After the Council, the General tells me, “This time, it was not like the previous time, an experiment, but the testing of our first bomb — don't say it: classified information. It's the military device itself that exploded, the one that will be mounted under the fuselage of a Mirage. From next September onwards, we will manufacture one Mirage and its bomb every month. By the end of next year, we will have what it takes to kill twenty million men two hours after the start of an aggression.”
I was about to ask him, “Doesn't it bother you to think that you could...” but I catch myself to soften the question: “It's impressive to think that one could kill twenty million humans.”
He replies calmly, “Exactly, we won't kill them because they will know we could. And because of that, no one will dare to attack us anymore. It's no longer about waging war, as it has been since the dawn of mankind, but about making it impossible, as we've never succeeded in doing before. We will become one of the four invulnerable countries. Anyone who dares to challenge us will get hurt, and fatally so. The striking force is not meant to strike, but to avoid being struck.”
AP: “The bomb did strike, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”
CDG: “It wouldn't have struck if the Japanese had one. And it had to strike for the first time. To bring Japan to its knees, there needed to be proof that this bomb was a terrifying and unstoppable reality. And this bomb had to end World War II, so that the prospect of its use would deter a third one. Otherwise, its virtues would never have been believed.
All of this must be judged on the scale of history. The bombings of Dresden and Leipzig killed more people than the two atomic bombs. The three hundred thousand deaths in Hiroshima spared many more Japanese, who would have been crushed under conventional bombs. And above all, they spared the tens of millions of deaths in another world war, which would have followed shortly after the previous one. Deaths from conventional bombings would have been pointless deaths. The deaths in Hiroshima were... necessary deaths.” (He searched for the word, then finally settled on the one that must have come to him immediately.)
AP: “And the deaths in Nagasaki?”
CDG: “That, I admit, is more debatable. Truman waited only three days to drop his second bomb, without giving the Japanese time to recover. He could have sent them an eight-day ultimatum.”
AP: “Hundreds of thousands of deaths, women, children, and elderly people burned in a thousandth of a second, and hundreds of thousands more dying in excruciating pain in the following years, isn't that what is called a crime against humanity?”
The General raises his arms. It's not his problem: “Nagasaki may not be very defensible. But without Hiroshima, nuclear weapons would have been no more effective than a water gun. Truman showed courage. It was necessary.”
[…]
At the Council meeting on June 27, 1962, Pompidou announces that there has been a miscalculation for the construction of the isotope separation plant in Pierrelatte. “We must either reassess the funding or spread out the implementation.”
CDG: “Absolutely no spreading out! France's defense cannot wait! The army must convert and adapt to deterrence right away! There's no reason for the country not to decide. The matter must be resolved either in the budget revision or otherwise.”
Pompidou: “As rushed as we may be, it would be better to postpone this debate until autumn. Everyone knows that Pierrelatte is costing more than expected and that there have been irregular transfers.”
The General does not respond. He must be thinking about the reform of the presidential election, which he discussed with me. He cannot undertake everything at once. Pompidou's proposal may seem reasonable to him, but he is reluctant to give in immediately.
After the Council, I ask him about the Pierrelatte funding. What did he mean by saying that the matter should be resolved differently?
CDG: “If it's not resolved in Parliament, it will have to be resolved before the nation. We will hold a referendum.”
AP: “But how would the Constitution allow it? Article 11 only provides for a referendum for the ratification of a treaty or the organization of public powers. An increase in funding falls under neither of these categories.”
CDG: “Indeed, the wording of Article 11 is too restrictive. The referendum should cover two questions:
Do you approve a new wording of Article 11, allowing the people to decide all kinds of debates, not just the two currently provided for?1
If the answer is positive, do you approve the establishment of a national deterrent force, and the allocation of such and such credits to this force?”
[…]
July 11, 1962. The General seemingly has an appetite for referendums. He sticks to his idea, but his idea is flexible.
CDG: “If a motion of censure were passed regarding nuclear armament, a double problem would arise: that of the Assembly, which would obviously be dissolved; that of the nuclear force, and the country would decide. The two consultations, the legislative elections and the referendum, would be simultaneous. But common sense will prevail.
The establishment of this force commits the destiny of the country. It is of immense importance, as it determines territorial integrity and national independence, which the President of the Republic is duty-bound to maintain, in accordance with the Constitution. This duty would no longer be possible to fulfill if this force could not be established.”
AP: “Does this mean that the establishment of the nuclear force relates to the organization of public powers, and therefore could fall within the scope of Article 11 of the Constitution as it stands?”
CDG: “Indeed. A good organization of public powers presupposes that the most eminent of public powers, the President of the Republic, has the ability to exercise the prerogatives conferred upon him by the Constitution.”
So, for the past two weeks, he has been pondering the matter. One of his collaborators may have raised objections against the simultaneity, in the same referendum, of two different questions. He has found another way that would allow only one question to be asked, even if it's a bit far-fetched.
[…]
At the next Council meeting, on July 18, 1962, Palewski announces:
“Our plutonium-based A-bomb is definitively ready. The future H-bomb could be tested starting in 1970. Several countries are seeking our assistance and cooperation in nuclear matters, such as India and Israel. We have taken the initiative with Euratom. We would like it to work, even if our partners contribute nothing. But it is for Europe that we have worked. It will benefit from it when the time comes.”
After the Council:
AP: “Don't you think 1970 is far away for the H-bomb?”
CDG: “Yes, it's far. I wonder if we could shorten the deadlines. But you see, these things take a lot of time. The important thing is to launch them in a way that makes them irreversible.”
AP: “Is it really for Europe that we are working, as Palewski says?”
