Jacques Foccart on May 1968 - Part II
From the Elysée audio diary of Jacques Foccart
Jacques Foccart was the only person to have spoken with General de Gaulle on a daily basis during the ten years and four months of his presidential tenure. He was officially General Secretary of the Elysée for African and Malagasy affairs. He also was, unofficially, his advisor on domestic policies and in charge of relations with the Gaullist movement, and its leaders. From January 1965 until the death of Georges Pompidou in 1974, he maintained an audio diary.
Every entry was dictated by Foccart on a recorder. At the beginning of each reel, he repeated or paraphrased the following:
“I ask from those who will have the opportunity to make use of these documents later on to do it in the spirit that animates me, that is to say for historical purposes. It is possible that certain opinions on this or that man may be difficult to admit, may even be difficult, for their relatives; I will have reported them out of a duty of sincerity, and I ask that these elements never be used in a spirit of controversy or disparagement.”
All of General de Gaulle’s quotes will be rendered in italic.
Wednesday, May 1st, 1968 — Houphouët-Boigny at Luzarches.
On May 1st, I stay at Luzarches. I have invited Houphouët-Boigny. Houphouët, his wife, his ambassador, and his aide-de-camp come for lunch. Obviously, it makes for a large entourage since they are accompanied by about twenty people, including drivers and security chiefs, who are white, and all the bodyguards, who are black. The lunch is very pleasant, and the conversation with Houphouët is extremely interesting. I truly believe that we are like two brothers, on the same wavelength. We discuss African problems without hiding anything from each other. I took the liberty of sharing a number of considerations about his politics with him and of giving him, in a somewhat veiled manner, some advice: “In the past, you prepared your affairs better. Now, you are neglecting the contacts through intermediaries that you used to practice. I believe that if your relations with Upper Volta and with other countries of the Entente are not as good, it is because they have the impression that you present them with a fait accompli. Because of their touchiness, they react badly.” Surprisingly, Houphouët justified himself: “Yes, but at such a moment I did such a thing, for such a reason.” He told me that he would take my remarks into account.
Thursday, May 2nd, 1968 — “This is never-ending!”
The audience is quite short. The General is annoyed, I don't know why. I remind him that he will see Houphouët the next day at 3:30 P.M. He gives me a tirade to which I am accustomed:
“This is never-ending, they come, they come back, they are always here; and then we have to welcome them and see them off, and it never ends.”
“General, certainly, this is the third time Houphouët has come this year, but generally, they come once a year, sometimes twice.”
“Given their number, it's unbearable.”
“Yes, but given the interests it represents…”
He makes a face, but I am convinced that he agrees with me, and I add: “I think the Americans or the British would be happy if Washington or London were visited in this manner.”
It seems to me that the argument is good: “Yes, but still, it’s tiring, it’s unbearable.”
“Believe me, General…”
“But there is still Eyadéma1! You're sticking me with another lunch!”
“Well, yes! Believe me: I'm not forcing it, on the contrary, I'm limiting them, but there are things I can't spare you from”
Very quickly, because he seems exasperated, I speak to him about the meeting in Port-Gentil between Bongo, Massemba-Debat, and Ahidjo. He makes no comments. I tell him that they will meet again on May 8th to take a position regarding Chad and the CAR.
I speak to him about the election in Dahomey next Sunday:
“Pff… It's all smoke and mirrors…”
I mention that Eyadéma was received in Lagos and that d'Arboussier will be appointed ambassador of Senegal.
Poujade will run in the special elections in Dijon, for the municipal council, but he thinks he will have the former rector of Dijon, Bouchard2, against him, and it will not be easy. “Well, if he must be defeated, let him not run; if he does not want to, he only has to not go.”
“General, that is not at all the way to approach the problem. I am simply informing you, because it is my duty to tell you that the race will not be easy. He will not give up: there is a risk of him being defeated by a coalition that will be highly criticizable, but in the end, it could achieve its goals.”
Then, I speak about the audience with De Broglie3, asking if there is anything particular. “No. He came to assure me of his loyalty, which I do not believe at all. He talked my ear off about receiving Giscard, and that, I do not think I should do.”
