Charles de Gaulle on Algerian Independence, Integration

From "C'était de Gaulle"

While I do not wish to pepper this series with my own opinions, I felt it was important to give some pointers to any readers.

The policy of De Gaulle was indeed one of decolonization, but it is far more nuanced than is let on by either his purported partisans today or his opponents. De Gaulle was raised on the ideas of the French Empire, of the greatness of France - an idea which was his raison d’être. The General recognized the era he lived in, and thought the situation was leading to an impasse. He wanted to get rid of a problem which he thought was keeping France from accomplishing its role amidst the burgeoning Cold War.

Unfortunately, we can also see that De Gaulle made large mistakes in misunderstanding the reaction that the Algerian independence movement would have on the French established in Algeria. He held hope that they could come back and have a place in the new nation, this never happened. And so he largely washed his hands of it and turned to what he thought were more important matters.

In any case this transition which De Gaulle spearheaded, that of resigning France to being a mere nation-state, has defined the France of the current era and its mores. These passages are invaluable in understanding what his thinking was, as well as refuting any mythologies which moderns retroactively assign to him.

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On the integration of Algerians

CDG: "If I weren't here, the majority of the Assembly would have voted enthusiastically for the integration of French Algeria, this fanciful idea of the Algerian colonists and a few colonels who are on their side.

AP: "When the two communities fraternized last May, wasn't that what you called the integration of souls?"

CDG: "It was not Lagaillarde who provoked the fraternization! It started on the Forum on May 15, from the moment we shouted 'Long live de Gaulle!' It was on my name that it was done!

AP: "But why did you launch the Constantine plan four months ago, if not to allow Algeria to modernize and come closer to the level of the metropolis? It gave the impression that you wanted to realize French Algeria."

CDG: "I did it because we cannot get out of this box of scorpions except by completely transforming Algeria. We must try to fight against the pauperization of Algerians. Of course, pacification must also make progress on the ground. It has made progress in Oran. It will do so in Algiers when we put the same means there. But it will never be final if Algeria does not transform itself. I'm trying to transform it. The single college, equal rights, elections that give Muslims the habit of voting to choose their representatives, the opening of the civil service to Muslims, respect for each community, what is it if not integration, but a realistic integration?"

AP: "Why have you never used that term?"

CDG: "Because they wanted to impose it on me, and because they want to make it seem like a panacea. Let's not kid ourselves! It's great to have yellow French people, black French people, brown French people. They show that France is open to all races and has a universal vocation. But only if they remain a small minority. Otherwise, France would no longer be France. We are, after all, above all else, a European people of white race, of Greek and Latin culture, and of Christian religion.

Let's not kid ourselves! Have you gone to see the Muslims? Have you looked at them with their turbans and djellabas? You can see that they are not French! Those who advocate integration have the brain of a hummingbird, even if they are very learned (he must be thinking of Soustelle). Try to integrate oil and vinegar. Shake the bottle. After a while, they will separate again. Arabs are Arabs, French people are French people. Do you think the French body can absorb ten million Muslims, who will be twenty million tomorrow and forty million the day after tomorrow?

If we did integration, if all the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria were considered French, how could we prevent them from coming to settle in the metropolis, where the standard of living is so much higher? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées!"

On the decolonization policy:

CDG: “So, Mr. Deputy, you're back from Africa?"

I tell him about the enthusiasm that his name arouses, from Fort-Lamy to Brazzaville and from Yaoundé to Bangui; but also in the Belgian colonies, Rwanda and Burundi, and in Congo, from Leopoldville to Elisabethville; which does not please the Belgian authorities at all. On the other hand, I do not hide from him the strong criticism that Dr. Schweitzer directs at his decolonization policy, alongside whom I spent four days in that miserable village of huts they call his "hospital."

The old Alsatian believes that the Community, which is moving straight towards independence, is madness; that the blacks still live in the Stone Age, except for 1 or 2% of them; that it is foolish to treat them as if they were Europeans today. According to him, by trying to make them happy without taking into account the stage they are in, we are preparing their misery. "I know that the French in Libreville and African politicians call me paternalistic, colonialist, and racist. But experience has opened my eyes."

CDG: "Schweitzer is right and wrong. It's true that the natives are not yet mature enough to govern themselves truly. But what he forgets is that the world exists around us and that it has changed. Colonized peoples are increasingly unable to tolerate their colonizers. There will come a day when they will no longer be able to tolerate themselves. In the meantime, we are forced to take account of reality. What we had to do most urgently was to transform our colonial empire, replacing domination with a contract. We have a great advantage in passing the baton to local officials before it is snatched from us. (He did not say, "before it is snatched from our hands.")