CDG: “It's primarily for France! I beg you, don't be ashamed to say it! You see, it's enough for the world to know that France is becoming a nuclear power, for other countries to immediately seek our technical assistance. They prefer it to that of the Americans or the Russians, who would make them dependent, or to that of the English, whom they know are dependent on the Americans.
But that doesn't mean that, for the future, we are not working for Europe. Since France is in Europe and there is no European construction without France, it will probably be Europe that benefits sooner or later. Provided that what we invent and create is not poured into a cauldron called Euratom, where we would bring everything, where others would bring nothing, and where, however, everyone could draw as much as us. That's Euratom! It's unbelievable! It's shameful! It's beyond belief! Well, all that's over. Finished!”
He pounds the table with his hand.
At the Council meeting on July 25, 1962, Palewski states:
“We still have another year of nuclear tests to conduct in the Sahara. Then we will have to prepare to withdraw and set up in Polynesia.”
After the Council:
AP: “I don't understand what Palewski said. Our future installations in Polynesia, which will only start next year, will not be ready before 1966. Does that mean there would be a gap of three years between the end of tests in the Sahara and the start of tests in Polynesia?”
CDG: “Yes, he must have made a mistake. Don't worry, our atomic engineers will always find things to do in the Sahara during those three years. Even if those experiments serve no purpose, they love running them.”
On the role of the deterrence force
CDG: “If the free world is attacked, all the states of the free world must fight. It's an undeniable reality.
For thirteen years since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the world has completely changed. The Americans were alone in the world in possessing the atomic bomb. If Europe were attacked by the USSR, the Americans would drop their bombs and it would be over. Europe, which didn't have much substance, in return provided its conventional means to America. That's what we called 'integration.' It corresponded to the nature of things at the time.
Today, Russia has a nuclear arsenal that can annihilate America, just as America can annihilate Russia. Consequently, they have no desire to annihilate each other. Therefore, the question of Europe's protection by American atomic bombs arises. It's no longer certain at all that the United States would use their bombs. The United States themselves don't know. In the eyes of France, the solidity of NATO has long been shaken; the Germans, who believed firmly in it, are now beginning to question it.
It is therefore normal for us to take back our marbles, not to withdraw them from the Atlantic Alliance, but to use them within the Atlantic Alliance according to what we believe is useful.
To succeed in Europe, especially in its politics and defense, is more necessary than ever. France has proposed it. The distracted or misinformed have prevented it from happening until now2. In any case, the special solidarity imposed by geography on France and Germany is evident.
The Germans have not done well so far because they pursued a chimera, that of American protection. But it is possible that they will tighten their practical military ties with us. For our part, we are very willing to do so.”
[…]
CDG: “You must understand that the Americans will not risk their survival to defend Europe. They never have, and they never will. They have no desire to do so. It's as clear as daylight. Throughout their history, they have never put their national existence at stake for an external commitment. They fought to the death for their independence, then for the Civil War. Externally, they only ever sent expeditionary forces, which represented only a small part of their capabilities, even if they fought courageously.
Why would they agree to be wiped off the map just because a European country threatened by Russia called for their help? They will never use their bombs in such a case! There's no point in them telling us stories. There's no point in us telling ourselves stories!
That France and Germany, to whom geography imposes solidarity, deploy all their forces if one of the two is attacked, is in line with the nature of things. That's why we need to push further for alliance with the Germans. But the United States will always back down.
Therefore, we need our own national deterrence force. If we could only rely on the American strike force, we would have no real guarantee.”
AP: “Do you believe that our small nuclear force will suffice to deter the Soviets if they are certain that America will not intervene if they attack us?”
CDG: “If we can kill a quarter or half of the Russians, we are sure they won't attack us. And don't say: the adversary is Moscow. It's a mistake to designate an exclusive adversary. The adversary could be an aggressor — and, for the moment, indeed, that's all we see. But it could also be another aggressor, unimaginable today, or another country than an aggressor.”
AP: “I don't understand. Why deter a country that wouldn't think to attack us?”
The General repeats calmly:
“The deterrence force is not only meant to deter an aggressor. It is also meant to deter an abusive protector. That's why it must cover all angles.
Besides, we never know where the threat might come from, or where pressure or blackmail might come from. Minds must not waver. Sooner or later, fabulous events, incredible reversals, can occur. There have been so many in history! America could explode due to terrorism, or racism, who knows, and become a threat to peace. The Soviet Union could explode because communism collapses, its peoples quarrel. It can become threatening again. No one can say in advance where the danger will come from. And since it takes twenty years to prepare for it, we take our precautions immediately.”
AP: “The most likely scenario, however, is the confrontation of the two superpowers! And in that case, we would be on the side of the Americans, wouldn't we?”
CDG: “As long as we remain in the bloc system, it's either one of two things. Either the United States and Russia fight, and we are condemned to death; or they agree, and we are condemned to oblivion. Let's assume they agree to neutralize Germany: we are incapable of resisting the Russians, we become their plaything. As long as the Russians and the Americans remain face to face, there is no other outcome than their conflict, or their condominium.
That's why, while remaining allies of the Americans, we want to stop relying on them.”
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On the Nassau Agreement and the position of France
Élysée, January 3, 1963. This is the first Council meeting since the Nassau Agreement that the British Prime Minister signed with President Kennedy on December 21. The Americans are proposing to France a similar agreement of nuclear cooperation: the “multilateral force.” We are all waiting to see what position General de Gaulle will take.
But first, Couve outlines the complex details of this agreement, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of extending it to France:
“The American government announced, at the same time, that it is abandoning the construction of the Skybolt missile, which was intended for the British air forces, and proposes to replace them with much more powerful rockets, the Polaris. Was the American decision a fortuitous coincidence with Macmillan's visit? Or was it intentionally announced at that time? In any case, this matter has given the meeting a dramatic touch.