“In my opinion, no, to the extent that they have now engaged in battle and we will have to explain ourselves in the next elections.”
“That is exactly what I think, and I will not receive him. As for De Broglie, he claims to be loyal; but, you know, the best of them, once they become deputies, are no longer the same, and that is the case for all of them.”
Friday, May 3rd, 1968 — Arms for the Biafrans? Vietnam War.
I talk about the audience with Houphouët. “There is nothing particular to say about it that you do not already know.” Nevertheless, the General asks me to see to what extent, within what limits, and in what way we could provide some arms and ammunition to the Biafrans, who are very much in need, arms and ammunition that would be delivered to Houphouët and which he would then handle. (There are certain things that I cannot dictate here, as they are known only to the General, Pompidou, Messmer, and myself.) He then tells me that, in their opinion, Guillaumat4 is not giving enough to the Biafrans. “General, Guillaumat has already given quite a bit, but he is waiting.” Then the General, with a good smile, says to me: “Yes, he is waiting to see which way the balance will tip.”
“Well, yes. For the moment, legally, it is still Lagos that must collect the duties, but Guillaumat has made an effort for Biafra.”
“We must do something through the French Red Cross. They must help Biafra because these poor people lack medicines and all sorts of supplies. We must send aid workers there, and their presence will at least make the others hesitate to bomb so ferociously.”
He then writes instructions, which he hands to me, saying: “Here, you will put this note in front of someone at the Quai d'Orsay; and take care of it.”
Francis Huré, the former ambassador to Cameroon, who has just left his post, is back and at the General's disposal. “I will see him later.”
Terrenoire must come on Monday to see the General. “I am simply informing you,” I say, “that it would be useful to advise him, in his own interest, to take more care of his constituency, in general.”
“Why?”
“Because he is very dedicated to European affairs.”
“They are all the same!”
“The voters have the impression that he does not take care of them enough; so we will have to be careful for the next elections.”
“That does not surprise me. It’s always the same! They are deputies, and as soon as they have an opportunity to escape, they no longer do what they should.”
“I am not saying that, but we must warn him.”
I come to the Vietnam issue: “The Vietnam affair appears to be something quite enormous. I have received many phone calls.” The Vietnam affair was — I had learned in the afternoon — that the Americans and the Vietnamese had finally agreed that their meeting to negotiate peace would take place in Paris. This had provoked a very strong reaction in France, and my phone had not stopped ringing.
Then, the General interrupts me with a rather satisfied smile: “They consider this as a French victory.”
“Yes, some deputies, like Henri Rey, wanted to write to you to tell you how happy they were. They all consider it to be, ultimately, proof of endorsement of your policy, since Paris is the place of the possible meeting. This justifies your positions.”
The General does not react.
“You know, if this is well exploited, without exaggeration, it can have a very good influence on public opinion, which will be reflected in the polls.”
“That is possible, but all this is just beginning.”
Sunday, I will go to Rânes and to Francheville for the annual mass in memory of Leguerney. It is the meeting place for the people of my resistance network. Twenty-four years later, it is touching to see people gather. Alas, now many are represented by their sons, as age and often the rigors of deportation have gradually reduced their numbers.
Sunday, May 5th, 1968
I went to the mass in Francheville. I left in the morning, my wife being ill and unable to come, only with Odette Leguerney. This mass, as always, is moving. If it is true that those who fought by my side are fewer and fewer, there is really an astonishing phenomenon: their children and even their grandchildren come in greater numbers. This is how I saw one of Martinez's daughters, who had sheltered me during the war. Martinez is dead, I had not seen his daughter since her marriage, celebrated just after the Liberation, and she came with her son in uniform, as he is doing his military service. There are many similar cases. The church is occupied at least four-fifths by the veterans of my network. I meet them all with joy. For once, they are not asking for things, and I feel they are always close around me.
Monday, May 6th, 1968 — Djibouti. Dahomey. Bokassa. Rodrigues Island: “All these territories, all these countries that England has stolen from us...”