We founded our colonization, from the beginning, on the principle of assimilation. It was claimed that we could make the negroes good Frenchmen. We had them recite 'Our ancestors, the Gauls'; not very clever. That's why decolonization is so much more difficult for us than for the English. They always recognized differences of race and culture. They organized self-government. All they had to do was loosen the reins a bit and everything would work out. We denied these differences. We wanted to be a Republic of a hundred million identical and interchangeable Frenchmen. That's why the French experience decolonization as a tearing apart. Well, I created the Community precisely so that each of the peoples who compose it can follow their own path as they wish, preferably in good agreement with us; because ultimately it is in the interest of everyone.

It's beautiful, equality, but it's not within our reach. Wanting all the populations of the overseas territories to enjoy the same social rights as those in the mainland, an equal standard of living, would mean that ours would be halved. Who is ready for that? So, since we cannot offer them equality, it is better to give them freedom! Bye bye, you cost us too much!"

It is clear that he wants to disengage. I am still surprised to hear him, whom I would have imagined as the heir of Jacques Cartier, hold views that would please Raymond Cartier. It is true that he advocates aid to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa, which this brilliant journalist does not want to hear about. It is also true that he does not disavow conquest in past centuries, but the stubbornness in this second half of the 20th; because the world has changed. He dresses up realism with greatness.

AP: "So, General, are you going to pursue Mendes' policies?"

CDG: "If you want. But Mendes could not have done it. So, it will not be Mendes' policy, it will be De Gaulle's policy."

[…]

AP: "The majority of the group's deputies and almost all of the activists remain firmly attached to the integration of French Algeria."

CDG: "One can integrate individuals, families, small groups; and even then, to a certain extent only; and it takes generations. Peoples, with their past, traditions, common memories of battles won or lost, and heroes cannot be integrated. Do you think that between the pieds-noirs and the Arabs, it will ever be the case? Do you think they have the feeling of a common homeland, sufficient to overcome all the divisions of race, class, and religion? Do you really believe they have the will to live together?

Integration is a trick to allow the Muslims, who are the majority in Algeria ten to one, to become a minority in the French Republic at one to five. It's a childish sleight of hand! Do you think we can fool the Algerians with this trick?

Have you considered that Arabs will multiply by two and then by five, while the French population will remain almost stationary? Will there be two hundred, four hundred, six hundred Arab deputies in Paris? Can you imagine an Arab president in the Élysée?"

[…]

AP: "You are preaching to the converted. But the turmoil within the group makes me fear that the foundation of the movement in Bordeaux at the beginning of November will be difficult. The 'Soustelle followers' will be strongly in the majority."

CDG: "I'm counting on you, and thankfully on a few others (this 'thankfully' is not friendly), to show the activists that only de Gaulle can settle the Algerian issue and that Gaullists have no other duty than to support him. Try to make them understand, as they understand the language of numbers, that it is better for France to have an Algerian Algeria within the Community than a French Algeria within France, which would flatten us forever!

The maintenance of Algerian departments within France would not only cause us serious moral damage in the world, but also ruinous effort! It would be Danaid’s barrel! If Algeria remained French, we would have to provide Algerians with the same standard of living as the French, which is beyond our reach. If they detach themselves from France, they will have to settle for a much lower standard of living; at least they won't be able to blame France for it anymore, and they will have a sense of dignity, that of being granted the right to govern themselves."

[…]

At the end of the Council, the General told me:

"Our partners are practicing sacred egoism. We are the only ones who want the Africans to develop, by making them escape the catastrophic variations of the world price of raw materials and tropical products. We are the only ones who want Africa to make it. The association of the overseas territories was the only real advantage we had from the Treaty of Rome, with the prospect of the Common Agricultural Market, provided that it was transformed into reality.

There are only three solutions. Either accept the collapse of the Africans' income. This is unacceptable, it would mean dooming them to poverty and for some to starvation. Or we could continue to pay extra prices, but then give up the Common Market, where we would not be on equal terms with our partners. Or we could obtain from our partners that the European Community accepts to support the productions of these countries above the world price.

This would be the best solution. If our partners continue to shy away, we will have to resign ourselves to leaving the Common Market. I am not sure that this would be a great misfortune.”

At the Council of June 27, 1962, Gorse, contrary to the pessimism of his last communication, mentions the agreement reached in extremis for the association of African countries.

CDG: "This result is important. By the figures obtained, 780 million dollars for the five years 1963-1967. Because the associated countries are especially in our French movement. Because the obstacles coming from our partners have been removed. Things only move forward because we make them move forward. And they say that we are not European!”

At the Council of July 11, 1962, Gorse gave a calamitous account of the reactions of the Africans, deeply disappointed with the European compromise.

CDG: "Come on! They will not deprive themselves of the 780 million dollars they are guaranteed! But one should never count on the gratitude of people to whom one has rendered the greatest services.”

After the Council, the General said to me: "The Blacks have not been given time to mature. They are still big children. We must speak to them as we speak to big children: by respecting their dignity and making them respect us. That's the only way to keep their trust."