Britain will cease to have bombs carried by planes. It will only have nuclear submarines. All of this will be included in this multilateral force under an Anglo-Saxon label. But it will be placed under NATO command, meaning under American command.”
[…]
After Couve and Pompidou, we get the impression that everything has been said and that de Gaulle is coming too late. And yet:
CDG: "We are faced with the question posed by Kennedy. It is a technical question and a question of principle.
The technical question, first. There is no comparison between the situation of Great Britain and ours.
1. Great Britain is forced to choose between: accepting the American proposal (the Polaris instead of the Skybolt) or having nothing in the short term. Its bombers are obsolete and its Skybolt missiles are worthless now that America is stopping their production. We, on the contrary, have nothing yet, but we are about to have something. Our Mirage IVs fly much faster than the English bombers and they carry bombs that are ours, A-bombs, each worth three Hiroshimas, which is not insignificant.
So, we do not have the choice, like the English, between something and nothing. We will have something.
2. For the future, the prospects are also different. The English will have nuclear submarines, Polaris missiles, and nuclear warheads to place at the end of these Polaris missiles.
They have the first and the third elements of the system, whereas we do not have them. Thanks to the Nassau Agreement, they are sure to have the second element, which allows them to operate the first and the third.
On the contrary, it is useless for us to have the second, since we do not have the first and the third. The first and the third, the English have them thanks to the Americans. For us to be able to use the American offer, we would have to do without them what the English have done thanks to them. This will be the case, but many years will pass before this interests us.
In short, we will have something of our own, while the English will have nothing of their own. And if we were given Polaris missiles, we would not know what to do with them for a long time.
It is true that the system proposed by the Americans is, as the English say, very sophisticated. So why don't we accept it? Because it would not serve us immediately; and in the future, we do not know exactly which path we will take; but what we do know is that it will be our own.
We must keep our hands free. However, this is precisely what the Americans want to avoid. They do not want their allies to have strategic, and therefore political, independence. They felt, with the Cuban Missile Crisis, capable of standing up to the Soviets, and even pushing them back. They have concluded that they have no reason to restrain themselves vis-à-vis their allies. They are determined to abolish their allies (he did say abolish).
In such a case, one survives or does not survive. When you are a nation like France, you cannot accept to disappear.
Accepting the American offer would be the end of any possibility of independent, or even autonomous, atomic action. We would have to place our own atomic forces in this system, and place them under the absolute command of the Americans. There is no reason to accept it.
The English owe the Americans much of what they have or will have. For nuclear matters, we owe the Americans nothing, except hindrance. For our atomic experiments, they have done everything they could to bother us, thanks to the UN, by stirring up protests like that of Nigeria. That's all they've done for us.
In the future, we will also have no reason to enter this system. Britain imagines it has safeguarded its autonomy, since the text contains the expression: 'if its supreme interests are engaged.' These are just words. It's smoke and mirrors. How could one break an organization made for war and in which one would have entered? A defense system is a concentrated, nested, complex system that cannot be destroyed once it is created, even if one wants to.
We have occasionally regained some autonomy from the Americans. In Strasbourg, Eisenhower gave in, because I ordered our troops to defend Strasbourg no matter what happens. But it would not be the same with a multilateral force integrated under American leadership.
On this fundamental point, we must keep our defense capabilities intact. It is possible that they will be contested. A whole campaign is developing, with Lippmann, Alsop, officials, and unofficials.
And the English are furious to see that we are not taking the bait as they themselves did. It's ridiculous!
Gentlemen, the English, Gentlemen, the Anglo-Saxons, you are wasting your time! your money! You are hindering the allied strategy! Because this strategy can only work if countries like France feel committed by themselves and for themselves.
Our defense is the very condition of our policy. It must remain ours. It is not certain that American interests always coincide with those of Europe and France. It is possible that the current contacts between Americans and Russians will prove this one day.
It is not about us equipping ourselves with a force equivalent to that of the Americans and Russians. We are not in the realm of conventional weapons, but in the realm of deterrence. The question is not to match the level of the adversary. The question is to represent a sufficient retaliatory capacity to dissuade aggression.
Deterrence begins as soon as there is the possibility of killing enough people in the aggressor's country to persuade them that the game is not worth the candle. It is not necessary to have an atomic capacity on the scale of that of the Americans or Russians.
When we are sure that we can kill (which will be the case within seven, eight, or nine years) 40 or 50 million inhabitants in our aggressor's country, we are assured that we will not be attacked.
On the contrary, we cease to be assured if the Americans are behind the scenes; for they will have an interest, or believe they have an interest, in preventing us from resorting to our atomic weapons, so as to avoid any risk of being drawn into a generalized conflict.
As for the English, it could be the same for them... if they had retained their independence. They lost it in the Bahamas. They are a bit confused about it. They try to cover themselves with the terms 'supreme interests,' but I fear they won't get away with it. The Bahamas is an operation by the Americans to get their hands on Britain's means and thus its future.
I replied to Kennedy to thank him for informing me of the content of his statement before it was published. As for his proposals, I told him that they needed to be examined very closely, that the technical conditions to be examined were very particular, that we are obliged to consider the issue from the perspective of our own national defense, which he knows well.
We did not ask for any explanation about the system he proposes; but if he wanted to give us one, we would be interested.
Helping the Americans set up their system would probably not cost us any less than helping ourselves to gain our independence.”
He concludes this masterful exposition on this financial note, as Pompidou had done. Is it to extend a lifeline to Giscard, to get him to speak and to get him to commit on a point so sensitive to his political friends? Giscard - as usual, sitting very upright in his chair - without taking his eyes off the General, does not flinch and remains silent.
