaign plan was achieved; great results were obtained: the Piedmontese fortresses in the Alps had fallen; the coalition was weakened by the loss of a power that supplied it with 60,000 to 70,000 men and was even more important for its strategic position.
Since the beginning of this campaign, within the span of a month, the legislature had declared five times that the Army of Italy had well earned the gratitude of the fatherland, in the sessions of April 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26; and each time for new victories.
In accordance with the conditions of the armistice of Cherasco, the King of Sardinia sent the Count of Revel to Paris to negotiate a definitive peace. He concluded and signed it on May 15, 1796. By this treaty, the fortresses of Alessandria and Coni were handed over to the Army of Italy; Susa, La Brunette, Exilles, were demolished, and the Alps opened; which placed the King at the disposal of the Republic, having no other fortified positions remaining except Turin and the fort of Bard.