The General is very relaxed. I took the opportunity to tell him what Dr. Schweitzer had said to me, with whom, in August 1959, I had spent four days in Lambaréné in his village of straw huts called "hospital":

"De Gaulle is mistaken. Why does he want to decolonize so quickly? He wants to treat the Negroes as if they were white people. Why does he want to put them in offices? They are hunters, fishermen, at most peasants, manual workers. They will remain so. The African masses are still in the Neolithic period. De Gaulle does not realize that they are not ready for democracy. Even less for independence. It will be a tragedy for them.”

CDG: "You think I don't know that decolonization is disastrous for Africa? That most Africans are far from having reached our European Middle Ages? That they are attracted to the cities like mosquitoes to lamps, while the bush will return to savagery? That they will experience tribal wars, witchcraft and anthropophagi again? That fifteen or twenty more years of tutelage would have allowed us to modernize their agriculture, to provide them with infrastructures, to completely eradicate leprosy, sleeping sickness, etc.

It is true that this independence was premature. It is true that they have not yet learned democracy. But what do you want me to do about it? The Americans and the Russians believe that they have the vocation to liberate the colonized peoples and they indulge in a bidding war. This is the only thing they have in common. The two super-giants present themselves as the two anti-imperialists, whereas they have become the two last imperialists. A wind of madness has blown over the world. What should have taken fifty years has taken place in two or three years. But we couldn't stop it. We can't afford the luxury of new confrontations.

And then (he lowers his voice), you know, it was a chance for us to seize: to get rid of this burden, much too heavy now for our shoulders, as people are more and more thirsty for equality. We have escaped the worst! It is not possible that, in the same French ensemble, we can find citizens who have one of the highest standards of living in the world, and other citizens who have one of the lowest.

I did just that for the Community, so that it would slowly take the road to independence. In Gabon, Leon M'Ba wanted to opt for the status of a French department. In the middle of equatorial Africa! They would have remained attached to us like stones to the neck of a swimmer! We had all the difficulties in the world to dissuade them from choosing this status. Fortunately, most of our Africans were willing to peacefully take the path of autonomy, then of independence."

AP: "You won't prevent distances from widening between the elites who reach the European level and the masses who remain in the stone age. The misfortune is that Africans do not like each other."

CDG: "No, we won't avoid it! But it will be their business. You will see that their doctors will cluster in the cities. You will see that the bush, instead of advancing, will retreat. It is still a chance if, afterwards, they do not leave their countries to come and settle in France. But there, at least, we will be able to say no.

Until the day when the masses will regret the time when our colonial doctors went into the bush, when our missionaries evangelized them, when our colonial troops protected them from tribal wars... The unfortunate thing is that Africans do not like each other. The intellectuals will abandon their people, and their people will be thrown down the well. What do you want me to do about it? We will give them coins, but we will no longer be responsible for their destiny."

AP: "It's a shame, though, that the antagonism between Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor scuttled the Community."

CDG: "Of course! The evolution from federation to confederation should have taken place over the years. Instead, for reasons of self-respect, they stubbornly insisted on wanting everything or nothing in their system, like children. They broke the toy we had given them. It is not me who will cry! The day will undoubtedly come when they themselves will cry for having wanted to leave so quickly."

On the Algerian war negotiations

AP: "The 'peace of the brave' and the 'white flag' were interpreted by the Algerians as a summons to surrender and a refusal to decolonize." CDG: "It was the white flag of the negotiators, those on whom we do not shoot because they come to negotiate... And do you think I could do whatever I wanted overnight? We had to gradually change people's minds. Where was the army? Where was the Assembly? Where was my government? Where was my Prime Minister? We are not a dictatorship. People are slow to give up their prejudices. They only understand very slowly, especially those who think they know everything."

He looks at the foliage of the park, where the leaves are already turning yellow. CDG: "The Algerian drama is not confined to Algeria itself, nor to the relationship between France and Algeria. It affects the French themselves. It poisons everything in France. And it undermines France's position in the world." He must be thinking, "Do you think it was worthy of France to maintain itself through war and torture?" Yet he does not say it. He does not want to admit it, but he lets it be guessed that he must constantly maneuver to tame the military, the pieds-noirs in Algeria, the conservatives in the metropolis, and bring them to accept the inevitable evolution, even if it means amusing them with decoys."

On ‘self determination’ in Algeria

AP: "What will come out of self-determination?"

CDG: "It will be a trap for fools."

AP: "But who will they be?"

CDG: "The FLN, if they refuse to negotiate. The pieds-noirs, if they refuse to play the game, even though they could have an essential place in Algeria once peace is restored." He stands up. "We cannot hold up this prolific population like rabbits, and these enormous territories. It is a good thing to emancipate them. Our trading posts, our stopovers, our small overseas territories, that's fine, they are just specks. The rest is too heavy. The populations are caught in the mass of the Arab whole in North Africa, the black whole to the south of the Sahara. How can you expect some to govern themselves freely and others not?