On the implicit understanding behind American-Russian nuclear forces in Europe
At the end of our interview on April 3, 1963, as he escorted me out, the General dropped a heavy confidence on me: “There is a deep agreement between the two giants regarding the atomic bomb. It is tacit, but it's as if it had been written and signed. The United States only leaves bombs in Europe that do not target Russia, but only the satellite countries.” I promised myself to question him further on this point."
Golden Salon, after the Council meeting on April 10, 1963:
AP: "The English and American press are stepping up their attacks on your nuclear force."
CDG: "You can tell your journalists that, as of this summer, the French atomic force will become a reality. Both concerning the aircraft, the first operational Mirage IVs, which will be mass-produced starting from September, and the explosives, which will be manufactured at the same time, following a synchronized pace that will accelerate. You can announce that. We will have our 50 Mirages and our 50 bombs by the end of 1965.
This story of delay is a joke. Those who spread it obviously have an interest in making it appear that we are facing difficulties. When France clearly expresses its opposition to a policy that is not its own, they say, 'France is ruining everything! She is endangering Western unity! She is breaking her alliances! She is preparing a Paris-Moscow axis! She is neutral! She is endangering the Common Market!' And after a while, it turns out that the Common Market is doing well, there is no neutrality, there is no Paris-Moscow axis, the alliances are not broken, Western unity is not in danger, and France hasn't broken anything at all. And when France graciously receives its guests, at a time when France's partners show a general desire to get closer to it, they exclaim, 'Ah! France is forced to compromise. Things are going badly in France.'
All of this is a way for our good allies to mask their defeat. They have finally rallied to France's point of view, or at least, they have rallied to the idea that nothing could be done against France.”
AP: “Are you aware, General, of the articles in Newsweek and The New York Times claiming that General Gallois admitted that setting up the strike force faced serious technical and economic difficulties, which could prove insurmountable?”
CDG: “But Gallois has formally denied it, and rightly so. It's all absurd. Bohlen is the conductor, he's a staunch enemy of France. He does everything he can to turn the accredited English and American press in Paris, and even French journalists, against us. He has no trouble succeeding because French journalists are on the lookout for anything unpleasant and rush like a howling pack behind anyone plotting against me.
Besides, Gallois has very good ideas, but I never see him. I haven't met him once since I returned to office! It has been said that he is my close advisor. It's of the same ilk as everything else.
AP: "I understood the other day that you believed there was a secret agreement between the Americans and the Russians regarding the atomic bomb. What do you mean by that?”
CDG: “Yes, there is an implicit and profound agreement between the Americans and the Russians. For the Americans, it consists of leaving in Europe only nuclear forces whose range does not allow them to reach Russia, but only the satellite countries. And vice versa for the Russians: they implicitly commit not to attack American territory if something happens in Europe, in exchange for the fact that the Americans will not attack Soviet territory.
The two superpowers get along like thieves. There is a neutralization of the supreme threat of the Americans against the Russians, and vice versa.
Why do you think the Americans withdrew their missiles from Turkey immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis? Because their missiles in Turkey could only target Russia itself. Just as Soviet missiles in Cuba could only target the United States. Turkey was the Cuban Missile Crisis for the Americans; Cuba was the Turkish Missile Crisis for the Russians. The nuclear balance between the two great powers required the double withdrawal.
Now that the sought-after agreement has been translated into action and recognized by both sides, the Russians and the Americans are relieved. Their two sanctuaries are out of harm's way. They can afford to fight in Europe, nothing serious will happen to them. Certainly, the Americans may claim that if Europe is attacked, they will defend it. Yes... They will defend it with the few soldiers they leave there, and maybe with tactical nuclear bombs targeting troops or, at most, the satellite countries in the rear.
But the grand nuclear strategy will not happen. Because the Russian threat to the United States will neutralize the American threat to Russia. The missiles in Cuba as well as in Turkey broke this deep-seated agreement. That's why the story of the U2 from Turkish soil had the Russians in a frenzy."
On the NATO Multilateral Force
CDG: "This is also the hidden meaning of the Nassau Agreement. It's about tying up the British, so they can't shoot at Russia; otherwise, it would bring down the understanding between the two giants. Russia can only be satisfied with Nassau, and so can America. You see, if I were American, I would have done the same! You can never blame a statesman for defending the interests of his country. The Americans are perfectly right to negotiate directly with the Russians. But the policy of the Americans is not the policy of France. Because the interests of the Americans are different from the interests of France.
The British naively imagine that if they join the multinational force, they can withdraw when the time comes to deal with their own interests. It's a joke. Because if it's a conflict involving Kuwait or the island of Saint Helena, they won't use atomic bombs. If it's a conflict involving a nuclear power like Russia, then they will be tied up by the Americans. Because they won't be able to escape from America's net, and they will be forced to submit to its strategy. Moreover, if the British wanted to withdraw against the will of the Americans, they couldn't. They are entirely at the mercy of the Americans. If they were to shoot from their submarines, escaping from the American guidance and tracking system, they wouldn't know if they were shooting at Moscow or Vladivostok, or somewhere in the tundra!
As for the Germans, of course, they are not against the multilateral force project because they consider that any atomic organization where they will be admitted will be a first step towards the constitution of a nuclear force of their own. A German general as close as possible to the center of triggering a potential atomic war is their dearest wish. Because they know that at the moment, they cannot aspire to more."
On the effort and the need to develop a thermonuclear weapon
The General's car pulls up in front of the steps precisely on time. We are asked to put on white lab coats, supposedly to protect us from potential contamination. This attire would have delighted journalists and photographers, if this visit had not been as protected as the research itself. We quickly tour the laboratories together, amid comments that I absolutely don't understand, and the General, I suppose, understands no more than I do. Then, we are seated for the briefing; a word that visibly annoys the General, but he refrains from commenting on it. He asks questions about the duration of the studies remaining before the first thermonuclear tests. The answers are vague:
"If we had discovered the process, we would know roughly how long it would take us to implement it. Today, we still don't have the solution.”