I report on the attack against Ali Aref in Djibouti. The driver was killed and Aref suffered some scratches. One of the perpetrators of the attack, a Gadabourssi, who had been released by the justice system after being arrested for an attempted attack, has already been caught. Two or three Somalis have also been arrested. For my part, I feared reactions from the Afars, who would not fail to want to avenge their chief. I refrain from saying that the high commissioner is in Paris. I spoke to Billotte about it: “It is your responsibility; if I were you, I would have him return.” But I do not want to appear, in the eyes of the General, to be bypassing Billotte and passing a negative judgment on him. I present to the General the text of a telegram addressed to the high commissioner: “I would be grateful if you would kindly communicate to President Aref,” etc. The General — I must say he is not in a very good mood — takes this text: “What is this?” He then angrily corrects. “What is this? You are making me say to the high commissioner that I am grateful to him; I am not to be grateful to him; he must simply obey.”
“General, not at all, if you read the text until the end, it is a telegram sent with my signature and where your own text is cited; it is me who is grateful!”
“Well! That’s the same thing: you are not to be grateful to the high commissioner.”
He uttered this formula, barely imaginable, I could not believe my ears:
“You are directly after me and, consequently, well before the high commissioner, and you are not to be grateful: you give him orders, and you tell him ‘Do give.’”
As for the rest of the telegram, he modified a certain number of things. I talk about the presidential elections in Dahomey.
[unintelligible passage]
And then, all of a sudden, he throws out: “I hope that we are not giving them money.”
“No, it’s still blocked.”
“So, how are they managing?”
“The best they can. I precisely saw the president of the Central Bank, he told me they were almost a month late in paying stipends.”
“Always the same thing; since December, I am told that if we don’t immediately give them money, it’s bankruptcy. We are in the month of May and they are still holding on. You see; we must hold on.”
“Yes, but if they are able to form a government, we must reconsider the matter.”
“I am not saying, but for the moment, out of the question to give in; they must become reasonable.”
Mali and Guinea decided to reopen their embassies in the CAR, after they explained that they decided to close them on principle due to economic reasons, but in reality because of disputes; evidently there was a reconciliation.
As for the Central African president Bokassa, he puts us on notice from exploiting his uranium mines,
“I think we must keep our commitments, because in this case, we made commitments.”
“Yes, indeed, when a promise is made, it must be kept.”
“Furthermore, the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] considers that it’s interesting.”
“Then what are we waiting for? Why has the CEA not started anything? It’s ridiculous, to stall like this. It’s ridiculous to be wrong like this.”
“The CEA has not started anything because of the Niger uranium mines, which occupy it considerably.”
“Yes, but it’s dangerous: if it continues like this, we’re going to get blown out in this case. They must ensure that what is necessary is done. But this Bokassa, clearly, is conducting himself very badly. You put a telegram from him the other day…”
Indeed, eight days prior, I attached to the file a telegram in which Bokassa declared that he would not select anyone to attend the festivities of July 14th.
“That’s not proper at all and, consequently, I decide to remove two sections that we have placed at his disposal; kindly bring them back home.”
I began to discuss it, it lasted three minutes, a rather bitter discussion:
“General, I am asking you for a delay.”
“Always, always the same thing! Always wait, always compose, always discuss.”
“No, this cannot be done now, not in the least because it’s a game we’re playing in relation to the Tombalbaye affair, and that Tombalbaye has just reconnected with our new ambassador, that therefore there is something positive. If we take a position vis-à-vis Bokassa, Tombalbaye will feel supportive of him and everything will once again be called into question.”
“No! All of that, it’s a bunch of stories. It’s weakness!”
Twice over, during this discussion, which, once again, lasted only three or four minutes, which is rather long, the General moves his hand forward to take a piece of paper and put an order in writing. The second time, I tell him:
“General, listen, it is a delay I am asking you for. Give me the possibility to play this round, and, naturally, if he doesn’t change course, if his conduct stays the same, obviously, the troops will have to be pulled out. But once again, not right now!”
The general accepts, seemingly exasperated.
Then I bring up the Rodrigues Island. Immediately, he gets excited about the matter. Rodrigues is a little island 500 kilometers east of Mauritius. It counts a population of around twenty-five thousand inhabitants, almost all descendants of French colonists and their black slaves. I expose:
“The island is very poor. It organized a political protest to refuse its attachment to Mauritius. Thinking it could obtain some independence, it carried a campaign with an appeal to the UN. All of this was done in the name of France and in the name of General de Gaulle, acclaimed by the populations, because they are Francophones.”