As long as we haven't rid ourselves of it, we can't do anything in the world. It's a terrible burden. We need to detach ourselves from it. That's my mission. It's not a fun one. Put yourself in my shoes! I'm not doing this with a light heart. But it might be the greatest service I will have done for France. The years go by. We don't have time to wait anymore. And I'm not immortal."

He leaves his hand on the door handle.

"Anyway, since you're going to the UN, you're not going to be caught off guard with self-determination. Those people can't be hostile to it."

He extends his hand, whose light pressure contrasts so much with his forceful personality:

"It's like hunting, I won't wish you good luck. You'll come and tell me about it when you're back."

On the idea of French Algeria and the multi-ethnic state

CDG: "The pieds-noirs continue to proclaim 'Algérie française!' As if this magic formula will save them! But French Algeria is not the solution, it's the problem! It's not the remedy, it's the disease! How could we have let this European immigration grow without control in the middle of a radically different population, in a hostile country? We landed in Sidi-Ferruch for a fan story, without knowing what we would do next.

Under Louis-Philippe, under the Second Republic, under the Second Empire, we went from uprising to uprising. Bugeaud, then Pélissier, then Mac-Mahon were still firing cannon on villages. Then the Third Republic, which claimed to deny the differences between races and religions and considered that there was only one civilization, its own, gave free rein to its chimera of assimilation.

That's when they made the departmentalization definitive, really choosing French Algeria. It was becoming increasingly difficult to make it otherwise. But it was only a facade. It is enough to spend some time in Algeria to realize that the Arab people are unassimilable. And under all regimes, the administration regularly oppressed the natives in favor of the colonists."

[…]

"Never mind the details. Let's get to the point. For you, what is essential?"

AP: "The essential is that:

1. We group together all the French of European descent, along with all the Muslims who have sided with us and want to stay with us, between Algiers and Oran.

2. We transfer to the rest of Algeria all the Muslims who prefer to live in an Algeria led by the FLN.

3. We keep free access to the Sahara, which must become a territory autonomous from the first two.

4. Everything else is negotiable. We can share Algiers like Berlin or Jerusalem: the Casbah on one side, Bab-el-Oued on the other, with a demarcation line in the middle."

CDG: "So in other words, you want to create a French Israel. That's what Ben Gurion tried to convince me to do when he came to see me. But he warned me, 'It will only work if you send massive numbers of other French settlers, if they settle permanently, and if they enlist as soldiers to fight.' Can you imagine that? The pieds-noirs want our army to defend them, but they have never felt the need to defend themselves! Do you see them standing guard at their borders to take over from the French army? The so-called 'Territorial Units' never had any military value. They did more harm than good. They had to be disbanded."

AP: "But I don't advocate a definitive separation or a partition between a territory that would remain French and an Algeria that would be delivered to the FLN. I propose an independent Algeria, with cantons like Switzerland, where each community is master in its own house. What I think desirable is not an irreversible partition, but making coexistence possible and association desirable. If that is the case, we would have separate management of the private parts, and joint management of the common parts - such as the Sahara or the ports. We would create organic links that could be reinforced in the future. The partition would be only a threat, a deterrent."

CDG: "Make no mistake, it would not be a peaceful coexistence, it would be a hostile neighborhood."

AP: "Every time ethnic communities have clashed, history has found only one way to keep them quiet, and that is to separate them. For example, in Ireland, India, Palestine."

[…]

CDG: "I believe you are exaggerating things. Anyway, we'll see. But we won't suspend our national destiny to the whims of the pieds-noirs! If we follow your solution, we'll make the whole world turn against us. The Third World will unite in solidarity with the Arabs. We will have created a new Israel. Hearts all over the Arab world, in Asia, and in Latin America, will beat in unison with the Algerians.

The Jews have a good reason: it is on this land that they had their roots, long before the Arabs, and they have no other national home. In Algeria, the Arabs have seniority; everything we have done bears the indelible stain of the colonial regime; the national home of the French in Algeria is France. Believe me, this solution would not be worthy of France. It would not be in its long-term interests. We must shift this burden from our shoulders. It exhausts us."

AP: "You told me in July that the FLN would never make peace unless we forced a bitter pill down their throat. Has it changed? If you no longer want the division as the bitter pill, what would we have left?"

CDG: "We would have to withdraw as soon as possible. It might be better for us; it would certainly be worse for them."

Thus, Malraux was right about de Gaulle against de Gaulle. The General is shifting. He stops being divisive to become dismissive.

AP: "You couldn't give the FLN a greater gift than to announce our withdrawal! That's all they want."

CDG: "Good for them!"

My heart sinks as I see de Gaulle sweep aside my arguments in favor of regrouping, with as much vigor as he had brushed aside my objections last July. I make one last attempt: "We can divide the spoils, but we shouldn't let it all go up in flames! France has no right to abandon those who believed in her!"