CDG: “But do you know in which direction you should be looking for it?”
“Not really. The H-bomb is not an improved A-bomb. It's a completely different principle, which the Americans discovered, and which the Russians and the British also found, the former through espionage, the latter through their close ties with the Americans. We, on the other hand, are alone. No one is helping us. We are exploring several avenues and will experiment with them in the Pacific as soon as we see clearly enough.”
The General asks Robert: “Isn't there a way to speed things up?”
The director of military applications responds with technical objections:
“We are obliged to organize a shooting campaign on the atolls only every two years, because we have to send a large part of the fleet to the Pacific and then overhaul it in Brest the following year. Five useful years, therefore means ten years. And then, we have to wait for Pierrelatte to operate at full capacity in order to proceed with the first experiments, since we need a sufficient quantity of uranium 235. Finally, the Americans refuse to provide us with the giant computers that would be necessary to carry out our calculations.”
As we are about to leave, the General signals to me: “Are you going back to Paris? Come with me.”
As soon as the car started, he said to me in a low voice, as if he were afraid the driver or the aide-de-camp might hear:
“I don't have a good impression. They don't even know what they're doing. I don't believe these guys are up to the task. My instinct tells me they won't succeed. I repeat to you that I want the first thermonuclear test no later than 1968. It's in two and a half years and they are far from it. They even mentioned 1975 or 1976. Can you believe it? Nine or ten years? Have you studied how long it took others to go from the stage of their first atomic device to that of their first thermonuclear device?”
AP: “Of course, General. (I recite the lesson I recently learned.) The Americans, July 45: first atomic test. October 52: first thermonuclear test.”
CDG: “That's seven years. And the Russians?”
AP: “August 49: first atomic test. August 53: first thermonuclear test.”
CDG: “That's four years. And the British?”
AP: “October 52: first atomic test. May 57: first thermonuclear test.”
CDG: “That's four and a half years. And here we are, six years already since we detonated the first atomic bomb and we still have nothing in thermonuclear. And it would take us fifteen or sixteen years to do what others have done in three or four times less time? For crying out loud tell me, why is it so difficult to recruit valuable scientists for this kind of research?”
AP: “Firstly, it's difficult to hire people for work that we can only reveal to them if they're willing to engage in it. And then they hesitate to devote their careers to work that may be interrupted by a political turnaround.”
CDG: “As long as power evaded responsibility, scientists shouldn't have been asked to be more determined than it. But now that power has chosen, is it really impossible to recruit competent individuals? Now they know they'll be covered.”
AP: “Yes, but a scientific career progresses through publications, and secrecy prohibits publishing. Civil research work is valued. Military research work is secret and almost nonexistent. But at least you endowed the CEA with an exceptional status of autonomy that allowed continuity of vision and action. It doesn't progress quickly, but it progresses.”
CDG: “You know, the CEA was infested with communists during Joliot's time. I hope they have been removed from sensitive positions. But who knows if there aren't enough left in the house to exert hidden pressures? In any case, the CEA hasn't caught up with our delay. It dragged on because the government got tangled up in hesitations and contradictions.”
AP: “But the Fourth Republic still made decisions that led us to Reggane 4.”
CDG: "Yes, yes, I know, the governments turned a blind eye to what the CEA was preparing and refused to take responsibility for it! That was the system of the Fourth Republic. But now, all of that is over. We must double the pace!
I repeat, if the first tests take place while I'm here, no one after me will dare to question the weapons system that will result from it. If the first explosion doesn't happen before I leave, everything will be abandoned. We will have been downgraded. We will stick to the A-bomb, and our mission will have failed. France will have lost its rank. See if all their objections hold. Is it really essential to only conduct a campaign every two years? To have uranium from Pierrelatte in quantity? To possess giant computers? Try to see if these are not false reasons.”
Then, the General drops the conversation. I try to talk about something else. He doesn't respond. I feel out of place. He brought me into his car to ‘give me a dressing-down.’ The deed is done; he has nothing more to say to me, nor does he want to hear from me.
The General takes a bag of caramels from the glove compartment. He lowers the window, crumples the paper into a ball, and throws it onto the road.
In June 1965, I had already been surprised to see him act like this, in the car where I kept him company on the roads of Eure-et-Loir. The aide-de-camp had explained to me that the General had developed this habit when he gave up smoking. Sucking on caramels had become another dependence for him, less harmful to his health than tobacco. The aides-de-camp always made sure he had a pack in his office and another in his car.
We have only covered a quarter of the way. We can't possibly remain silent until the Élysée, with him sucking on caramels and me watching, can we? I was about to try to restart the conversation when he does it himself.
CDG: “Take a close look at this matter of calculators. The CEA demands giant American calculators; but did the Americans have them when they made their H-bomb? Look into that. Anyway… It's distressing that we are so inadequate in this field. The Bull affair was lamentable.”
AP: “For research, in 1966, we still operate on the structures you established previously: in 1945, the CEA, in 1958, the General Delegation, research, research funding, concerted actions.”
CDG: “When I returned to office in '58, there was an urgent problem to solve: to bring order to the research domain, to organize responsible bodies for the choices to be proposed to the government We had already considered this problem in the previous years. But, as always, no one had made a decision.
