Today, 23 years ago Air France withdrew the Concorde from service. An eagle zipping through the airs at Mach 2 speeds, traversing the Atlantic in a few short hours.
The period ushered in by De Gaulle’s leadership is today known in France as the “Thirty Glorious”, denoting thirty glorious years of French industrial growth, technological progress, and vision. The Concorde is one such achievement that to this day carries the hopes and dreams of this era.
Born out of the fierce competition and genius split between French and British engineers. Supersonic commercial aviation was perhaps but a dream, but for the France of the 1960s it was reality. If there is any visible symbol of De Gaulle’s France today, it’s the Concorde.
On this day we remember that plane which captured the spirit of the era. It remains a hope denoting French prowess in the eyes of those who pay it tribute, passing by the airport bearing the name of its progenitor. Perhaps one day its engines will roar again, and exit that pedestal upon which it rests.
On the Franco-British project
After the victory of the British Labour Party on October 15, 1964, the General doesn't have much confidence in them to fix an already dramatic economic situation. One of the first actions of the new government in London concerns the Concorde project.
During the Council meeting on October 28, 1964, Jacquet says, "Two years ago, the Franco-British agreement gave birth to the Concorde project. The letter we just received from Wilson suggests a delay in the operations. We cannot accept that. The Concorde project is already in competition with a more ambitious American project (3.3 Mach compared to our 2.2 Mach). Delaying the production would render the endeavor pointless. Instead of flying in 1971-1972, it would be pushed to 19751. By then, the Americans would have completed their project2, while we would have only built a prototype.
We either need to boldly continue or stop everything. The goal is to be the first in the market for long-range supersonic aircraft; the initial orders received would be a guarantee of commercial success. Although we didn't embark on this project because it would be profitable, but rather to provide work for Sud-Aviation. Giving up on the Concorde would deliberately put us under the wing of the American giant. It would be a kind of ‘aeronautical Nassau,’ meaning, from our perspective, a resignation."
Jacquet knows the General well! He knows how to strike a chord. The General tries to find a way out, saying, "Is there really no chance that damn SNECMA can develop an engine for us?"
Jacquet replies, "Apart from the option of handing the baby over to the Americans, there is no alternative."
CDG: "Collaborate with the Americans? The Concorde doesn't interest them unless we give them everything, as always. So, abandon it all? But what would happen to Sud-Aviation?"
Jacquet explains, "Thirty thousand workers would be employed in the construction of the Concorde. That ensures the workload for the French aviation industry until 1975. Otherwise, we would have to scrap the Concorde project and develop the 'aerobus' or 'gallion,' a large internationally viable carrier that would need to be sold in 200 units to recover costs3."
CDG: "There's profitability, and then there's incentive. We need to strive for profitability as much as possible, but we also need to consider the best incentives for the cutting-edge sectors."
After the Council meeting, I read a handwritten note to the General for his approval. The note was passed to me by Pompidou around the table. It says, "You could mention that Britain is facing difficulties due to excessive consumption, and it doesn't come as a surprise to us. We will see what their final intentions are regarding the Concorde and draw our own conclusions. In any case, we are determined not to let the French aerospace industry die."
The General reacts abruptly, saying, "You can't say that! We shouldn't interpret or explain the British difficulties in a government statement. It's neither charitable nor appropriate. No, they have their difficulties, that's all. They will inform us more precisely about how they plan to tackle them. Then it will be up to us to decide what we will do. That's the question.”
“As for the Concorde," the General continues, "Jacquet says, 'If they ask us to delay it for a year, then there's no point in pursuing the Concorde.' It's possible but not certain; we need to see. Jacquet also said, 'It's not a profitable project; it was only meant to save Sud-Aviation.' The crux of the problem with our aerospace industry is that they can't make engines. That's all there is to it! If they were capable of making engines like we make the world's leading airframes, we could install engines and be competitive without needing the British."
"For forty years, we haven't been able to make engines. We have polytechnic graduates, central school graduates, a bunch of individuals, and they have never been able to make an engine. Even when it was propeller engines, they couldn't do it. And now, with jet engines, they're still incapable. And I would add that they can't make motorcycle engines or damn boat engines either."
AP: “It shows the danger of relying on another country for an essential industry.”
CDG: “Exactly! That's the truth! (He likes when people can guess it.) To go faster, because it's more convenient, we buy the license. And off we go! So, we make arrangements with Rolls-Royce, we make arrangements with Pratt & Whitney, and we buy their engines. The British and the Americans think that's great! But in the meantime, we never make engines ourselves, we put ourselves at their mercy.”
AP: “For the Caravelle, it was the same, the engine is from Rolls-Royce.”
CDG: “Obviously! Why have we never been able to make Caravelle engines? I've never understood why. We are just as capable as the British and the Americans of making all kinds of extraordinarily complex machines, electronic machines, or atomic stuff. Why aren't we capable of making engines as well?”
AP: “That could be a compelling reason to ask SNECMA to do something.”
CDG: “Oh! They're good-for-nothings.”
On the British attempt to suspend the Concorde project, and a possible Russian co-production
At the Council on November 12, 1964, Marc Jacquet reports on his conversations with his counterpart, Roy Jenkins.