The General responds with restrained vehemence: "And do you think it would be easy for me? Me, who was raised in the religion of the flag, of French Algeria and French Africa, of the army that guarantees the Empire? Do you think it's not a trial? Do you think it's not terrible for me to bring the colors, wherever it may be in the world?"

On the subject of the pieds-noirs¹

He then turns his attention to the pieds-noirs: "The vast majority of Europeans in Algiers and Oran did not really live in Algeria, near the Algerians. They lived on the coast, among themselves. They transport themselves to Marseille to start over. That's impossible! They must be forced to disperse throughout the entire territory. Their distribution and employment require measures of authority!

Pompidou (who always has the impulse of defending his ministers): “Mr. Boulin and the Ministry of the Interior have worked very well... Why not ask the Foreign Affairs to propose immigrants to the countries of South America? They would represent France and French culture.”

CDG: “But we must wait! Things will settle down! All these guys, instead of going to Lille, they will prefer to come back to Oran! We must not give up! It is a French human substance that we have no right to lose! It is desirable that they return to Algeria, and that those who are still there stay there! We must neither let them cluster in Marseille nor let them expatriate! Where would our advantage be in provoking a movement of emigration?”

Joxe (insists on Pompidou's suggestion, which he had to convince beforehand; his great idea is that the pieds-noirs would inoculate fascism to France): “In many cases, it is not desirable for them to return to Algeria, nor to settle in France, where they would be a bad seed! It would be better for them to settle in Argentina, or Brazil, or Australia.”

CDG: “No! Rather in New Caledonia! Or in Guyana, which is under-populated and where they need pioneers and clearers!"

This may be the only occasion when I heard the General express a positive feeling towards the pieds-noirs. He and they did not "understand" each other, but he does not want France to lose them.

On the continued flow of repatriations from Algeria

After the Council, he gave me instructions for my final press conference to "take note of the signs of appeasement that have appeared in Algeria over the past few days. The elections scheduled under the Évian Accords must ensure political stability and allow for the formation of a truly representative government through democratic means. The government is primarily waiting for stability to be restored in order to guarantee the security of persons and property, which is a fundamental condition for cooperation."

However, the constant influx of repatriates makes it impossible to be reassured. 100,000 or a maximum of 200,000 out of a million: that was the first figure the General gave me last December for the pieds-noirs who were supposed to return to France. They were the "beneficiaries of colonization" for whom, in a decolonized Algeria, there would be no place. Then he started talking about 200,000, 300,000. He stayed at the latter figure for a long time, then went up to 350,000. Pompidou, the first, dared to advance the figure of 550,000. Today, we are approaching 750,000.

"My General," I said, "I fear they will not return to Algeria and that almost all of those who are still there will soon come to join them. The FLN will not let them stay. The pressure is enormous. They only accept French people who have never set foot in Algeria as collaborators."

The General explodes: "Of course! The Europeans supported the OAS, which did everything in its power to sabotage the Évian Accords and make coexistence between communities impossible! AP: Wasn't that inevitable? They had been told so many times: 'The suitcase or the coffin'... They still prefer the suitcase.

CDG: No! With a little common sense, it could have been avoided."

These are the last words he delivers to me as spokesperson and the first as Minister of Repatriates. Not very encouraging. Is there any common sense in wars, especially civil ones?

[…]

Golden Salon, October 22, 1962.

After the Council, where I made a new communication about the repatriated, I ask the General if I can follow him for a moment to his office. He introduces me and makes me sit down.

AP: "My general, I spoke earlier about the material difficulties of the repatriated. There is worse than their physical distress. It is their moral distress. I know that you have made your decision based on the higher interests of the country. But these people were born on this land, which they had to leave in dramatic conditions. They have lost their homeland, the one where their parents and ancestors are buried. They need someone to talk to them. They need you to tell them that the motherland opens wide its arms to them. I took the liberty of writing a draft speech, from my heart. It seems to me that if you say something like this to them, they would feel immense benefit, and France with them."

I hand over my two pages to the General. He takes them, adjusts his glasses, quickly scans them, then goes over them line by line and hands them back to me: "Your speech is good. Just say this on television. Announce it several days in advance, they need to be informed so that everyone will listen."

I am dismayed: "But, General, it won't have a thousandth of the impact it would have if it came from you!"

The General looks out the window that overlooks the park and remains silent for a long time. I begin to hope. Then the verdict falls.

CDG: "No, that's your job. You were appointed to this position for that reason."

Is he annoyed that I suggested not only the content but also the form of a text, when he writes all his speeches himself? I think he simply wants to direct his energy towards other horizons. It is not worth insisting. He has taken on all the risks of a terrible decision. He did not, and refuses to have, the words that would have softened it. He knows very well that this million of repatriates is the tangible sign of a serious failure. He does not want to admit it, or even admit it to himself. He must think that his credit, his authority, and the chances of success of his vast enterprises depend on his composure and his silence.