Meanwhile, scientists were becoming discouraged. More and more were leaving for abroad, especially to the United States. It was necessary to restore confidence to researchers in their future in France. Between the summit of the state and the laboratory technician bent over his test tubes in his laboratory, there was a mess of relays that contradicted each other, or at least duplicated each other; some belonging to the state, but without any impetus from the state; others belonging to the private sector and supported by public funds, but without control by the public authority; not to mention the overlaps between the various ministerial departments. In short, it was chaos, and chaos never led to anything.
It was therefore necessary to sort all that out; and then, means had to be provided. But if we had given too much right away, we would have had to proceed with massive recruitment, we would have lowered the level below mediocre. What is needed is a continuous and reasonable increase. See if you can speed up this growth, but don't accelerate it too much either.”
[…]
AP: “In the face of advances in science, are you pessimistic or optimistic?”
CDG: “Both. I hope that scientists will free man from his repetitive tasks, liberate him, make him more capable of initiatives. But I worry about the establishment of a mass society that would be mechanized and enslaved by a machine beyond its control.
In any case, our scientific and technical progress is necessary for our national independence and our greatness.
France is only a middle power (he emphasizes with derision this qualifier that belongs to the arsenal of his adversaries) by its size and its resources; therefore, they must be managed rigorously. But it has a great past; it needs to feel that it has a great future, and that this future is essential not only for itself, but for the future of humanity. So, we cannot do everything, but what we choose to do, we must do it as well as possible. Your role is to ensure this.”
[…]
Golden Salon, July 6, 1966.
The General still has a singular intuition. Upon the objections raised, which had been confirmed to me, I conducted a thorough investigation, of which I now give an account.
AP: “It was claimed that a massive mobilization of our naval forces would be necessary to surround the sites with a sanitary cordon to prohibit the dangerous zone. Several working sessions revealed that by attaching the bombs to captive balloons, held by cables at altitude, pollution would be reduced to almost nothing: the fireball would not be enlarged by materials from the ground; it would not reach either the atoll or the sea, and would rise rapidly; the cloud, much less radioactive, would disperse more easily. The area to be monitored and protected would be reduced accordingly. We would no longer need as many boats. We could therefore carry out a shooting campaign every summer, which should halve the experimentation time.
Another discovery: thermonuclear devices do not require enriched uranium from Pierrelatte. The British have achieved theirs with plutonium, which we produce abundantly.
Finally, the three countries that preceded us, the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom, conducted their first thermonuclear experiments without possessing the giant computers that we are told are indispensable and that did not yet exist.”
The General listened to me without interrupting, looking at me intently: “I suspected as much. We're being fed nonsense. Does all this mean that the experiments we are conducting this summer will not advance us in the path of thermonuclear?”
AP: “Probably. But they won't be entirely useless. They will allow us to test the Pacific site, to verify that more powerful shots, conducted under a balloon, actually result in pollution, the reassuring results that theoretical models suggest. Our engineers and researchers will tackle new problems for them. For example, systematically using balloons, or capturing information that must reach the recorders a few nanoseconds before the explosion destroys the cables charged with transmitting them. We will also detonate a real series bomb, as delivered to the aviators; they will be reassured. We will be able to acquire perfect mastery of atomic weaponry, while awaiting the day when we have penetrated the secrets of thermonuclear fusion.”
CDG: “But we could have done without it anyway! We could also have saved money on Pierrelatte...”
AP: “There too, we shouldn't regret it too much. Pierrelatte will be necessary to supply fuel to nuclear submarine engines, although the Americans propose to sell us some for this purpose. And enriched uranium, when we have it, will provide more flexibility in the design of H-bombs. In any case, the construction of Pierrelatte allows CEA engineers and associated companies to master advanced technologies of which they knew nothing.”
CDG: “Well, be that as it may! You have plutonium, functioning sites, quality teams. You will have enriched uranium. Now we need to quickly move on to the H-bomb. It's your business!”
"Sort it out!" His injunctions aim to make me responsible and even culpable. If we don't succeed, it will be my fault. Which doesn't mean that if we succeed, it will be thanks to me.
[…]
On board the cruiser De Grasse, the third day, Sunday, September 11, 1966. 5 A.M.
Commander Besnault wakes me up by tapping on the iron door of my cabin, “This time it's good, excellent weather, calm winds, firing in an hour. Meet on the deck with the General in half an hour.”
Half an hour later, the General, Pierre Messmer, Pierre Billotte, and I put on a special suit. We are informed that it will protect us from potential fallout at ten kilometers (no risks are taken).
We are on the command bridge. Not a cloud in the sky. The pink glow to the east becomes brighter, and then the sun's disc appears, skimming the calm waters. The cruiser advances with all the power of its engines. In a few minutes, the waves change from black to midnight blue, then to turquoise blue. The light shimmers on their crests.
Through binoculars, we see the captive balloon, shaped like a dirigible, to which the bomb is suspended. We can make out the gondola, and even the cables holding the device, which will vaporize in a few minutes. The cruiser heads in its direction. The balloon grows rapidly.
One minute before six o'clock, we are told to turn around, despite our sunglasses and the compresses we hold with our hands. If we look in the direction of the explosion, we risk being blinded by a light “equivalent to that of ten thousand suns.” The countdown begins: ten, nine... At the instant zero, a sharp heat burns the back of my neck. It is not the heat wave released by the explosion, which will come half a minute later, along with the crash of the explosion; it is the heat instantly propagated by the light itself.
When we turn around, fire glows gradually fading away. A mushroom cloud rises, all white against the blue sky. We watch it blossom for a long time, then unravel.
Admiral Lorain comes to announce, “Perfectly successful shot; power: ten times the bomb of Hiroshima.”
The General is in a state I had never seen him in. He expresses his joy freely. Usually refraining from showing any emotion, he exclaims first, “It's magnificent!” Then, I seem to hear him say quietly, as if speaking to himself, “It's a resurrection!” I didn't understand what he meant, and in the presence of my two colleagues, I didn't dare ask for explanations at that moment.