The General, to whom I delivered a note last week had written on it:
“Foccart will talk to me about this case.”
I thus talk to him about it, with maps, because as soon as he is shown maps, the General is completely enthusiast. He puts his glasses on:
“Show me that.”
I first indicate to him the location of the Rodrigues Island in the Indian Ocean, and then I show him a detailed map of the island, where we can see that it is surrounded by much smaller islands with French names such as Ile aux Crabes, Ile Sainte-Catherine, Ile Marianne, etc.
“It is a very arid island, very poor, and that does not want to tie its fate with that of Mauritius.”
“But yet, during the referendum, they voted 98% their attachment to Great Britain.”
“Yes, but what they wished, it was either to remain attached to Great Britain, or to take back their independence. It is in that perspective that they turn towards France. They do not wish to remain a dependence of Mauritius, which evolved differently and was occupied by the Indians. In fact, they refuse to be under the control of the Indians.”
“Yes, I understand; we must send them someone. First off, do they come here from time to time?”
“Yes, sometimes one of their representatives passed by: that’s how a certain Olliveri was received by someone at the Quai during his visit to Paris.”
“By who?”
“I have not been able to get his name yet, but by someone that’s not very important. Perhaps we could send them someone from the Quai?”
“No, not the Quai! The Quai will be incapable to do that properly. No, we must send someone from La Réunion, someone from the Prefectoral corps.”
“It’s becoming a little complicated and it will make a lot of noise.”
“What does that matter? Is there an airfield?”
“No, to my knowledge there isn’t one, there is a port, but I do not know what the means of communication are.”
Seeing that the General is going to give me pretty radical instructions, I add:
“What I could do, if you want, is to talk about it to Evenou5, who was commander for a while in that sector and that while based in Mauritius, took La Réunion in the name of Free France. He must surely know Rodrigues Island, and I’ll see about it with him.”
“Oh yes, that’s a very good idea. In any case, follow this. You see, these territories, all these countries that England nicked off of us — because she did nick them off of us — we must take them back. It is thus that, for Quebec, we are beginning to do what must be done. Rodrigues Island, we will also have to take care of it; the Anglo-Norman islands, one day or another, we will have to take them back. We have allowed ourselves to be nicked all this with weakness, but all of this is intolerable.”
“Except Mauritius?”
“Mauritius too, Mauritius was French.”
“I know that very well, but General, you are laying out unsolvable economic problems. Remember that Maritius produces 600,000 to 700,000 tons of sugar, when we don’t know where to put our 500,000 tons. Really, we cannot take all of this on right now.”
“That, we’ll see about it later, but inform yourself on the matter of Rodrigues Island. Follow this up very closely and keep me updated.”
Tuesday, May 7th, 1968 — Attack in Djibouti. Biafra. Unease among the students.
I have lunch on rue de Prony6 around Mgr Gouet, with Roger Frey, Jean Charbonnel, Henri Rey, Pierre Bas7, etc. During this lunch, there is lots of talk about the relations between Gaullists and the clergy. What Mgr Gouet said about it is rather sad on what relates to the clergy, whose hierarchy has lot a lot of its authority and which no longer enjoys a sufficient moral credit to have a serious influence on opinion. It is, in any case, very interesting.
The evening, I give to the General a few indications on the attack against Ali Aref, in Djibouti. Aref recognized the four aggressors, of which three have been arrested. He was brave, since he immediately went to the port to clearly show to the Afars that he was alive and cut off all rumors. He attended the funeral of the driver.
“What? Already?”
“In these countries, the funeral happens on the same day; the attack happened in the morning, the funeral happens in the evening. Aref made a good statement on the radio and, this evening, he goes on television.”
“He’s a good man and, indeed, he acted with courage, but I don’t know what the aftermath will be.”
“The aftermath is probably going to be very rough, because in these countries blood is only repaid by blood and, right now, it’s certain that the Afars tried to take revenge. On that note, General, you have, in principle, fixed an audience on the 22nd with Ibrahim Egal, the Somalian Prime Minister, and it’s certain that over there, it will be considered as a statement.”