At the Council on November 7th, Joxe took off his rose-colored glasses: "The Algerian government has not put its affairs in order. No technical or political appeasement has been given to us. Ben Bella walked around the country but did not act. Insecurity and chaos are worsening."

The General exclaims, "This is intolerable! They won't understand until we cut off their resources!"

On new developments in Algeria since independence, and immigration into France

Council of State. January 3rd, 1963

Broglie: "The Algerians continue to get into inextricable difficulties. Their revenue cannot exceed 230 billion former francs. Yet they have already planned for 280 billion in expenses. They will therefore have to increase taxes, which will increase the cost of living. This is based on the bet of relaunching the economy, but it will be lost if there is no security for people and property, which is not yet the case."

Fouchet: "I saw Farès, Mostefaï, and Abdesselam. All three are reserved. The most serious of all is the administrative void. The French hemorrhage deprives them of the necessary staff."

CDG: "Don't forget that you are no longer the High Commissioner in Algiers, but the Minister of National Education!"

Fouchet: "Precisely, General. They came to see me in that capacity. Their big difficulties with paying teachers have started again."

CDG: "The same nonsense is happening with cooperation in Africa. Why are these stupidities happening? Why are they not paid?"

Pompidou: "It's a problem with the postal service. Three-quarters of the checks sent by mail to pay teachers have been returned because Algerian postal workers can't read the address."

Marette: "Algerian postmen are often illiterate. Even when we take the trouble to write the address in Arabic, they are not able to read it."

Broglie: "We built a beautiful structure, as if there were an Algerian structure. But there isn't one."

Grandval: "The Algerian authorities prolong the action of the FLN. For Algerian labor movements, they want to control everything at the start, but refuse to have any control at the entry point into France."

CDG: "We can't just let Algerian workers come to France like that! They are not in a conquered country!"

Broglie: "For the immigration of Algerian labor, there is a disagreement over family allowances. The Algerians are asking for them to be set at the rate practiced in the workplace. It would seem logical to us that they should be paid at the rate practiced in the family's place of residence, i.e., in Algeria."

CDG: "Of course! The families of migrant workers must stay in Algeria and the rate of allowances will follow suit. The question doesn't even arise."

[…]

Pompidou (seeing that the General is starting to get upset, he immediately wants to calm things down. He is concerned about avoiding unnecessary tensions for the General. While being the head of the government, he remains the director of the cabinet): "There is definite progress. Technical cooperation is going well. The presence of our senior officials on missions is working wonders. It's like a mechanic who immediately gets a car running again when the driver doesn't even know how to open the hood. The Algerians are asking that our consuls be responsible for resolving the wine problem... All of that is good.”

“What's bad are the Algerian ministers who come to France with arrogance and extraordinary demands. They want reciprocity in everything! Since we are installing a French system in Algeria to compensate for their under-administration, they want an Algerian system in France: for example, representatives of the Algerian Treasury who would oversee our treasury and tax system in France. It's comical. They want to see if Algerians are being tortured at Santé and other prisons in the Paris region!”

"We must control the Algerians in France ourselves. We must not allow ourselves to be invaded by Algerian labor, whether or not they pretend to be harkis². If we don't take care, all Algerians will come to settle in France! We cannot accept a foreign auxiliary police force being established in France either. The views of the Algerian leaders are so far from ours on all of these issues that there are necessarily points of friction."

The General has regained his composure: Pompidou has a calming effect on him. He concludes: "These are not insoluble questions! We must learn to do a cooperative gymnastics. For every advantage given, we need a counterpart, that is, a received advantage. We must be both open and closed at the same time."

At the Council meeting of January 16, 1963, the question of amnesty for the events in Algeria is examined (particularly the Jeanson network affair).

CDG: "Just because we granted independence to Algeria doesn't mean we should shower with flowers people who fought against the French army."

On the leak of the atomic tests in the Sahara

Here I must provide some context to put the passage in perspective. The Évian Accords stipulated that France would still have access to certain facilities for military use (specifically the Mers-El-Kébir naval base and atomic testing facilities in the Sahara desert) for a fixed period of time. As happened often in these decolonization experiments, the newly crowned governments had an incentive to appear strong vis-à-vis the old colonizer and manufactured ways to appear as if they had strong-armed France into leaving.

At the Council meeting on March 20, 1963, Couve said: "The atomic experiments in the Sahara were supposed to take place under conditions of absolute secrecy. Ben Bella was determined not to hear them. Unfortunately, he can no longer feign ignorance: Le Monde announced the last experiment with such precision that it is obvious that there has been a leak in the public services. Unpleasant consequences follow, that is to say, great emotion."