Admiral Lorain informs us a little later that a so-called “fishing trawler” from the Soviet Union, obviously loaded with electronic devices, was cruising off the coast of Mururoa, while an American plane flew through the radioactive cloud pushed by the winds from the mushroom. In addition, an American or perhaps English submarine is likely in the vicinity. They are taking samples to assess how far we have progressed in our research.
The General, always unperturbed in front of subordinates he doesn't know, does not respond to the admiral, as if he hadn't heard. A moment later, he says to Billotte — whose wife, he knows well, is American — and to me:
“These Anglo-Saxons are quite astonishing! That the Russians, who are our virtual adversaries, send a supposed trawler to assess the power of our bombs, we cannot blame them, they are doing their job. But for our allies to spy on us as they would on an adversary, that's a bit much!
In reality, they are always the same. During the war, they preferred Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Martinique, and Guadeloupe to remain under Vichy, risking them serving as stops for German submarines, rather than letting them return to Free France.
Yet, they knew perfectly well that the radio operator in Saint-Pierre was constantly sending messages to Vichy to inform the Germans about the weather and the movements of ships. However, they guessed that if we took control of these islands, they would remain French; whereas if they remained faithful to Vichy, that is to say, to the Germans, they could quietly confiscate them at the end of the war.
Today, they consider the Pacific to be an Anglo-Saxon ocean, with California, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Hawaii, Fiji, etc.; not to mention their countless satellites, starting with Japan and Formosa. They cannot bear that French Polynesia and New Caledonia remain French; they have forgotten the services they rendered during the war to alter the course of events in the Pacific. For us to set off our bombs in front of them is like an insult to them, as long as we refuse to be their satellite.”
A silence, then he continues, “It's rather flattering to be spied on by Russian trawlers and American planes. It's still extraordinary that neither of them can bear the fact that we're acquiring the means of our independence.”
This news further boosts the General's good mood. “So, we've taunted both superpowers symmetrically. Each one tries to spy on us. And neither can stop us from continuing.”
Then the General disappears into his cabin. Strangely, he is very reserved for the rest of the day, unlike the two previous days. Did he want to exert control over himself to compensate for the moment of exaltation he had indulged in? To regain his distance from those who had witnessed that moment of abandon? Or perhaps, the certainty of being right against all odds, injected by this successful experience, made him rise back to the haughty peak where he found his dream of pride?
He did not leave his cabin until lunch. At the table, he was so concise that silence weighed heavily on his paralyzed guests. When, in the afternoon, he descended from the ladder at Mururoa, the rumor quickly spreads: “He's in a foul mood.”
Although apparently, he has every reason to be excellent… Pompidou is not wrong to say that the General is “special.”
[…]
CDG: “Mururoa, of course! The bomb sums up everything we've tried to do. It means the challenge is met. Jean Monnet believed that European construction was impossible without equality of rights between France and Germany; and since the Soviets would never allow the Germans to possess atomic weapons, this prohibition would extend to France.
The EDC would have endorsed this atomic abstinence. France had the means for the bomb, but it would have had to renounce it because Germany had been defeated! On the means as well, we have risen to the challenge. Eisenhower told me, 'It will cost you too much, you won't succeed.' American satellites in Europe and around the world, opposition in France to American orders, repeated endlessly that we were not capable. Mitterrand and Lecanuet mocked the 'firecracker.'
And we are mass producing bombs ten times more powerful than Hiroshima's, and we are capable of delivering them accurately. Mururoa means that no country can attack France, because the risk to an aggressor would be immeasurably greater than the stake we would represent for them. He who touches it gets stung and condemns himself to death. Mururoa means invulnerability, therefore peace. It's a situation we've never experienced in our history.
We got there on our own, without assistance, and even with active hostility from the Americans and passive hostility from the Russians. While the English got there with American help, the Russians by spying on the Americans and the English, and the Chinese with Russian help! It's proven that France can rise to the level of the greatest on its own. We are capable of existing by ourselves. We have a state worthy of its name.
And furthermore, it justifies the popular election of the President. Only a man embodying popular sovereignty can determine the national destiny. A President appointed by the party system would never have the ability to press the button. Deterrence would cease to be credible immediately.
Yes, Mururoa sums up everything we've tried to do for the past twenty-six years. And it offers a chance that the country won't fall back into the abyss when I'm no longer here.”
Twenty-six years? I mentally calculate: 66-26 = June 1940.
AP: “Is that why you spoke of resurrection when you were told the shot was successful?”
The General looks a bit surprised, then replies, “Yes, it's a resurrection. But it will only be complete if we make the H-bomb. So try to move things forward.”
I still don't dare tell him what I learned at Hao.
From January to September, I was told that the experiments in Polynesia would be thermonuclear, or at least, 'would involve thermonuclear reactions.' Megaton shots were promised to me. However, one must face facts, none of the shots in this campaign have been or will be of a thermonuclear nature. I was confessed at Hao that they are only 'boosted A-bombs.' They may boost them even more next year, but it's not the H-bomb, the principle of which we still haven't discovered.
[…]
Raymond Aron, in Le Figaro of the same morning, has a sentence to express that his American friends, far from being skeptical about our capabilities to reach the thermonuclear level, are instead surprised that we are not progressing faster. It's surely this sentence that the General has retained. I explain to him again that it's not so easy. We couldn't make progress in thermonuclear matter as long as we didn't have both the knowledge and the enriched uranium in sufficient quantity.
He quickly retorts, “But nothing prevented advancing knowledge before we had the enriched uranium! And a year after Pierrelatte starts working, all this should be sorted out! Do you hear me: twelve months!”