“No! I cannot call that into question, that is not possible, we cannot take into account every possible consequences every time; besides the government of Somalia is full of good intentions and I must be able to confirm it in its dispositions.”
“Yes, but in the end, it will be interpreted nonetheless as a significant act.”
“I cannot help it. Besides, it depends on the manner in which it will be presented on the ground. We must arrange it so that it doesn’t appear as a capitulation of any kind. And then, it would even have a displeasing aspect if, after this attack, I did not maintain this audience; I would look like I was saying that the Somalian government was implicated, whereas nothing can indicate this. In these conditions, the audience will take place, and make sure there are no disagreeable consequences over there.”
On what relates to what the General asked for the French Red Cross in Biafra, the Quai d’Orsay solicited it, but it strictly has no means. Therefore, the Quai can release two million old francs to send a few medicines. There are problems that must be fixed for the transport and escort. I thus asked the Quai an extremely precise note, which will be given to me tomorrow, and then we will be able to make decisions: “Very well; we must do something and then, it must be made known.”
“Houphouët-Boigny wants to communicate to you the text of his press conference on Biafra, which he will hold in two days.”
I thought the General was going to answer me that he did not need to be aware of this text. On the contrary, he accepts.
Finally, I say a word on the student unease: “My impression is not good, because spirits are rather heated.” I add that I will go, right now, see youth from the UJP8, where there are students, and I will report to him tomorrow. “Fine! Fine!” he answers me without worrying further.
The evening, I have that dinner — we cannot say dinner-debate because it’s just the UJP bureau — at the House of Latin America. Of course, the conversation on the events relating to the students, on the protests; I find people rather decided to react, but still rather struck by the general atmosphere. It’s not very good; they are very resolute, but I sense there is some unease. When leaving the dinner, I find boulevard Saint-Germain completely filled with officers, arriving quickly, because all the students are coming this way, and to get back home, I have to drive my car not only on the pavement, but also on the wrong side of the road.
Wednesday, May 8th, 1968 — Foccart in the Quartier Latin. Biafra. Central Africa.
I promised to Vic-Dupont that I would go attend his inaugural lesson as professor of medicine, rue de l’École de Médecine, which makes it so I cannot go to the General’s audience. The day before in the evening, I let him know: “General, tomorrow it will not be me who will come for the audience, it will be Journiac, because I will attend the inaugural lesson of Vic-Dupont.”
“Ah yes, it’s him who treated Léon Mba. But actually, that chair, isn’t he already tenured since it was created by Léon Mba?”
“I don’t think so; I don’t know what connection there is.”
I checked, and the General was perfectly right, which is fantastic. When you think about all the problems that must be taken care of, he follows all of it in the tiniest detail. Vic-Dupont is indeed tenured of the chair created by the Léon Mba Foundation.
I did not go either to the May 8th ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe, whereas I always attend. It’s Journiac who replaced me. I therefore went to this inaugural lesson; there was a rather curious atmosphere in the Latin Quarter, where people, well some of them, were surprised to see me arrive casually by car, whereas there were quite a few protests on the streets. It went very well for Vic-Dupont.
The General and Journiac dealt with the problem of the recognition of Biafra by the Gabonese government; he approved it:
“It’s very good. Bongo is a courageous guy who does what he says, which is pretty rare! As for the aid of the French Red Cross to Biafra, I have a note from the Quai. Medicine must naturally be sent on the ground through the intermediary of the delegation of Biafra and, if possible, they should be brought there by the Red Cross agents. I had them add thirty thousand francs from my personal fund on top of the twenty thousand that the Quai can make use of.”
At that moment, he called La Chevalerie: “You will deliver to Foccart thirty thousand francs for the Red Cross.”
Then he continued by telling Journiac: “I took note of Colonel Ojukwu’s letter9. Did it come through the intermediary of the elected officials of Biafra?”
Journiac answered that this was not the case.
“Then we will have to make it known in some time that Colonel Ojukwu wrote to General de Gaulle to describe him the situation in Biafra, and that he has acknowledged the letter by informing him that he was full of attention for the suffering of the Biafran people. It should be brought up to me again after Houphouët-Boigny will have himself recognized Biafra.”