The General was furious: "The irresponsibility of Le Monde is unbelievable. But it's also unbelievable that the leak could have happened!"

Palewski said, "I withdrew the accreditation of the author of the article."

The General replied, "It's incredible that we allow accredited individuals who are authorized to fish for information in such sensitive areas of the services! It's monstrous!"

Couve said, "Ben Bella raised the protests that he could not avoid."

Everyone got criticized. The General said, "Why couldn't he avoid them? Did the Algerians sign the Evian agreements that authorized us to conduct our experiments for five years or not? They knew what they were doing! It's not clandestine! These agreements were adopted by referendum! Another referendum would be needed to reverse them!"

Couve said, "Ben Bella knows that we are preparing replacement sites. He will surely ask us to question the Evian agreements, so that he can appear to be the one who obtained our departure, even if he had nothing to do with it. New incidents will occur when there are new experiments. From now on, it will be very difficult for them to go unnoticed."

[…]

At the Council meeting on April 3, 1963, Broglie explained that following the atomic experiment revealed by Le Monde, Ben Bella felt compelled to make a forward escape. "He adopted the themes of the most fanatical Algerians. Franco-Algerian relations are out of sync (the euphemism is amusing). "

After the cooperation momentum in December and January, the Algerians got lost in palaver. The implementation of cooperation has not been done. The conflict has developed between Ben Bella and the FLN Secretary-General, Khider. The FLN newspaper, El Moudjahid, denounces Ben Bella's weakness towards France. "The atomic explosion revealed by Le Monde served as a detonator. An army of unemployed and poorly paid guerrillas provides contingents of dissatisfied people who only ask to descend into the streets. "

On March 18, a decree on vacant property was issued. It legalizes previous spoliations, extending the notion of vacancy to insufficient exploitation, always easy to pronounce, whether it be a farm or a cinema. Thus, they seize control of the Borgeaud estate, the Germain estate, the Calan estate. In letter and spirit, they violate the Evian Accords. Yet we must avoid a pitfall. The Algerians have just attacked the largest representative of colonialism. But Borgeaud is not France. (It sounds like we're hearing from de Gaulle.)

"We have always said that we will not oppose an agrarian law. But we must show that we are shocked by the procedure, while avoiding degrading such a fragile situation. Give a warning by slowing down aid, yes. But do not challenge Evian. If Algeria is evolving not like Morocco but like Yugoslavia, what can we do? Our margin of action is narrow. We must avoid the escalation of reprisals and counter-reprisals.”

CDG: “Ben Bella is in the grip of the djinns. He is struggling with his rivals; with the difficulties of a country that cannot control its economic problems and therefore engages in one-upmanship; with the demons that we see stirring these days among the Arabs: desperate romanticism, socialism, pan-Arabism. We, French people, who are not besieged by demons or djinns, must abide by the Evian Accords.

The Algerian government came out of it to nationalize the land. But anyway, it couldn't fail: it was inevitable, with this box of sorrows. It will last as long as there are French lands in Algeria. Ben Bella is taking over vacant property. Someone had to own it: since it belonged to no one, it belongs to him. We cannot blame him.

Fifteen French people still hold 150,000 hectares in Algeria to this day. It's unbearable. It's indefensible, given the elemental frenzy of these fellahs. Had we maintained French Algeria, we would have been obliged to eliminate these enormous and scandalous properties.

But that should not stop us from maneuvering! We cannot let that happen like that. We must expect the question of the colonists' land to arise piece by piece. All the land will eventually pass into their hands, as in Tunisia and Morocco, it is inevitable. But there is a way. Ben Bella went about it all wrong. We missed the boat. We must show our disapproval and penalize him for it.”

Grandval (takes the opportunity to mention a possible field of retaliation): “Algerian immigration to France has resumed at an alarming pace: 6,000 immigrants per week.”

CDG: “That's 300,000 a year. It's not unbearable, provided they go back home after a while.”

Grandval (pressing on): “Boumaaza had made it his mission to stem this tide. But the General Union of Algerian Workers is pushing a lot of workers to come to France. They enter without health checks and don't know how to do anything. It's an intolerable situation.”

Giscard (returning to the dispossession of colonists): “Agrarian reform was inevitable, but the process is such that a reaction is necessary. If this reaction focused on financial aid, we would face pressure to return the equivalent value to the dispossessed. So we must disconnect the Constantine plan! (It sounds like he's talking about tubes that keep an accident victim alive.) We must not refuse our help, but dose it according to the goodwill shown to us.

CDG: "Of course, we shouldn't compensate the dispossessed big settlers ourselves! This appropriation has always been the cause of many misfortunes."

Joxe: "There is a shift from Ben Bella towards escalation. If he resists, Khider will attack him to the detriment of French heritage and oil."

Missoffe: "We should expect to receive 100,000 more repatriates who returned to Algeria this winter."