Jenkins proposes suspending, in full agreement with the French authorities, the work on the Concorde as it is and developing a new project for another supersonic aircraft. The General doesn't agree with this:
"If they don't want to proceed with the Concorde, let them say so. We want and can continue. It's up to them to take their responsibilities. Obviously, we won't build the Concorde alone. Nor with the Germans and the Italians, who are unable. Nor with the Americans, who are not desirable and wouldn't desire it. In short, we won't do it.
We have assets here that can prove their capabilities in studies, research, and innovation. If we can't demonstrate these capabilities through the Concorde, then we should do it with something else. The criticisms of the Concorde may arise from the fact that it doesn't fully meet the intended plan. It's not just about the Concorde crossing the Atlantic from England or France. It should also be able to do so from Germany, Sweden, Italy.
We should be moving towards longer-distance transport aircraft. This project could have brilliantly fueled our industry. All of this is not a reason to throw in the towel. Perhaps the Russians..."
Eyes widen around the table. The silence thickens. How pathetic it is, this old man and the sea of discouragement surrounding him.
He resumes, as if to erase the incongruous hypothesis he just mentioned: "But the Russians, that's a different story. Let's not talk about it anymore. However, it is essential to move forward. The first supersonic aircraft is likely to be American. And then? The airframes? We shouldn't have too much difficulty. On the other hand, when it comes to engines, we're not capable of making them.”
(In public, he says 'capable'; in the Council, 'not capable'; in private, 'not fucking capable'.)
"Why this deficiency? Because we don't want it.”
Pompidou: “It's a general weakness of the French industry: we don't have a sufficient metal industry. The foundation is lacking.”
CDG: “If we give up, we sink. It's always possible to fade away. That allows for vegetating; it doesn't allow for existing. We can only give impetus to the industry if there are projects! That was the interest of the Concorde. That's the interest of Pierrelatte. We need to call upon French industries and gather them around great ambitions. Each project has a ripple effect, propaganda effect, prestige effect for other projects and other sales."
[…]
After the Council.
AP: "Don't you see any alternative solution to the Concorde?”
CDG: “I don't see any.”
AP: “You mentioned the Russians?”
CDG: “I believe it wouldn't be practical. It would raise mountains of difficulties.”
AP: “So, you want us to force the English to admit that they are the ones giving up.”
CDG: “Yes, and perhaps they would be willing to offer some compensations. But I don't believe it. However, it must be well established that they are not fulfilling an engagement they had made. The English wanted to muddle the waters."
By compelling the English to reveal themselves, the General did not make it easy for them to back down. But he thought that they would give up nonetheless.
On December 2nd, he revisits the issue. "They don't want to do it. They are forced to hit the Americans, who are pressuring them to make them give up. The Germans, the Italians can't do it. It would only be the Russians, but that would cause a lot of trouble. The Labour Party is in the state we were in under the Fourth Republic. In any case, whether Labour or Conservatives, they always end up giving in to the Americans."
[…]
He had mentioned the idea of converting the Franco-British project into a Franco-Soviet project three times. Once during the Council, but immediately dismissed it. Twice in front of me.
"There would only be the Russians, but it would cause a lot of trouble."
His statement intrigued me. I later learned that the General had the idea of proposing to the Russians to replace the English. He had sounded out Vinogradov. The Russians were more than willing. But he had to discuss it with Pompidou and Couve, who convinced him to abandon this venture. The "secret-defence" was so involved in the construction of the Concorde that the Americans would have done everything to prevent such a U-turn. It would have caused a major crisis, in short, "another story."
The English come back to the table
During the Council on Thursday, January 21, 1965, Jacquet reports on an English turnaround: "Regarding the Concorde, an agreement has been reached. The project for the prototypes won't be publicized, but the deadlines for the production series will be extended. We will have a five-year advantage over the Americans. The English believe that our aircraft will be sellable, and we agree to involve either the Germans or the Italians, depending on a formula to be found."
CDG: "Let's not get tangled up. The English have gone back on their refusal to proceed with the Concorde. They can no longer retreat. We must have them completely committed. To muddle the waters by involving the Americans, Germans, or Italians would yield nothing. We must tell them: 'Well, you have decided to fulfill your commitments, and we will uphold ours.' The rest is just theatrics."
After the Council, the General tells me: "If the English have gone back on their refusal to continue building the Concorde, it's because they couldn't do otherwise. Well, well, very well, let's make the Concorde. I had, however, become accustomed to the idea that we wouldn't do it, that we would do something more profitable, more commercially viable. We can no longer retreat since the English aren't retreating, but I'm not sure if it's a good deal considering how expensive it is."
The General sounds resigned. There's no choice but to proceed. The English have reneged on their refusal, which we did not accept. He doesn't even try to hide that he would have been relieved if the English had given up. He took a big gamble: he expected them to back down, and he lost. And perhaps it's his fault: he thought he was only dealing with "socialists," but by poking at their pride, he found the English.
Instead, the first Concorde flight would occur on March 2nd, 1969 - a few weeks before General de Gaulle’s resignation.
The Americans would give up their SST 2707 in March 1971.
This would later become the Airbus project, developed with Germany.