The General returned the Quai’s note with the handwritten mention: “For the French Red Cross, must directly see the representative of Biafra and send him what he wishes as soon as possible (personnel and materal) and that we are able to send.”
The General brought up the Central African problem. He got back to the fact that Bokassa refused to send representatives for the July 14th ceremony. At that moment, Journiac, quite inappropriately, said: “But this morning, Foccart, thinking about the matter, said that he was taking into account the assassination attempt of which he believed he was the target by President Dacko with the help of the Quai d’Orsay, which got him invited to the ceremonies of July 14th, 196510.
So the General asked Journiac what that was really about.
“What we know,” replied Journiac, “is that he was invited. Now, to know whether there were ulterior motives, that’s possible.”
Thursday, May 9th, 1968 — Students: de Gaulle is not worried. Misc.
There is, at the Elysée, a reception of about twenty prefects from the south-east: Provence, Côte d’Azur, Hautes-Alpes, all that region and some prefects from the Center. Always very classic lunch, at the end of which the General raises a toast. He receives all these prefects that I see, me too, on the side. Of all this, what comes out is that the General does not have the impression that on the matter of the students the situation is very concerning.
The evening, I speak to him of the audience of Eyadéma set for the next day. I show him the table plan. I tell him that I have the intention of adding Barrère, chargé de mission11: “Yes, do what you want,” he says very kindly.
The press conference of Houphouët-Boigny happened in a very favorable atmosphere for Biafra.
“I read it, it’s not bad. Where did it happen?”
“At the Orsay palace, I believe.” But I was wrong, it was at his embassy.
I bring up the Kampala meeting, in Uganda, where the Nigerians and the Biafrans must meet.
“But is it decided?”
“I think so; that’s my impression from all the press releases.”
“Good, it is a good thing.”
I then mention a rather difficult situation in Congo-Brazzaville, no doubt due to the opposition of the Far Left.
On that note, I indicate, on the subject of the students that I saw the day before, that the youth of the UJP gave me a really good impression, but that I felt unease in all this youth and that we must really pay attention to it.
“They expressed the wish that their bureau be received.”
“How many are they?”
“Seven or eight, they are good guys. There’s Grossmann12, the president; there’s a vice president, the general secretaries; they’re valuable young guys, and I think they must be encouraged. Indisputably, they are all very convinced Gaullists.
“Fine, yes! I mean, of course. I’ll see them after my trip to Romania.”
During the evening, the situation, as I feared, got worse in the Latin Quarter; protests, bad atmosphere, tendency towards anarchy, all of this leaves me with an unpleasant impression.
Friday, May 10th, 1968 — Eyadéma. “Order must be maintained.” Fouchet flustered. Improvised summit meeting at the ministry of the Interior.
At 8:30, I go see General Eyadéma at his hotel, le Royal Monceau. The ambience is excellent. Next, I have my photograph taken by the AFP, as it’s been years that agencies ask me for photos. I didn’t want to, because I have no taste for publicity, but I realized that I was wrong, because people use anything whatsoever, often very bad pictures.
Then there is the reception of Eyadéma who visits the General at 11:30, and lunch, which happens in a very good ambience, the General seemingly unaffected by this student fuss.
The afternoon, I go see the youth of the UJP. I keep myself as informed as possible.
The evening, I go see the General: when the situation is rather serious, he does not want to give the impression that he is worried and he happily lingers, perhaps with more calm and attention, on the other problems. That is how, as I often said, when, the evening after the audience of a President, I ask: “Is there anything in particular?”, the General answers: “No, nothing special. I mean you know very well what it’s about.”, etc. Here, on the contrary, for Eyadéma, whereas it’s not very important, the General, with much precision, tells me:
“I saw Eyadéma; he’s a guy who seems determined, he seems courageous. He asked me a certain number of things. He explained to me that he wanted tanks, because, he says, — that, you’ll verify it, I don’t know if it’s true —, we offered them to him. Eyadéma feels mortified to not have them, whereas the heads of state of the Entente have a few tank units, or a few tanks; so see to it. There has to be somewhere a few that we don’t use anymore and that could be of use over there; we must help him! He also asked me for a plane.”