Curiously, during the world tour, the General didn't show much insistence on his thermonuclear requirement. As if the intense satisfaction he derived from the Mururoa test had momentarily erased his concerns. So now he's back on the attack.
AP: “General, we still haven't found the operational device capable of triggering the fusion reaction, but we have made significant progress in fission. The results of the experiments, especially the one you witnessed, 'Betelgeuse,' are such that the Directorate of Military Applications is confident in developing an 'enhanced' type A bomb. It would have a much higher power. Of course, it's not the H-bomb, but it's still such an improved nuclear fission that the Directorate of Military Applications wonders if this solution might not be the most suitable. It's within reach and would therefore be more economical.”
CDG (vividly): “But then, they would want to abandon the H-bomb? I suspected as much.”
He pauses for a few seconds, as if to control his anger, then looks at me sternly:
“It's out of the question! They believe that by doubling it, no one will notice the difference. Do you imagine that the Americans and the Soviets, with their reconnaissance planes, trawlers, and submarines, won't realize it? They will know immediately where things stand. We will have remained at the threshold. Among the five nuclear powers, we will be the only one not to have reached the thermonuclear level. The secret lies in the process, not in the results! They cannot be hidden. Moscow and Washington will make sure they are known. Everyone will know that we have failed. We will have lost our status! And besides, there are surely technical reasons why the Americans, the Russians, and the British abandoned A-bombs when they could have H-bombs.”
AP: “Indeed, there are at least two technical reasons. The first is that thermonuclear, being much more powerful at equal volume, lends itself to much greater miniaturization. If we have thermonuclear capability, we will be able to make tactical bombs or lighter missile warheads. It greatly expands our arsenal. Furthermore, A-bombs can be neutralized by what is called the neutron effect: preventive measures taken by the enemy at high altitude would prevent the chain reaction from occurring as expected in a bomb that had to traverse this atmosphere; in other words, it would become a dud.”
CDG: “So, you see, why hesitate! Our A-bomb is a step. We are establishing, based on it, an interim armament. But it is out of the question that we settle for it! If we do not penetrate the thermonuclear sanctuary, our armament will not be a deterrent to those who possess the ultimate weapon.”
I assure the General once again, but with growing concern, that I will do everything in my power to accelerate the process.
[…]
On April 1, 1967, the last Council before my transfer, the General asks me again, “So, is it progressing?” "This time, I have full confidence," I tell him. And I tell him about the bet I made on Dautray.
Dautray synthesized all the studies engaged in a few weeks and focused efforts on the formula that seemed right to him. He initiated the studies and tests that needed further exploration. Robert Hirsch skillfully appeased conflicts by persuading everyone at the CEA that the former team members had already done part of the work that allowed Dautray to reach conclusions so quickly, reducing his merit to a role of synthesis. Robert and Viard successfully redefined, within a year, based on these entirely new foundations, the program of tests planned for 1968.
In the summer of 1968, on August 24 and September 8, three months after experiencing one of his last sorrows, de Gaulle had his final joy: the first two thermonuclear devices exploded, confirming Dautray's hypotheses. Their power was significantly in the megaton range. One of them, using plutonium, performed as well as the other, using enriched uranium. So, Pierrelatte could indeed have been dispensed with, at least for the bomb, just as giant computers had been dispensed with…
If high-level scientists, through the highly advanced studies they had already conducted in 1966-1967, had provided the elements of a synthesis; if Dautray had the capacity to quickly assimilate and master all the disciplines necessary for this synthesis; if Robert Hirsch had elegantly overcome the blockages that could have been caused by a revolt of the old guard against the new; if Maurice Schumann, my successor, had the merit of steadfastly maintaining the given directions against all odds — it still ultimately falls to de Gaulle and him alone to be credited with obstinately insisting on going all the way.
On non-proliferation
Council meeting of February 22, 1967.
Couve informs us about "the big issue of the moment."
Couve: “The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has taken up the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It's a proposal from the United States, which they complement with detailed provisions regarding control, to be entrusted to the agency in Vienna. It would be organized industrial espionage on the entire nuclear industry, to the benefit of the Americans and the Russians. There have been strong reactions from states that have or are preparing a nuclear industry, such as Canada, India, Sweden, and Italy. The Germans, in particular, are disappointed, irritated. This also proves that, despite commitments and good words, the Germans have always had ulterior motives regarding the possession of atomic weapons.”
CDG: "The issue of nuclear non-proliferation strikes at the heart of the matter. Either we truly disarm and for everyone. But the Americans don't want to. Or we simply keep others out of the arms race. But that's just bluffing and it elicits reactions. For us, the question is one of disarmament. Therefore, we do not participate in discussions on non-proliferation.
Furthermore, the German ulterior motives are clearly evident. But if they were not to remain mere thoughts, if the Germans were to claim and assert aspirations for nuclear weapons, we would oppose it. Everything else, meaning what is done outside of disarmament, is just showoff. What needs to be emphasized is that this conference, despite all the noise surrounding it, is not a conference on disarmament.”
[…]
Council meeting of March 8, 1967.
Couve explains how, regarding the multilateral issue of non-proliferation, the Americans and the Russians have just added another issue that concerns only them: that of anti-missile missiles. Without delving into this subject at all, the General speaks with sudden seriousness.
CDG: “I believe that sooner or later, under penalty of death (he emphasized the words), we will have to address the crucial question of atomic disarmament. This is one of the reasons why, in anticipation of this fateful debate, we must have atomic weapons to have a full say in the matter.”
He has so often proclaimed that the construction of our atomic force guarantees us peace, that it is surprising. But for some time now, since this force has become a reality, he has been measuring its significance.