Triboulet: "Let's explain to them that in Africa and Madagascar, mixed economy companies have bought out settler properties. The new operators gradually repay, and everything is done in order."

CDG: "If the Algerians go about it brutally, in the future they will only find technicians from communist countries."

Frey: "There is agitation in the South against the importation of Algerian wines. The quantity should be reduced."

Broglie: "But that would affect French people who stayed in Algeria!"

CDG: "How easy cooperation would be if we didn't have any French people in Algeria! (Said in a tone of bitter banter, but it reveals that he has finally come to terms with the massive repatriation of pieds-noirs.) If there were no Algerian wines, would we be able to make people drink Hérault wine without blending?"

Pisani: "The habit has been formed of drinking high-degree wine. Seven to ten million hectoliters of Algerian wine are essential."

Pompidou (irritated by these constant interventions): "The Minister of Finance wants retaliation in the field of money, the Minister of Agriculture in the field of wine, the Minister of the Interior wants to calm Hérault, the Minister of Labour wants to stop the importation of labour. We must see the question from a higher angle, that of the relations between France and Algeria. As for workers, they all come with contracts and are always employed."

CDG: "Are they real or fake contracts?"

Pompidou: "Real contracts, especially for public works companies. We can always perform work-to-rule, which the Ministry of Finance is so good at doing by sending mandates six months late; carry out health checks, discuss identity documents, etc. We will introduce inconvenience, which will be our main pressure. Ben Bella is chasing after this Khider. This is a bad sign: he seems to be losing the battle with his party. So we should expect stronger tension. We must put a stop to it. But we need to choose a better ground than the Borgeaud case."

On Algerian immigration

Broglie, who returned from Algeria: "Ben Bella is only doctrinally hostile to our atomic tests. His only demand is secrecy. 'Do them in the air if you want, but let's not talk about it!' He has his theory of pauperism. He considers it inevitable. If Algeria remained like Tunisia and Morocco, it would keep its poverty, plus unbearable inequalities. Ben Bella wants to equalize poverty, so that it becomes acceptable."

CDG: "He only has poverty to share."

Triboulet: "There is a danger in pursuing free foreign aid. If we grant it to Algeria, the black states will take this pretext to ask for the same."

Giscard: "It is satisfactory that we proceed with a reduction of 200 million on free aid, so as to penalize Algeria for the nationalization of land."

The General suddenly intervened on a subject that had not been discussed:

"I call your attention to a problem that could become serious. There were 40,000 immigrants from Algeria in April. This is almost equal to the number of babies born in France in the same month. I would like to see more babies born in France and fewer immigrants coming to France. Really, there is no need for that! It is becoming urgent to put things in order! I ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, to study ways of dealing with it.”

[…]

Pointe-à-Pitre, March 20, 1964.

The General tells me about his meeting with Ben Bella at the castle of Champs-sur-Marne: "He did not make a bad impression on me. He has confidence, but without jabbering. He told me humorously that his personal position was assured thanks to his incarceration, which saved him from wearing himself out in the squabbles of Cairo and Tunis and made him the supreme fighter.

But he also told me that he was later treated with honor in a fortress, not in a prison cell, and he knows to whom he owed it. He is full of praise for the cooperators and especially for the teachers. Ah, if all the colonists had behaved like that, instead of sweating the burnous!” (Is that Ben Bella speaking, or the General?)

AP. - However, the war began with the murder of teachers, not colonists.

The General did not answer: "In any case, Ben Bella assured that there was no longer the slightest animosity between the French and Muslims. I told him that we wished him success, because France's vocation was to help countries that were late in developing. He recognized that no African country has equipment comparable to that which we have bequeathed to Algeria: not Egypt, not Yugoslavia, which he perhaps places in Africa. (Laughter.)

I repeated to him that France was ready to help Algeria to perfect this equipment by a prolonged cooperation; with two counterparts, the oil, and the bases of the Sahara which we must be able to have until the end of 1966. I said two harsh things to him, between four eyes so as not to make him lose face.

One: You wanted all the pieds-noirs to take their suitcases, threatening them with the coffin. Now you want the cooperants, on condition that they arrive only with their suitcase, to leave as soon as you decide. And what's more, you withhold their salaries! So don't be surprised that there aren't that many candidates.

Two: And stop sending us migrant workers, who are still trying to pass themselves off as harkis. We have too many of them. You wanted independence, you got it. It is not up to us to bear the consequences. You have become a foreign country. All Algerians had one year to opt for French nationality. This deadline has largely passed. We will not admit any more. Figure it out so they live on your soil.”

1. The pieds-noirs are French and other Europeans born in Algeria who were repatriated after the war, means literally “black feet”.

2. Harki designates an Algerian who served in the French army during the Algerian War. The term comes from “Haraka” (in the Algerian language rather pronounced Harka), which means a movement or a war party. After the Algerian War, the term has come to mean “traitor” in Algeria and the Maghreb at large.