“Last time, he already asked you for one, and you accepted. You cannot give him a plane every time he shows up.”
“Yes, but I mean he wants the Broussard replaced as it doesn’t work anymore. Then he talked to me about the issue of phosphates. He considers that it’s not profitable enough. I am rather tempted to believe him, as the companies we have over there seek most of all, and it’s in their nature, to gain as much as possible without sometimes realizing that they are killing the golden goose. So, we must take a look and see what we can do.”
“Yes, I was given a note on the subject.”
“I know, he told me; so, see to it, see what we can do and do it.”
I got a phone call from Houphouët: the recognition of Biafra will occur next Wednesday.
“That’s very good.”
“And he sees Diori on Sunday.”
In Dahomey, the election was cancelled and it’s fully deadlocked. There also, the General talks to me with indulgence about Dahomey, of what is happening there, and assures once again that we won’t allow ourselves to be intimidated.
The Quai d’Orsay sends a telegram that I consider good, asking for explanations from Tombalbaye and from Bokassa on the defense accords signed with Mobutu.
On that note, the General, by himself, asks me what I think of the situation. “For the students,” I say, “the case seems to me rather difficult because a rather insurrectional atmosphere is sprouting, an atmosphere of anarchy that gives me a bad impression. In principle, next Tuesday, the students and the unions are set for a big protest. Amidst all this, there are rather demagogical efforts, such as that of René Capitant13, who is taking a position on the amnesty.”
The general is surprised. “The amnesty?”
“Yes, the amnesty of the students.”
“Ah, yes.”
The General seemed to think that it was the problem of the amnesty that was crucial in this whole thing.
“There are a few guys who are agitating. Souchal, for example, is at this very moment submitting an amendment on the collective budget and Debré will most likely have to ask for a blocked vote.”
“Who on earth is this Souchal?”
“You know him well, he’s a good guy, he’s the deputy of Nancy and Fouchet’s14 running mate.”
“But why did Fouchet pick him as running mate?”
“It’s not Fouchet who picked him, it’s Souchal, who was incumbent.”
“That’s right.”
Coming back to the students, the General tells me: “Listen, we’ll see. In any case, we have what we need to face it: order must be maintained, there’s no question about it. And then we’ll see how things evolve.”
I go Rue de Solferino, where I have a meeting with the steering committee of the Service d’Action Civique. It’s about preparing the meeting of the regional delegates also set at Rue de Solferino, tomorrow. We have here an interesting session where I sense very determined boys, truly authentic activists. We have dinner together at the restaurant Le Solferino and I go back home around 11 P.M. Before sending my car away, I tell my driver to wait, while I make a phone call to Fouchet. Indeed, as we were leaving the restaurants, rumors were circulating that students had begun a big protest. I ask Fouchet:
“How is it going?”
“Where are you,” he asks me. “Can you come?”
“Sure, I can come around.”
I reach Fouchet, who is alone. This, is for History and I write it in complete objectivity and without any ulterior motives: the judgements that I hold here translate well what I then thought. Fouchet is a bit “flustered”, asking himself questions; he does not have, in my eyes, a sufficient determination. He tells me: “This situation is serious… Those guys! How can they this? How can they that?”, anyway he is a bit angry. I tell him: “We have to see. Anyway, we must, of course, avoid any confrontations. We must avoid clashes, but we can’t fall into anarchy either. Consequently, there will be a point where we’ll probably have to do something.”
On that note, Fouchet receives a phone call from Michel Debré: “I am leaving my ministry. I’m heading home. What’s new?” Fouchet tells him: “We are talking about it with Jacques. Do you want to have a drink with us?” Debré accepts, arrives, and begins to chat. At that moment, Joxe, who is acting Prime Minister15 as Pompidou is in Iran, calls: “I will leave my ministry, I’m heading home. I am letting you know. So, how is it going?”
“Well,” says Fouchet, “I’m discussing it with Foccart and Debré; do you want to come as well?”
“Gladly,” says Joxe.
Obviously, this meeting is entirely normal, but we didn’t realize it — we know, but never keep it in mind enough — that journalists are in the press room of the Ministry of the Interior facing us, and that they saw us come in, which will result, afterwards, in many comments. Finally, for Tricot it was the same thing. Tricot, now informed, says: “I’m coming.”
It is at this moment that we began to talk of barricades which may set themselves up, or of the intention of building up barricades. I want to be very clear and precise. Debré was probably there and Joxe as well, but I don’t know if Tricot had already arrived. I took a categorical position because I felt that Fouchet was very uncertain, saying: “But come on, I don’t know if the police,” etc. I tell him: “Listen, Christian, I am absolutely positive. This is the second time that I will pronounce the same sentence and in circumstances which I consider to be very serious. The first time, it was January 22nd, 1960, the barricades were put up in Algiers and that sentence costed very dearly for my reputation, but too bad, because it’s in the national interest that I pronounced it. I said: ‘Daylight must not rise on barricades.’ And that’s when Beaufort called me up and it’s from that moment that I was insulted by leaflets: ‘Foccart wants the end of the army.’ I told Beaufort that there was no problem and Beaufort was very violent. So I tell you the same thing: it must be avoided that barricades set themselves up. In any case, if anything were to occur, put up the necessary reinforcements, because it is not possible, believe me, it is not possible that daylight rises on barricades in Paris. Otherwise it is an entire insurrectional affair that begins. You cannot know where it will end: people will be comforted during the day, resupplied, more numerous and then you will face a situation where you will no longer be able to act.”
“Ah!” says Fouchet, “that’s easy to say.”
“Yes, but well, that’s what it is, maintaining order.”
“Fine! Fine!”
I must say that Debré spoke in the same line: “Jacques is perfectly right, it is not possible to allow barricades to constitute themselves and in any case it is not possible to allow barricades tomorrow morning…”
On that note, we spoke of the state of mind, the conversation interrupted by phone call, by information that was coming in. For the barricades, Joxe, even though he was acting as Prime Minister, did not take a position. We got to a sort of consensus. The issue, is that there was at that moment, in the protests, and behind the few barricades which began to set themselves up, very young people. Fouchet’s idea, but well it was everyone’s, was that it would be dangerous, and psychologically very bad, to charge at very young elements. I made a proposition:
“Let’s wait for the last metro: those who will stay will be the militants, enraged ones, and you won’t risk anything.”
It was said: “Yes, indeed! At what time does the last metro leave?”
“It leaves at 12:45 A.M. It’s at that moment, I think, that we should act.”
Dannaut16 said that, according to him, it would be better to wait until 2 A.M.: “Well alright, that, that’s your affair, but beware!”
Gabriel d'Arboussier, director for information and research at the UN, had been considered for the general directorship of the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) in October 1967. Supported by Senghor, he had ultimately been defeated in the election.
Marcel Bouchard was the rector of the Academy of Dijon from 1946 to 1968.
Jean de Broglie is the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Pierre Guillaumat, a former minister of De Gaulle, is the president of the Elf company. As such, he must pay oil royalties to Nigeria. A portion has already been paid to Biafra. At the beginning of October 1967, De Gaulle advised Guillaumat to drag things out.
Admiral Jules-Richard Evenou, companion of the Liberation, is inspector general of the Navy.
Jacques Foccart’s Parisian apartment is on Rue de Prony, in the 17th arrondissement.
Mgr Gouet is auxiliary bishop of Paris, Pierre Bas, former administrator of France in the overseas territories and Jacques Foccart’s former chargé de mission, is deputy of Paris.
Union des Jeunes pour le Progrès, created in 1965, regroups youth from the UNR-UDT and the Gaullist Student Action
Colonel Ojukwu is the president of the secessionist State of Biafra.
At the time, David Dacko was President of the Republic, and Jean-Bedel Bokassa Army Chief of Staff.
Gérard Barrère is administrative affairs advisor to Jacques Foccart’s general secretariat.
Robert Grossmann is the youngest general councilor elected in these last elections. He was previously received by General de Gaulle on December 20th, 1967.
René Capitant is the head of the Left-Gaullists.
Fouchet is the Minister of the Interior.
Louis Joxe is the Minister of Justice
Jean-Pierre Dannaud, former head of cultural and technical cooperation at the Ministry of Cooperation, is the head of cabinet of Christian Fouchet.